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1 Introduction
The rapid growth of digital electronics technology has led to the proliferation of sophisti-
cated computer systems capable of achieving very high reliability requirements. Reliability
requirements for computer systems used in military aircraft, for example, are typically in the
range of 1 - 10 -r per mission, and reliability requirements of 1 - 10 -9 for a 10-hour flight
are often expressed for flight-crucial avionics systems. To achieve such optimistic reliability
goals, computer systems have been designed to recognize and tolerate their own faults; i.e.
fault-tolerant computer systems. Although capable of tolerating certain faults, these systems
are still susceptible to failure. Thus, the reliability of these systems must be evaluated to
ensure that requirements are met.
The reliability analysis of a fault-tolerant computer system is a complex problem. A life-
testing approach is typically used to determine the reliability or "lifetime" of a diversity of
products such as light bulbs, batteries, and electronic devices. The life-testing methodology
is clearly impractical, though, for computer systems with reliability goals of the order 1 -
10 -7 or higher; hence, an alternate approach is necessary. The approach generally taken to
investigate the reliability of a highly reliable system is
1. develop a mathematical reliability model of the system
2. measure or estimate the parameters of the model
3. compute system reliability based upon the model and the specified parameters.
The estimated system reliability is consequently strongly dependent on the model itself.
Since the behavior of a fault-tolerant, highly reliable system is complex, formulating models
that accurately represent that behavior can be a difficult task. Mathematical models of
fault-tolerant systems must capture the processes that lead to system failure and the system
capabilities which enable operation in the presence of failing components. Since current
manufacturing techniques cannot produce circuitry with adequate reliability to meet ultra-
high reliability requirements, highly reliable systems use redundancy techniques, such as
parallel redundant units or dissimilar algorithms for computing the same function, to achieve
their fault tolerance. Reconfiguration, the process of removing faulty components and either
replacing them with spares or degrading to an alternate configuration, is another method
often utilized to increase reliability without the overhead of more redundancy. Fortunately,
most of the detailed instruction-level activities of a system do not directly affect system
reliability. Only the "macroscopic" fault-related events must be included in the reliability
model.
Furthermore, experimentally testing the correctness of the model would require at least
as much experimentation as is required for life testing! Consequently, the best that can be
done is to carefully develop the reliability model and subject it to scrupulous scrutiny by
a team of experts. The process of reliability modeling is thus not an exact science, and at
best, should be called an art. It is the goal of this paper to look into this "craft" of reliability
modeling.
The paper is structured in a tutorial style rather than as a catalog of reliability models.
Consequently, elementary concepts are introduced first which are followed by increasingly
more complex concepts. Thus, the paper begins with an overview of essential aspects of
Markov models. Next, the fundamental techniques used for modeling the non-reconfigurable
systems are developed. Then, the basic techniques used in modeling reconfigurable systems
are explored. Before pressing on to more complicated models, the computer program SURE
(Semi-Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator) [8], which can be used to solve the reliability
models numerically, is introduced. Next, the two basic types of reconfiguration--degradation
and sparing--are examined in more detail with the help of the SURE input language. At this
point, the paper introduces a new language for describing reliability models--the ASSIST
language. This is necessary since the models presented in the later sections are very large
and complex. If they were defined by enumerating the states and transitions of the model ex-
haustively, the reader would become exhausted. The expressiveness of the ASSIST language
allows complex models to be defined in a succint and economical manner. Next, complex
systems consisting of multiple triads using various forms of reconfiguration are investigated.
Then the techniques used to model transient and intermittent faults are presented. The next
section explores the techniques used to model the components of control system architectures
including sensors, buses, actuators, etc. Finally, some specialized topics, such as sequence
dependencies, phased missions, and non-constant failure rate models, are presented.
2 Introduction to Markov Modeling
Traditionally, the reliability analysis of a complex system consisting of many components has
been accomplished using combinatorial mathematics. The standard "fault tree" method of
reliability analysis is based on such mathematics. Unfortunately, the fault-tree approach is
incapable of analyzing systems where reconfiguration is possible. In reconfigurable systems
the critical factor often becomes the effectiveness of the dynamic reconfiguration process. It
is necessary to model such systems using the more powerful Markov modeling technique.
The system is thus represented as consisting of a vector of attributes which change over
time. A particular set of values of the attributes is called a "state" of the system. These
attributes are typically system characteristics such as the number of working processors, the
number of spare units, the number of faulty units which have not been removed, etc. The
more attributes included in the model, the more complex the model will be. Thus, one
typically tries to choose the smallest set of attributes that can accurately describe the fault-
related behavior of the system. The next step in the modeling process is to characterize the
transition time from one state to another. Since this transition time is rarely deterministic,
the transition times are described using a probability distribution.
Certain states in the system represent system failure, while others represent fault-free
behavior or correct operation in the presence of faults. The model chosen for the system
must represent system failure properly. Defining exactly what constitutes system failure is
difficult because system failure is often an extremely complex function of external events,
software state, and hardware state. The modeler is forced to make either conservative or
non-conservative assumptions about what is system failure. If one wishes to say that the
reliability of the system is higher than a specific value, then conservative assumptions are
made. For example, in a triple modular redundant (TMR) system of computers, the presence
of two faulty computers is considered to be system failure. This is conservative since the two
faults may not actually corrupt data in such a way as to defeat the voter. This assumption
simplifies the model since the probabilities of collusion between the faulty pair does not have
to be modeled. If one wishes to say the reliability is no better than some value, then non-
conservative assumptions are made. For example, the modeler assumes only certain parts of
the system can fail.
It is important that all of the transitions in the reliability model be measurable. This often
is the primary consideration when developing a model for a system. Although a particular
model may elegantly describe the behavior of the system, if it depends upon unmeasurable
parameters, then it is useless.
Typically, the transitions of a fault-tolerant system model fall into two categories: slow
failure transitions and fast recovery transitions. If the states of the model are defined prop-
erly, then the slow transitions can be obtained from field data and/or MIL-STD 217C cal-
culations. The faster transition rates correspond to system responses to fault arrivals and
can be measured experimentally using fault injection. The primary problem is to properly
model the system so as to facilitate the determination of these transitions. If the model is
too coarse the transitions become experimentally unobservable. If the model is too detailed
the number of transitions which must be measured can be exorbitant.
In this introduction some of the issues of reliability modeling have been introduced. The
goal of this paper is to explore the methods and assumptions used in the development of
reliability models for fault-tolerant computer systems.
3 Modeling Non-Reconfigurable Systems
The simplest types of systems to model are non-reconfigurable systems. This section in-
troduces the basic elements of reliability modeling by describing how to model simple non-
reconfigurable systems ranging from a single simplex computer through a majority-voting
N-modularly-redundant (NMR) system.
Figure 1: Model of a SimplexComputer
3.1 Simplex Computer
The first example is a system consisting of a single computer. First, we let T be a random
variable representing the time to failure of the computer. Next, we must define a distribution
for T, say F(t). Typically, it is assumed that electronic components, and consequently
computers, fail according to the exponential distribution:
F(t) = Prob[T < t] = 1- e -at
The parameter A completely defines this distribution. An important concept in reliabihty
modeling is the failure rate (or hazard rate), h(t) defined as follows
h(t) =
For the exponential distribution, the hazard rate h(t) = ._. The exponential is the only
distribution with a constant hazard rate. The Markov model representing this system is
given in figure 1. In this Markov model, state 1 represents the operational state in which the
simplex computer is working, state 2 represents the system failure state in which the simplex
computer has failed, and the transition from state 1 to state 2 represents the occurrence of
the failure of the simplex computer. The transitions of a Markov model are exponential and
thus can be labeled by the constant hazard rate.
For reliability modeling purposes, it is generally assumed that electronic components fail
according to the exponential distribution. Some immature devices may exhibit a somewhat
higher failure rate due to insufficient testing before product delivery; however, mature devices
have been shown experimentally to fail according to the exponential distribution [1]. The
reader is referred to the MIL-STD 217D handbook [2] for a more complete discussion on the
problem of estimating the reliability of electronic components. Once the reliabihty of each
chip in a computer is known, the computer's failure rate is simply the sum of the failure
rates of the individual chips. To see this, suppose 11, _2,..., _. represent the failure rates of
the chips in the computer. Letting T be a random variable representing the time of failure
of the computer, and Ti represent the time the ith chip fails, the distribution of failure for
the computer Fc(t) is determined as follows:
3._ C 2_
Figure 2: Model of a TMR System
v (t) = Prob[T < t]
= Prob[min{T_,T2,...,Tn} < t]
= 1 - Prob[T1 > t,T, > t, .... T, > t]
If we assume that the chips fail independently, we have
Fo(t) = 1 - I]_'=_ Prob[Ti > t]
= 1 - ]-Ii"=l exp(-Ait)
- I- exp(- VTM Ait)
-- ,--,/=1
which is an exponential distribution with failure rate --,i=_
The above technique does not work for parallel redundant systems. The time of failure
of a redundant system is not merely the time that the first chip fails. Such systems will be
examined in the following sections.
3.2 Static Redundancy
The Triple-Modular Redundant (TMR) is one of the simplest hull-tolerant computer archi-
tectures. The system consists of three computers all performing exactly the same computa-
tions on exactly the same inputs. The computers are assumed to be physically isolated such
that a failed computer cannot affect another working computer. Mathematically, therefore,
the computers are assumed to fail independently. It is further assumed that the outputs are
voted prior to being used by the external system (not included in this model), and thus a
single failure does not propogate its erroneous value to the external world. Thus, system
failure does not occur until two computers fail. The model of figure 2 describes such a
system. State 1 represents the initial condition of three working computers. The transition
from state 1 to state 2 is labeled 3)_ to represent the rate at which any one of the three
computers fail. The system is in state 2 when one processor has failed. The transition from
state 2 to state 3 has rate 2A since there are only two working computers that can fail. State
3 represents system failure because a majority of the computers in the system have failed.
In figure 3, the probability of system failure as a function of mission time is given. The
failure rate )_ is lO-4/hour. It can be seen that high reliability is strongly dependent on
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Figure 4: Model of 7MR System
a short mission time. It should be noted that it was implicitly assumedthat the system
starts with no failed components(i.e. Prob in state 1 at time 0 = 1). This is equivalent to
assumingperfect maintenancebetweenmissions.
3.3 N-Modularly Redundant System
The assumptions of an N-modularly redundant system are the same as for a TMR system.
The voter used in such a system is usually a majority voter--as long as a majority of
processors have not failed the system is still operational. The following model (figure 4)
describes a 7-processor system with a 7-way voter. The probability of system failure as a
function of mission time is given in figure 5. Figure 6 shows the unreliability of an NMR
system as a function of N. Theoretically, the probability of system failure _ 0 as N ---, _.
Of course, this model ignores the practical problem of building an arbitrarily large N-way
voter. If implemented in hardware, the additional hardware would significantly increase the
processor failure rate ._. If implemented in software, the CPU overhead could be enormous,
seriously increasing the likelihood of a critical task missing a hard deadfine [3].
3.4 Fault Tree Analysis: A Few Comments
Fault trees have been used for the reliability analysis of complex system for many years.
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the limitations of the fault-tree method. Basically,
a fault-tree can be used to model a system where there is no reconfiguration--the removal
of a faulty component from the system. Thus, all of the examples in this section could have
been modeled with a fault tree. In reconfigural_e systems, the system attempts to remove
faulty components before another failure occurs which could overcome the capabilities of the
voters. (This will be explored in more detail in the next section.) The probability that the
system will not succeed cannot be calculated with the combinatorial fault tree approach.
The more powerful Markov state-space modeling approach is needed.
Although fault trees can only be used to solve a limited class of problems, these combi-
natorial solutions can be calculated quite efficiently using a fault-tree solver such as NASA
Langley's Fault Tree Compiler (see [4]). Thus, a reliability engineer who frequently analyzes
nonreconfigurable systems that can be solved combinatorically would be wise to use an effi-
cient fault-tree solver whenever possible, because the combinatoric fault-tree computations
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Figure 6: NMR Unreliability As a Function of N
are typically more efficient than are Markov solutions.
4 Modeling Reconfigurable Systems
Fault-tolerant systems are often designed using a strategy of reconfiguration. Reconfiguration
strategies come in many varieties but always involve the logical or physical removal of a
faulty component. The techniques used to identify the faulty component and the methods
used to repair the system vary greatly and can lead to complex reliability models. There
are two basic types of reconfiguration strategies--degradation and replacement with spares.
The degradation method involves the permanent removal of a faulty component without
replacement. The reconfigured system continues with a degraded sel of components. The
sparing method involves both the removal of faulty components and their replacement with
a spare. In this section we will briefly introduce these concepts. They will be explored in
greater detail in later sections.
4.1 Degradable Triad
The simplest architecture based upon majority voting is the triplex system. To increase the
rehability of the system, triplex systems have been designed which reconfigure by degrada-
tion. The model of figure 7 describes the behavior of a simple degradable triplex system.
The degradable triplex system begins in state 1 with all three processors operational.
The transition from state 1 to state 2 represents the failure of any of the three processors.
Note that since the processors are identical, we do not have to represent the failure of each
processor with a separate state. At state 2 the system has one failed processor. The system
analyzes the errors from the voter and diagnoses the problem. The transition from state 2 to
state 4 represents the removal (i.e. reconfiguration) of the faulty processor. Reconfiguration
transitions are labelled with a distribution function (e.g., F(t)) rather than a rate. The
reason for this is that experimental measurement of the reconfiguration process has revealed
that the distribution of recovery time is not exponential [1]. Consequently, the transition
cannot be described by a constant failure rate. The meaning is simple--the probability
that the transition time from state 2 to state 4 is less than t is F(t). The presence of a
non-exponential transition generalizes the mathematical model to the class of semi-Markov
models. Such models are far more difficult to solve than pure Markov models. In a subsequent
section, several computer programs will be discussed which can be used to solve Markov and
semi-Markov models.
At state 4 the system is operational with two good processors. This transition occurs as
long as a second processor does not fail before the diagnosis is complete. Otherwise, the voter
could not distinguish the good results from the bad. Thus, there is also a second transition
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Figure 8: Model of Triplex to Simplex System
from state 2 to state 3 which represents the coincident failure of a second processor. The
rate of this transition is 2_, since either of the remaining two processors could fail. State
3 is a death state (i.e. an absorbing state) which represents failure of the system due to
near-coincident failure.
At state 4 the system is operational with two good processors and no faulty processors
in the active configuration. Either one of these processors may fail taking the system to
state 5. At state 5, once again, a race occurs between the reconfiguration process ending
in state 7 and the failure of a second processor ending in state 6. State 6 is thus another
death state and state 7 is the operational state where there is one remaining good processor.
The transition from state 7 to 8 represents the failure of the last processor. At state 8 there
are no good processors remaining, and the probability of reaching this death state is often
referred to as failure by exhaustion of parts.
4.2 Triad to Simplex
The model presented in the previous section was unrealistic in one major respect--the recon-
figuration process from the dual to the simplex was assumed to be perfect. In other words,
when either of the two processors failed, the system diagnosed which of the two processors
was the faulty one with 100% accuracy. When using a majority voter on three or more
processors, such an assumption is not unrealistic. However, with only two good processors,
there is no way for this diagnosis to be perfect. In a later section we will explore the use of
self-test programs to diagnose failure in a dual system. In this section, we will explore an-
other option--avoid the dual mode, i.e. degrade directly from a triplex to a simplex system.
The model of figure 8 describes this system.
As before the horizontal transitions represent fault arrivals. The vertical transition repre-
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Figure 9: Model of a Degradable Quad
sents system recovery. The recovery transition is labelled with a distribution function rather
than a rate to indicate that the transition is not exponential. The transition rate from state
1 to state 2 is 3_ because there are three active processors that can fail. When one of those
processors fails, the system is in state two. Before reconfiguration occurs, there are still two
active processors that can fail; thus, the transition from state 2 to death state 3 with rate
2_ competes with the recovery transition. Reconfiguration consists of discarding both the
faulty processor plus one of the working processors. Thus, the transition rate from state 4
to state 5 is _ because only one processor remains in the active configuration.
4.3 Degradable Quad
The model in figure 9 describes a degrad,_ble quad. This system starts with four working
processors. When one of those four processors fails (state 2), the reconfiguration process
consists of removing the faulty processor, leaving a triad of processors (state 4). When one
of the three remaining processors fails (state 5), the reconfiguration process entails removal
of the faulty processor plus one of the working processors, leaving a simplex (state 7). Note
that a different function is used for the transition from state 5 to state 7 than from state 2
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Figure 10: Model of Triplex with One Spare
to state 4. This is necessary if the reconfiguration process, and hence its rate, varies as a
function of the state.
4.4 Triad with One Spare
In the previous models the reconfiguration process removed a faulty processor and the system
continued operation with degraded levels of redundancy. This section provides a brief intro-
duction to the technique of sparing, i.e. replacing a faulty processor with a spare processor.
This technique will be explored in detail in section 7.
Suppose we have a triplex system which has one spare that does not fail when it is
inactive. The model of figure 10 describes this system.
As before, state 2 represents the situation where there are two good processors and one
faulty processor. The transition from state 2 to state 4 represents the detection and isolation
of the faulty processor and its replacement with a spare processor. While the system is in
state 2, there are 2 active working processors that can fail; thus, the rate of the transition to
death state 3 is 2),. After reconfiguration occurs, there are once again three active processors
that can fail; thus the transition rate from state 4 to state 5 is 3)`. This model assumes the
system does not immediately degrade to simplex upon the next failure; but rather operates
in duplex until the next failure brings system failure.
4.5 Some Observations About Multi-Step Fault-Error Handling
Models
Fault-injection experiments have been performed at NASA Langley demonstrating the fea-
sibility of measuring the distribution of the overall recovery process [5!. Recovery processes
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havebeenshownto be nonexponential[5, 6], and a given system may even exhibit, different
distributions for recoveries from different types of faults. Fault injection experiments may be
used to estimate the mean and standard deviation conditional upon recovery, and this con-
ditional mean and standard deviation are used in the SURE program to define the behavior
of a recovery transition. For more information, see [7, 8] and section 5.
Before White's solution technique was developed, the solution of semi-Markov models
with nonexponential recovery transitions was extremely difficult. Some modelers have been
willing to make the assumption that the recovery process behaves according to an exponential
distribution in order to facilitate the solution of the model. However, it should be recognized
that such an assumption introduces a modeling error of unknown quantity.
Another approach utilized to avoid the necessity of solving semi-Markov models was to de-
compose the reliability model into a fault-occurrence model and a set of fault-error handfing
models 19, 10]. Coverage parameters derived from the solution of the fault-error handling
models are inserted into the fault-occurrence model in order to compute the system reliability.
Some of these fault-error handling models, such as the CARE III single-fault model, repre-
sent the individual steps that a system performs to accomplish the overall reconfiguration
process. This multi-step process was designed to enable a more accurate representation of the
reconfiguration process than could a single exponential process. However. these multi-step
models use some parameters that are not directly observable or measurable. For example,
while the overall time of reconfiguration is directly observable, the individual times required
to detect, isolate, and recover from a fault can be extremely difficult to measure accurately.
However. now that an efficient semi-Markov solution technique is available that requires only
directly observable parameters, such an approach is unnecessary.
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5 Reliability Analysis Programs
Before we proceed further in the art of modeling, the input language for the SURE reliability
analysis program will be presented. The same input language is used for the STEM and
PAWS reliability analysis programs. These programs are described in section 5.4.
In the remainder of this paper, the models will be presented in the SURE input language
as well as graphically. This is desirable for two reasons: (1) As the models increase in
complexity, it soon becomes impractical to present them graphically and (2) these programs
can be used to solve the models as functions of any model parameter. This will provide
insight into the nature of the systems being modeled.
5.1 Overview of SURE
Probably the easiest way to learn the SURE input language is by way of example. The input
to the SURE program for the degradable quad model in figure 9 is:
LAMBDA = IE-4;
MUI = 2.7E-4;
SIGMA1 = 1.3E-3;
MU2 = 2.7E-_;
SIGMA2 = 1.3E-3;
1,2 = 4*LAMBDA;
2,3 = 3*LAMBDA;
2,4 = <MU1,SIGMAI>;
4,5 = 3*LAMBDA;
5,6 = 2*LAMBDA;
5,7 = <MU2,SIGMA2>;
7,8 = LAMBDA;
The first five statements equate values to identifiers. The first identifier LAMBDA represents
the processor failure rate. The next two identifiers MU1 and SIGMA1 are the mean and
standard deviation of the recovery time from state 2 to state 4. The identifiers MU2 and
SIGMA2 are the mean and standard deviation of the recovery time from state 5 to state 7.
The final seven statements define the transitions of the model. If the transition is a slow
fault arrival process then only the exponential rate must be provided. For example, the last
statement defines a transition from state 7 to state 8 with rate A (or 1 × 10-4/hour). If the
transition is a fast recovery process then the mean and standard deviation of the recovery time
must be given. For example, the statement 2,4 = </401 ,SIGMA1> above defines a transition
from state 2 to state 4 with mean recovery time MU1 and standard deviation SIGMA1. The
following is an illustrative interactive session using SURE to process the above model. The
model description has been stored in a file named TRIADP1. The user input follows the ?
prompt.
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$ s_re
SURE V7.4 NASA Langley Research Center
i? read triadpl
2: LAMBDA = 1E-6 TO* 1E-2 BY 10;
3: MU = 2.7E-4;
4: SIGMA = 1.3E-3;
5: 1,2 = 3*LAMBDA;
6: 2,3 = 2*LAMBDA;
7:2,4 = <MU,SIGMA>;
8:4,5 = 3*LAMBDA;
9:5,6 = 2*LAMBDA;
10:5,7 = <MU,SIGMA>;
11:7,8 = LAMBDA;
12: TIME = i0;
0.05 SECS. TO READ MODEL FILE
13? run
MODEL FILE = _riadpl.mod SURE V7.4 24 Jan 90 10:16:21
LAMBDA
l.O0000e-06
1.00000e-05
1.00000e-04
1.00000e-03
1.00000e-02
LOWER.BOUND
1.68485e-14
3.00387e-12
1.61714e-09
1.45575e-06
1.23551e-03
UPPERBOUND
1.77002e-14
3.12024e-12
1.66224e-09
1.51644e-06
1.26292e-03
COMMENTS RUN #I
<ExpMat>
3 PATH(S) TO DEATH STATES
Q(T) ACCURACY >= 14 DIGITS
0.633 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
147
157 plo_ xylog
167 exi%
The first statement uses the READ command to input the model description file. It should be
noted that _ is defined _s a variable over a range of values in this file. This directs the SURE
program to automatically perform a sensitivity analysis as a function of this parameter over
the specified range. Statement 12 defines the mission time to be 10 hours. Statement 15
directs the program to plot the output on the graphics device. Figure 11 shows the graph
generated by this command. The XYLOG argument causes SURE to plot the X and Y axes
using logarithmic scales.
In the next subsections, more detail is presented. These subsections can probably be
skipped on first reading and used as a reference when something is encountered that is not
clear. The following conventions will be used to facilitate the description of the SURE input
language:
1. All reserved words will be capitalized in typewriter-style print.
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le+ 00
le- 10
le - 20
le - 07
I
le - 06
I I I
le - 05 le - 04 le - 03 le - 02
Lambda
Figure 11: SURE program's plot, of output
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2. Lowercasewordswhich are in italics indicate items which are to be replacedby some-
thing definedelsewhere.
3. Items enclosedin squarebrackets r] canbe omitted.
4. Items enclosedin braces{ } canbe omitted or repeatedasmany times asdesired.
5.2 Model-Definition Syntax
Models are defined in SURE by enumerating all of the transitions of the model. The SURE
program distinguishes between fast and slow transitions. If the mean transition time, say p
is small with respect to the mission time, i.e. p < T, then the transition is fast. Otherwise, it
is slow. Slow transitions are assumed to be exponentially distributed by the SURE program.
Fast transitions can have an arbitrary distribution. The SURE user must supply the mean
and standard deviation of the transition time. If there are multiple competing transitions
from a state, the user must supply the respective transition probabilities along with the
conditional means and standard deviations.
5.2.1 Lexical Details
The state numbers must be positive integers between 0 and the MAXSTATE implementation
limit, usually 25,000. This limit can be increased simply by changing the MAXSTATE
constant in the program and recompihng. The transition rates, conditional means and
standard deviations, etc., are floating point numbers. The Pascal REAL syntax is used for
these numbers. The semicolon is used for statement termination. Therefore, more than one
statement may be entered on a line. Comments may be included any place that blanks are
allowed. The notation "(*" indicates the beginning of a comment and "*)" indicates the
termination of a comment. The SURE program prompts the user for input by a line number
followed by a question mark.
5.2.2 Constant Definitions
The user may equate numbers to identifiers. Thereafter, these constant identifiers may be
used instead of the numbers. For example,
LAMBDA = 0.001;
RECOVER = 1E-4;
Constants may also be defined in terms of previously defined constants:
GAMMA = IO*LAMBDA;
In general, the syntax is
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name = expression;
where name is a string of up to eight letters, digits, and underscores (_) beginning with a
letter, and czpresswn is an arbitrary mathematical expression as described in a subsequent
section entitled "Expressions".
5.2.3 Variable Definition
In order to facilitate parametric analyses, a single variable may be defined. A range is given
for this variable. The SURE system will compute the system reliability as a function of this
variable. If the system is run in graphics mode (to be described later), then a plot of this
function will be made. The following statement defines LAMBDA as a variable with range
0.001 to 0.009:
LAMBD_ = 0.001 TO 0.009;
Only one such variable may be defined. A special constant, POINTS, defines the number
of points over this range to be computed. The method used to vary the variable over this
range can be either "geometric" or "arithmetic" and is best explained by example. Suppose
POINTS = 4, then the geometric range
XV = 1 TO* 1000;
would use XV values of 1, 10, 100, and 1000, while the arithmetic range
XV = I TO+ I000;
would use XV values of 1, 333, 667, and 1000. An asterisk following the TO implies a
geometric range, while TO+ or simply TO implies an arithmetic range.
One additional option is available--the BY option. By following the above syntax with
BY "increment", the value of POINTS is automatically set such that the value is varied by
adding or multiplying the specified amount. For example,
LAMBDA = IE-5 TO* IE-2 BY i0;
sets POINTS equal to 4 and the values of LAMBDA used would be 1E-5, 1E-4, 1E-3, and
1E-2. The statement
C1(= 3 TO+ 5 BY 1;
sets POINTS equal to 3, and the values of CX used would be 3, 4, and 5.
In general, the syntax is
vat = expression T0[c] expression [BY increment ];
where vat is a string of up to eight letters and digits beginning with a letter, expression is
an arbitrary mathematical expression as described in the next section and the optional c is
a + or *. The BY clause is optional; if it is used, then increment is any arbitrary expression.
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5.2.4 Expressions
When specifyingtransition or holding time parametersin a statement, arbitrary functions
of the constants and the variable may be used. The following operators may be used:
+ addition
- subtraction
* multiplication
/ division
** exponentiation
The following standard Pascal functions may be used: EXP(X): LN(X), SIN(X), COS(X),
ARCSIN(X), ARCCOS(X), ARCTAN(X), SQRT(X). Both ( ) and I] may be used for group-
ing in the expressions. The following are permissible expressions:
2E-4
1.2*EXP(-3*ALPHA);
7*ALPHA + 12*L;
ALPHA*(I+L) + ALPHA**2;
2*L + (1/ILPBI)*[L + (1/ILPHI)];
5.2.5 Slow Transition Description
A slow transition is completely specified by citing the source state, the destination state,
and the transition rate. The syntax is as follows:
source, dest = rate;
where source is the source state, dest is the destination state, and rate is any valid expression
defining the exponential rate of the transition. The following are valid SURE statements:
PERM = 1E-4;
TRANSIENT = IO*PERM;
1,2 = 5*PERM;
1,9 = 5*(TRANSIENT + PEKM);
2,3 = 1E-6;
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5.2.6 Fast Transition Description
To enter a fast transition, the following syntax is used:
source, dest = < mu, sig [, frac ] >;
where
mu
sig
.frac
= an expression defining the conditional mean transition time
= an expression defining the conditional standard deviation of transition time
= an expression defining the transition probability
and source and dest define the source and destination states, respectively. The third param-
eter frac is optional. If omitted, the transition probability is assumed to be 1.0, i.e. only one
fast transition. All of the following are valid:
2,5 = <IE-5, IE-6, 0.9>;
THETA = 1E-4;
5,7 = <T_ETA, THETA*THETA, 0.5>;
7,9 = <0.0001,THETA/25>;
5.2.7 FAST Exponential Transition Description
Often when performing design studies, experimental data is unavailable for the fast processes
of a system. In this case, one must assume some properties of the underlying processes. For
simplicity, these fast transitions are often assumed to be exponentially distributed. However,
it is still necessary to supply the conditional mean and standard deviation to the SURE
program since they are fast transitions. If there is only one fast transition from a state, then
these parameters are easy to determine. Suppose we have a fast exponential recovery from
state 1 to state 2 with unconditional rate a:
(_ F(t) = 1- e at
It
The SURE input is simply
1,2 = < l/a, l/a, 1 >;
In this case, the conditional mean and standard deviation are equivalent to the unconditional
mean and standard deviation. The above transition can be specified using the following
syntax:
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Figure 12: Model of three competing fast transitions
1,2 = FAST a;
When multiple recoveries are present from a single state, then care must be exercised
to properly specify the conditional means and standard deviations required by the SURE
program. Suppose we have the model in figure 12 where the unconditional distributions are:
&(t) = 1 - e -°'
F=( t ) = 1 - e -b'
F3(t) = 1 - e -¢'
The SURE input describing the above model section is:
0,I = < I/(a+b+c), I/(a+b+c), a/(a+b+c) >;
0,2 = < I/(a+b+c), I/(a+b+c), b/(a+b+c) >;
0,3 = < 1/(a+b+c), 1/(a+b+c), g/(a+b+c) >;
Note that the conditional means and standard deviations are not equal to the unconditional
means and standard deviations (e.g., the conditional mean transition time from state 0 to
state 1 is not equal to 1/a.) The following can be used to define the above model:
0,I = FAST a;
0,2 = FAST b;
0,3 = FAST c;
The SURE program automatically calculates the conditional parameters from the uncondi-
tional rates a, b and c. The user may mix FAST exponential transitions with other general
transitions. However, care must be exercised in specifying the conditional parameters of the
non-exponential fast recoveries in order to avoid inconsistencies. For more details see [8].
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5.3 SURE Commands
In this section a brief summary of some of the SURE commands is given. For more details
about the SURE program, see [8].
5.3.1 READ Command
A sequence of SURE statements may be read from a disk file. The following interactive
command reads SURE statements from a disk file named sifl.mod:
KEAD sif_.mod;
If no file name extent is given, the default extent .rood is assumed. A user can build a model
description file using a text editor and use this command to read it into the sure program.
5.3.2 RUN Command
After a semi-Markov model has been fully described to the SURE program, the RUN command
is used to initiate the computation:
RUN outname;
The output is written to file outname. IF outname is omitted the output is written to the
user terminal.
5.3.3 LIST Constant
The amount of information output by the program is controlled by this command. Four list
modes are available as follows:
• LIST = 0; No output is sent to the terminal, but the results can still be displayed using
the PLOT command.
• LIST = 1; Only the upper and lower bounds on the probability of total system failure
are listed. This is the default.
• LIST = 2; The probability bounds for each death state in the model are reported along
with the totals.
• LIST = 3; Every path in the model is listed and its probability of traversal. The
probability bounds for each death state in the model is reported along with the totals.
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5.3.4 START Constant
The SThRT constant is used to specify the start state of the model. If the START constant is
not used, the program will use the source state (i.e. the state with no transitions into it) of
the model (if one exists.)
5.3.5 TIME Constant
The TIME constant specifies the mission time. For example, if the user sets TIME = 1.3, the
program computes the probability of entering the death states of the model within time 1.3.
The default value of TIME is 10. All parameter values must be in the the same units as the
TIME constant.
5.3.6 PRUNE and WARNDIG Constants
The time required to analyze a large model can often be greatly reduced by model pruning.
The SURE program automatically selects a pruning level upon detection of the first death
state. This feature can be disabled by setting the AUTOPRLr/_Econstant to zero: AUTOPRUNE
= 0. The default value of ALrr0PRUNE is 1. Alternatively, the SURE user can specify the
level of pruning using the PRUNE constant. A path is traversed by the SURE program until
the probability of reaching the current point on the path falls below the pruning level. For
example, if PRUNE = 1E-14 and the upper bound falls below 1E-14 at any point on the path,
the analysis of the path is terminated and its probability is added to the upper bound. The
sum of all the pruned states' occupancy probabilities is reported in following format.
<prune x. xxx>
The SURE program will warn the user if the pruning process was too severe,i.e, if the
pruning produced a result with less than WARNDIG digits of accuracy. In this case, the
upper bound is still an upper bound, but is not close to the lower bound. The default v_lue
of WARNDIG is 2.
5.4 Overview of the STEM and PAWS Programs
The STEM (Scaled Taylor Exponential Matrix) and PAWS (Pad6 Approximation With
Scaling) programs were developed at the NASA Langley Research Center for solving pure
Markov models (i.e. all transitions are exponentially distributed). The input language for
these two programs is the same as for the SURE program. The only major difference is that
the fast-recovery transition statement is interpreted differently. The following statement:
source, dest = < mu, sig [, frac ] >;
where
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SO_TCC
dest
rl_u
s_g
frac
= is the source state
= is the destination state
= an expression defning the conditional mean transition time
= an expression defining the conditional standard deviation of transition time
= an expression defining the transition probability
is interpreted as
source , dest = frac/mu ;
If the third parameter frac is omitted, a value of 1 is used.
For more information on the solution techniqfles used by these two rehability analysis
programs, see [11].
6 Reconfiguration by Degradation
In this section the technique of reconfiguration by degradation will be explored. The first
example is a simple degradable n-plex. Later sections introduce more complicated aspects,
such as fail-stop dual processors and self-testing processors.
6.1 Degradable 6-plex
Reconfiguration can be utilized in conjunction with levels of redundancy greater than three.
The Software Implemented Fault Tolerance (SIFT) computer system is an example of such
an architecture [127. The SIFT computer initially contains 6 processors. At this level of
redundancy, 2 simultaneously faulty computers can be tolerated. As processors fail, the
system degrades into lower levels of redundancy. Thus, SIFT is a degradable 6-plex. It
is convenient to identify the states of the system by an ordered pair (NC,NF), where NC
= the number of processors currently in the configuration and NF = the number of faulty
processors in the configuration. The semi-Markov model for the SIFT system is shown in
figure 13. There are three main concepts that dictate the structure of this model:
1. Every processor in the current, configuration fails at rate )_.
2. The system removes faulty processors with mean recovery time m.
3. A majority of processors in the configuration must. not have failed in order for the
system to be "safe".
There are a few subtle points which must also be considered. First, this model implicitly
assumes that the reconfiguration process is independent of the configuration of the system.
For example, the mean recovery time from state (6,1) is the same as from states (5,1),
26
(6,0)
<re, s>
(5',0) 5_ (_
(4
,2_ (6,3)
< m_2, s..2 >
' 4_ 3_ ,
,1)-----_ (5,2)----::._ (5,a)
[
< m,,_ > / < m_.s_2 >
:0/4-A <4,2/
< rn,,s >
tax) a__. (aa) 2_ (3,z)
< m,,, >
(ito)_--L-.-(i,11
Figure 13: Semi-Markov Model of SIFT Computer System
(4,1) and (3,1). It is possible that a system in a degraded configuration may recover slower
{because less processing power is available) or faster (because there are fewer processors to
examine in order to find the faulty one). To determine this would require extensive fault
injection in numerous configurations--a very expensive process. If this were done, however,
one could easily modify the above model to contain this information. Second, the mean
and standard deviation of the recovery time from states with two active faults is probably
different from the states with only 1 active fault. Note that in the model these transitions
are labeled with <m_2, s_2>. These parameters would have to be measured with double fault
injections. In the absence of experimental data, it is convenient to let m.2 = m/2 and s_2
= s/2. If the the detection/isolation and reconfiguration of the two faults behaves like two
independent exponential processes, this assumption is reasonable. The following SURE run
reveals the sensitivity of lhe failure probability to the mean reconfiguration time.
7, S ure
SURE V7.5 NASA Langley Research C_n_or
I? read sif_
2: LAMBDA = 5.0E-4;
3: m = 1E-4 TO* IE-I BY 10;
4: s = 6E-4;
5:m_2 = m/2;
6:s_2 = s/2;
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7:1,2 = 6*LAMBDA;
8:2,3 = 5*LAMBDA;
9:3,4 = 4*LAMBDA;
10:2,5 = <m,s>;
11:5,6 = 5*LAMBDA;
12:3,6 = <m_2,s_2>;
13:6,7 = 4*LAMBDA;
14:7,8 = 3*LAMBDA;
15:6,9 = <m,s>;
16:9,10 = 4*LAMBDA;
17:7,10 =<m_2,s_2>;
18:10,11 = 3*LAMBDA;
19:10,12 = <m,s>;
20:12,13 = 3*LAMBDA;
21:13,14 = 2*LAMBDA;
22:13,15 = <m,s>;
23:15,16 = I*LAMBDA;
0.15 SECS. TO READ MODEL FILE
24? run
MODEL FILE = sift.mod
M
1.00000e-04
1.00000e-03
1.00000e-02
1.00000e-01
LOWERBOUND
9.17736e-12
1.21626e-II
4.34597e-II
6.77898e-10
15 PATH(S) TO DEATH STATES
1.233 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
267 exi_
UPPERBOUND
9.75265e-12
1.32216e-ll
5.48450e-ll
1.16481e-09
SURE V7.5 26 Feb 90 14:23:14
COMMENTS RUN #1
.................................
(The SURE program requires that the states be defined by a single number. Therefore, the
state vectors must be mapped onto a set of integers.) Finally, it should be noted that the
SIFT computer degrades from a triplex to asimplex. Thus, the reconfiguration transition
out of state (.3,1) carries the system into state (1,0).
6.2 Single-Point Failures
All of the previous models assumed that there were no single-point failures in the system, i.e.
one fault arrival causes system failure. If a system is not designed properly and is vulnerable
to single-point failures, the reliability can be seriously degraded. To see the effects of a
single-point failure, consider the following model in figure 14 of a TMR with a single-point
failure. The parameter C represents the fraction of faults that do not cause system failure
alone. The sensitivity of the system reliability to C can be seen in the following SURE run.
$ sure
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Figure 14: Model of a TMR System with a single point failure
SURE V7.4 NASA Langley Research Center
17 read spf
2: LAMBDA = 1E-4;
3: C = .9 TO 1 BY 0.01;
4: 1,2 = 3*LAMBDA*C;
5:2,3 = 2*LAMBDA;
6:1,4 = 3*(I-C)*LAMBDA;
0.05 SECS. TO READ MODEL FILE
7? run
MODEL FILE = spf.mod
C
9.00000e-01
9.10000e-01
9.20000e-01
9.30000e-01
9.40000e-01
9.50000e-01
9.60000e-01
9.70000e-01
9.80000e-01
9.90000e-01
1.00000e+O0
LOWERBOUND
3.02245e-04
2.72320e-04
2.42395e-04
2.12470e-04
I 82545e-04
1 52620e-04
i 22695e-04
9 27702e-05
6 28451e-05
3 29200e-05
2 99500e-06
UPPERBOUND
3.02700e-04
2.72730e-04
2.42760e-04
2.12790e-04
1.82820e-04
1.82850e-04
1.22880e-04
9.29100e-05
6.29400e-05
3.29700e-05
3.00000e-06
2 PATH(S) TO DEATH STATES
0.667 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
8? exit
SURE V7.4 24 Jan 90 10:20:43
COMMENTS RUN #1
----. ..............................
The results of this run are plotted in figure 15.
From this run it can be seen that C must be greater than .97 in order for the TMR system
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Figure 15: Failure Probability as a Function of C
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Figure 16: Failure Prob. of 5MR with )_ = 10 -5 As a Function Of C
to be more reliable than a simplex computer. Even more distressing is the realization that in
order to have a probability of failure less than 10 -9 in a 5MR system composed of processors
whose failure rate is very low, i.e. lO-S/hour, C must be greater than .999998. A 5MR
system that is not subject to single point failure has a probability of failure of 1 x 10 -11. See
figure 16 which was produced by solving the following model:
LAMBDA = IE-5;
N= 5;
X = IE-IO TO* I BY 2;
C= l-X;
1,2 = S*C*LAMBDA;
1,7 = 5*(I-C)*LAMBDA;
2,3 = _*C*LAMBDA;
2,8 = _*(I-C)*LAMBDA;
3,4 = 3*LAMBDA;
Experimental measurement of a parameter to such accuracy is easily shown to be imprac-
tical. Alternatively, one can design a system with no single-point failures, and thus remove
this transition from the model. If this is done, it is essential that systems be designed in a
manner that enables a proof of correctness of this property.
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2 * PFS * A Q
2- (1 - PFS) * A
PFS = 0 TO 1 BY 0.01;
1,2 = 2*PFS*LAMBDA;
2,3 = LAMBDA;
1,4 = 2*(1-PFS)*LAMBDA;
Figure 17: Model of Fail-Stop Dual
6.3 Fail-stop Dual
When processors fail, they often.either abort the current computation or produce an incorrect
answer so far from the correct answer that it would fail a simple reasonableness check. In
both cases, it is simple for a processor to detect its own failure and to halt its processing.
A processor with this capability is often referred to as a "fail-stop" processor. It is simple
to build electronic circuitry which can recognize that one fail-stop processor has halted
(e.g., since no data arrives) and automatically switch to an alternate fail-stop processor. A
system consisting of two fail-stop processors and this kind of "selection" circuitry is called
a "dual" system. Reliability engineers often make the mistake of assuming that this process
will work correctly 100% of the time. However, most of these so-called fail-stop processors
cannot be guaranteed to always halt upon failure. For example, the failure can cause an
erroneous answer that is not detectably unreasonable, or the failure can affect the ability of
the processor to detect the failure or to halt its processing or its output.
]n this example, we will investigate the impact on system reliability when a processor
is not 100% fail-stop. Suppose PFS = the probability that a processor stops when it fails.
Furthermore, we will assume the probability of failure of the comparator is 0. The model
in figure 17 describes such a system. The plot of the SURE solution of this model is given
in figure 18. The statement PF$ = 0 TO 1 BY 0.01 directs the SURE program to compute
the probability of system failure as a function of PFS. The program solves the model for
values of PFS over the range from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.01. As can be seen in figure
18, the reliability of the system is very sensitive to the probability of the fail-stop processor
halting upon failure, and PFS must be much greater than .9 in order to have a significant
improvement in reliability over a simplex computer.
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Figure 18: Plot of Fail-Stop Dual Unreliability vs. PFS
33
,PFS,_Q A
- PFS) * A
1,2 = 4*PFS*LAMBDA;
2,3 = 2*LAMBDA;
1,4 = 4*(1-PFS)*LAMBDA;
1,5 = NU;
5,6 = 4*LAMBDA;
(_ 2A ,Q
Figure 19: Model of Dual-Dual
6.4 Dual-Dual
The previous section illustrated the sensitivity of reliability to the assumption of fail-stop.
Consequently approaches have been sought to make the fail stop assumption virtually 100
percent. One such approach is the dual-dual architecture. In this system 4 computers are
configured into two self-checking pairs. The self-checking pairs run in lock step mode. Upon
any "miss-compare" on the outputs, the self-checking pair shuts itself down. Of course,
special circuitry must be used to perform the self-checking function, but techniques exist
which can make such circuitry "fail-safe', i.e. if the self-checker fails then the pair is shut
down. The outputs of the two self-checking pairs are sent to a selection switch as used in
the previous model. The self-checking pair serves as the fail-stop processor of the previous
model. In such a system it is not unreasonable to assume that the probability PF$ that
the self-checking pair does not stop, even though it has failed, is the probabihty that both
processors fail concurrently before the selection switch disconnects the pair. Clearly, such a
probabihty is small but not 0. This probability is intimately connected with fault latency
and failure correlation which will be further investigated in later models. In the following
model, PFS is assumed to be 0 as is commonly done. The reader, however, is cautioned to
remember the previous section. The failure rate of the switch selector ,J is included. The
parameter A represents the probability of failure of one of the processors in the self-checking
pairs. Also, the selection of the good processor pair after the shut-down of the failed pair
is assumed to be instantaneous. The transitions from state 1 to state 2 and from state 1
to state 4 in figure 19 collectively represent the failure of a processor before the selection
switch has failed. If the selection switch fails first, then the transition from state 1 to state 5
occurs. The transition from state 1 to state 2 covers the case where the failed pair shuts down
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properly. The transition state 1 to state 4 covers the situation where the failed processor
pair does not fail stop. All bets are off about the behavior of the system in this case: so
state 4 is a death state. After the selection switch has failed (i.e. system in state 5), the
system is assumed to be permanently switched to one self-checking pair, and the failure of
either processor in that pair is assumed to cause system failure.
6.5 Degradable Quad with Partial Fail-stop or Self-test
The question is often asked whether it is preferable to degrade a triad into a simplex or into
a dual. If one degrades to a dual, one must address the problem of dealing with a failure in
the dual. How can the voter know which processor's answer is correct? If the best that can
be done is guess with probability of 0.5 of success, the probability of system failure is exactly
the same as degrading to a simplex at the first failure. However, if the probability of success
in detecting the failed processor in the dual can be improved, then naturally the system
reliability can be improved. One method of obtaining improvement is to take advantage of
the fact that many failures cause a processor to halt, as was done in the previous model.
Studies by Bendix [13 i have shown that typically 90% of CPU faults result in a processor
halting. Although this is far from fail-stop, this aspect of system failure can be utilized in
the system design to increase the reliability of a quad system. The majority voting system
must be designed so as to recognize the non-arrival of data. The details of such a voter will
not be discussed here, but such a design is easily accomplished. In the model shown in figure
20, PFS = the probability that a fault causes the processor to halt. The SURE input file is:
LAMBDA = le-4;
MEANREC = le-2;
STDKEC = le-3;
MEANREC2 = 1.2e-2;
STDKEC2 = 1.4e-3;
PFS = 0 to 1 by .1;
1,2 = 4*LAMBDA;
2,3 = 3*LAMBDA;
2,4 = <MEANREC,STDREC>;
4,5 = 3*LAMBDA;
5,6 = 2*LAMBDA;
5,7 = <MEANREC2,STDREC2>;
7,8 = 2*PFS*LAMBDA;
8,9 = LAMBDA;
7,i0 = 2*(I-PFS)*LAMBDA;
(* Failure rate of processor *)
(* Mean reconfiguration time *)
(* Szandard deviation of .... *)
(* Mean reconfiguration time *)
(* Standard deviation of " " *)
(* Prob. fault halts processor *)
Since the fail-stop capability is not used until the configuration has been reduced to two
processors, it is most. effective for long mission times. The result of a SURE run with mission
time = 1000 hours, is shown in figure 21.
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Figure 20: Degradable Quad with Partial Fail-stop
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Figure 21: Failure Prob. of Degradable Quad with Partial Fail-Stop
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Another approach is to use a self-test program to diagnose the faulty processor in the dual.
This is modeled in the same manner. In this case, PFS is the probability that the self-test
program correctly diagnoses the faulty processor and the system successfully reconfigures.
7 Reconfiguration By Sparing
Three categories of spares are possible--cold spares, warm spares and hot spares. Some-
times systems are designed using spares which are unpowered until brought into the active
configuration. This is done because unpowered spares usually have a lower failure rate than
powered (hot) spares. If the failure rate of the inactive spare is the same as an active pro-
cessor it is called a hot spare. If the failure rate of an inactive spare is zero, then it is called
a cold spare. If the failure rate is somewhere in between 0 and the active processor rate it is
called a warm spare. If
A, = failure rate of an inactive spare
Ap = failure rate of an active processor
/
then
cold spare: $, = 0
warm spare: 0 < A, < Ap
hot spare: $, = Ap
The disadvantage of an unpowered spare (i.e. cold or warm) is that it must be initialized
during reconfiguration whereas a hot spare can be maintained with memory already loaded.
This can lead to a longer reconfiguration time. Thus, depending upon the strategy used, the
model parameter values "&'ill be different. Some reliability programs, such as CARE III [9],
explicitly assume that the spares are hot.
7.1 Triad with Two Cold Spares
In this model a new form of reconfiguration is investigated. Instead of degrading the configu-
ration upon detection of a faulty processor, a spare processor is brought into the configuration
to replace the faulty one. For simplicity, in this model it is assumed that the spares do not
fail (i.e. cold) while not in the active configuration. The issues associated with failing spares
will be considered in subsequent examples. In the model of figure 22 it is assumed that the
reconfiguration process is described by distribution F(t) which is assumed to be independent
of the system state. The SURE input is:
LAHBDA = le-4;
MEANKEC = le-2;
STDREC : le-3;
(* Failure ra_e of processor *)
(* Mean reconfigura_ion time *)
(* Standard deviation of roconfig, time *)
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Figure 22: Model of Triplex with 2 Cold Spares
1,2 = 3,LAMBDA;
2,3 = 2,LAMBDA;
2,4 = <MEANKEC,STDKEC>;
4,$ = 3*LAMBDA;
$,6 = 2*LAMBDA;
5,7 = <MEANREC,STDREC>;
7,8 = 3*LAMBDA;
8,9 = 2*LAMBDA;
State 1 of this model represents the initial system with three active processors and two
spare processors. The system is in state 2 when one of the three active processors has failed.
There are two transitions leaving state 2: near-coincident failure of one of the two remaining
active processors and replacement of the f_led active processor with a spare. In state 4,
the system consists of three active processors plus one remaining cold spare. Once a cold
spare processor is brought into the active configuration, it has the same failure rate as the
other active processors. Thus, the transition from state 4 to state 5 has rate 3')_. State 5
has the same transitions leaving it as sta_ 2. Once the system reaches state 7, there are no
remaining cold spare processors.
7.2 Triad with Two Warm Spares
If we assume the system has perfect detection of failed spare processors, the model developed
above can be easily modified to include spare failures. As shown in figure 23, this simply
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Figure 23: Model of Triplex with 2 Warm Spares
requires the addition of two transitions. The transition from state 1 to state 4 represents
the failure of one of the two spare processors before either of them is brought into the active
configuration. The rate for this transition is 2*7, where _, is the failure rate for a warm spare.
The transition from state 4 to state 7 represents the failure of the remaining spare processor
after the first spare processor has either failed or been brought into the active configuration
to replace a failed active processor. The SURE input is:
LAMBDA = le-4; (* Failure rate of active processor *)
GAMMA = le-5; (* Failure rate of warm spare _rocessor *)
MEANKEC = Ie-2; (* Mean reconfiguration time *)
STDREC = le-3; (* Standard deviation of reconfi E. time *)
12=
14=
23=
24=
45=
47=
5,6 =
5,7 =
7,8 =
8,9 =
3*LAMBDA;
2*GAMMA;
2*LAMBDA;
<MEANREC,STDREC>;
3*LAMBDA;
GAMMA;
2*LAMBDA;
<MEANREC,STDREC>;
3*LAMBDA;
2*LAMBDA;
The same model can be used to model a system with hot spares by assigning the spare failure
rate 7 to the same value as the active processor failure rate _. The probability of failure as a
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Figure 24: Failure Prob. of Triplex with 2 Warm Spares
function of the spare failure rate is plotted in figure 24 for three mission times--10,100 and
1000 hours.
In this section we made several modeling assumptions, such as perfect detection of failed
spare processors and no state-dependent recovery rates. These assumptions significantly
simplified the reliability models in this section. In section 9 we will model systems without
making these simplifying assumptions and will investigate more complex systems which use
several different kinds of reconfiguration and which consist of several subsystems. Models
of complex systems are often very large. As complexity is added to a system it quickly
becomes impractical to enumerate all of the states and transitions of a model by hand. In
the following section a simple but expressive language is introduced for specifying Markov or
semi-Markov models. This language serves as the input language for the ASSIST computer
program which automatically generates the states and transitions of the model. The output
of the ASSIST program can be directly processed by the SURE program.
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8 The ASSIST Model Specification Language
A computer program was developed at the Langley Research Center to automatically gen-
erate semi-Markov models from an abstract, high-level language. This program, named the
Abstract Semi-Markov Specification Interface to the SURE Tool (ASSIST), is written in
Pascal and runs on the VMS and Unix operating systems [14, 15]. The ASSIST program
generates a file containing the generated semi-Markov model in the format needed for input
to a number of Langley-developed Markov or semi-Markov reliability analysis programs, such
as SURE or PAWS. The abstract language used for input to ASSIST is described in this
section. Only the features of the language necessary for understanding the models in this
paper are presented. For more detailed information about ASSIST, the reader is referred to
[14]. The process of describing a system in this abstract language also forces the reliability
engineer to clearly understand the fault tolerance strategies of the system, and the abstract
description is useful for communicating and validating the system model.
The ASSIST program is based on concepts used in the design of compilers. The ASSIST
input language is used to define rules for generating a model. These rules are first applied to
a "start state". The rules create transitions from the start state to new states. The program
then appties the rules to the newly created states. This process is continued until all of
the states are either death states or have already been processed. The expressiveness of the
ASSIST language is derived from the use of a "recursive" semantics for its constructs.
The ASSIST input language can be used to describe any state space model. Its full
generality makes it useful for specifying Markov and semi-Markov models, even when it is
not necessary to generate the model. The ASSIST language can serve as a convenient vehicle
for discussing and analyzing complex state-space models without having to specify all of the
states and transitions of the model by enumeration.
8.1 Abstract Language Syntax
A formal description of the language is not presented. Nevertheless, it is necessary to define
a few conventions to facilitate description of the language:
1. All reserved words will be capitalized in typewriter-style print.
2. Lowercase words which are in italics, such as const, indicate items which are to be
replaced by something defined elsewhere.
3. Items enclosed in square brackets [] can be omitted.
4. Items enclosed in braces { } can be omitted or repeated as many times as desired.
The language consists of 6 types of statements:
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1. The
2. The
3. The
4. The
5. The
constant-definition statement
SPACE statement
START statement
DEATHIF statement
PRUNEIF statement
6. The TRANT0 statement
Each of these statements is discussed in the following sections.
8.1.1 Constant-Definition Statement
A constant-definition statement equates an identifier consisting of letters and digits to a
number. For example:
LAMBDA = 0.0052;
RECOVER = 0.005 ;
Once defined, an identifier can be used instead of the number it represents. In the following
sections, the phrase const is used to represent a constant which can be either a number or a
constant identifier. Constants can also be defined in terms of previously defined constants:
LAMBDA = 1E-4;
GAMMA = IO*LAMBDA;
In general the syntax is
_dent = expression;
where expression is a legal FORTRAN/Pascal expression. Both ( ) and [] can be used for
grouping in the expressions. The following commands contain legal expressions:
ALPHA = 1E-4;
RECV = 1.2*EXP(-3*ALPHA) ;
DELTA = 1.2*[(ALPHA + 2.3E-5)*RECV + I/ALPHA];
All of the constant definitions are printed in the SURE model file so that they may be
used by the SURE program. In addition, any statements in the ASSIST input file that
are enclosed within double quotes are copied directly into the SURE model file and are not
otherwise processed by the ASSIST program. For example, if a user wished to be prompted
for the value of 7 by the SURE program instead of by the ASSIST program, and he wished
to see the effects of varying the value of _ exponentially, he could include the following
statements in his ASSIST input file:
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''INPUT GAMMA;''
''LAMBDA = 1E-4 TO* IE-9;"
8.1.2 SPACE Statement
This statement is used to specify the state space on which the Markov model is defined.
Essentially, the state space is defined by an n-dimensional vector where each component of
the vector defines an attribute of the system being modelled. In the SIFT-like architecture
example of figure 13, the state space is (NW,NF). This would be defined in the abstract
language as
SPACE = (NW: 0..6, NF: 0..6);
The 0..6 represents the range of values over which the components can vary. The lower
bound of the range must be greater than or equal to 0, and the upper bound must be greater
than the lower bound and less than or equal to 255. This maximum upper bound value
can be easily changed by modifying a constant and recompiling the ASSIST program. The
number of components (i.e., the dimension of the vector space) can be as large as desired.
In general the syntax is:
SPACE = (ident[: const., const] {, ident[: const .. const] });
The range specification is optional and defaults to a range from 0 to 255. The identifiers,
ident, used in the SPACE statement are referred to as the "state space variables".
8.1.3 START Statement
This statement indicates the state from which the ASSIST program will initiate the recursive
model generation. This state usually corresponds to the initial state of the system being
modeled, i.e., the probability the system is in this state at time 0 is 1. In the SIFT-like
architecture example in figure 13, the initial state is (6,0). This is specified in the abstract
language by:
START = (6,0);
In general the syntax is:
START = ( const {, const } );
The dimension of the vector must be the same as in the SPACE statement.
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8.1.4 DEATHIF Statement
The DEhTHIF statement specifies which states are death sta_es, i.e., absorbing states in the
model. The following is an example in the space (DIMI: 2..4, DIM2: 3..5)
DEATHIF (DIM1 = 4) OR (DIM2 = 3);
This statement defines (4,3), (4,4), (4,5), (2,3), and (3,3) as death states. In genera] the
syntax is
DEATHIF expression ;
The expression in this statement must be a Boolean expression. A Boolean expression may
use the logical operators 'AND,' 'OR' and 'NOT.'
8.1.5 PRUNEIF Statement
A model of a system with a large number of components tends to have many long paths
consisting of one or two failures of each type of component before a condition of system
failure is reached. Because the occurrence of so many failures is unlikely during a short
mission, these long paths typically contribute insignificant amounts to the probability of
system failure. The dominant failure modes of the system are typically the short paths to
system failure consisting of failures of "like" components. Model pruning can be used to
eliminate the long paths to system failure by conservatively assuming that system failure
occurs earlier on those paths.
The PRUNEIF statement specifies which states are prune states, i.e., conservative absorb-
ing states in the model. The syntax for the PRUNEIF statement is the same as for the DEATHIF
statement:
PRUNEIF expression ;
The expression in this statement must be a Boolean expression. The use of the PRUNEIF
statement to reduce the size of a model is discussed and demonstrated in section 12.2.
8.1.6 TRANTO Statement
This is the most important statement in the language. It is used to describe and consequently
generate the model in a recursive manner, fhe following statement generates all of the fault-
arrival transitions in the figure 1 model:
IF NW > 0 TRANTO (NW-I, NF+I) BY NW*LAMBDA;
The simplest syntax for a TRANTO statement is
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IF expression TRANT0 destination BY expression;
The first expression following the IF must be Boolean. Conceptually, this expression
determines whether this rule applies to a particular state. For example, in the state space
SPACE = (hl: 1..5, h2: 0..1), the expression (A1 > 3) AND (A2 = 0) is true for states
(4,0) and (5,0) only.
The destination vector following the TRhNT0 reserved word defines the destination state
of the transition to be added to the model. The destination state can be specified using
positional or assigned values.
The syntax for specification of the destination by positional values is as follows:
(expression, {, expression})
where the expressions listed define each state space variable value for the destination state.
An expression must be included for every state space variable defined in the SPACE statement,
including every array element. Each expression within the parentheses must evaluate to an
integer. For example, if the state space is (X1, X2) and the source state is (5,3), then the
vector (X1 + 1,X2 - 1) refers to (6,2).
The syntax for specification of the destination by assigned values is:
ident = expression {, ident = expression }
where ident is a state space variable and expression is an integer expression. The assignments
define the destination state of a transition by specifying the change in one or more state
space variable values from the source state to the destination state. There can be as many
assignments as there are state space variables. State space variables that do not change
need not be specified. The two syntaxes cannot be mixed in the same statement, and the
destination expression cannot be within parentheses when assigned values are to be used.
The expression following the BY indicates the rate of the transition to be added to the
model. This expression must evaluate to a real number. The user may include constants
names in the rate statement that are not defined in the ASSIST file. These names are simply
copied into the rate expressions in the model file to be defined during execution of the SURE
program. The ASSIST program also allows the user to concatenate identifiers or values in
the rate expression using the "' character. The use of this feature is demonstrated in section
10.5.
The condition expression of the TRANT0 statement can be nested as follows:
IF expression THEN
{ multiple TRANTO statements or TI_NTO clauses }
[ELSE
{ multiple TlqANTO statements or TI_NT{3 clauses } ]
ENDIF;
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wherea TRANTOclause is of the form:
TRANTO destination BY expression;
A TRANT0 clause may not appear by itself without a condition expression. If the IF is
not followed by a THEN, then only one TRANT0 clause may be included, and no ELSE clause
or ENDIF may be used. If the IF is followed by a THEN, then an optional ELSE clause may be
included, and the IF statement must be terminated with an F__DIF. The THEN clause and the
optional ELSE clause may contain multiple TRAIfr0 statements. Every rate expression must
be followed by a senficolon, and the end of the entire nested statement must be followed with
a semicolon.
State space variables may be used in any of the expressions of the TRANT0 statement. The
value of a state space variable is the corresponding value in the source state to which the
TRANT0 statement is being applied. For example, if the TRANT0 statement is being applied
to state (4,5) and the state space was defined by SPACE = (A: O..10, Z: 2..15) then A
= 4 and Z = 5.
8.1,7 Model Generation Algorithm
The ASSIST program generates the model according to the following algorithm:
Initialize READY-SET to contain the start state only
WHILE READY-SET is not empty DO
Select and remove a state from READY-SET.
IF the selected state does not satisfy a DE/tTHIF or PRUNEIF statement THEN
Apply each TRA,IgT0 rule to the selected state as follows:
IF the TRANT0 if-expression evaluates to TRUE THEN
Add the transition to the model.
IF the destination state is new, add it to the READY-SET
ENDIF
ENDIF
ENDWHILE
The ASSIST program builds the model from the start state by recursively applying the
transition rules. A list of states to be processed, the Ready Set, begins with only the start
state. Before application of a rule, ASSIS'I checks all of the death conditions to determine if
the current state is a death state. Since a death state denotes system failure, no transitions
can leave a death state. Each of the TPANTO rules is then evaluated for the nondeath state. If
the condition expression of the TRANTO rule evaluates to true for the current state, then the
destination expression is used to determine the state space variable values of the destination
state. If the destination state has not already been defined in the model, then the new state
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is addedto the Ready Set of states to be processed. The rate of the transition is determined
from the rate expression, and the transition description is printed to the model file. When
all of the TRANT0 rules have been applied to it, the state is removed from the Ready Set.
When the Ready Set is empty, then all possible paths terminate in death states, and model
building is complete.
8.2 Illustrative Example: SIFT-Like Architecture
Now we can specify the model of figure 13 in the language:
NP = 6;
LAMBDA = IE-4;
DELTA = 3.6E3;
(* Number of processors inizially *)
(* Yaul% arrival ra%e *)
(* Recovery ra%e *)
SPACE = (NW: O..NP, (* Number working processors *)
NF: 0..NP); (* Number faulty processors *)
START = (NP,O);
IF NW > 0 TRANT8 (NW-I,NF+I) BY NW*LAMBDA;
IF NF > 0 TRANTO (NW, NF-I) BY FAST NF*DELTA;
(* Fault arrivals *)
(* System recovery *)
DEATHIF NF >= NW; (* 5ys%em failure if majori%y no% working *)
The first three lines equate the identifiers NP, LAMBDA, and DELTA to specific values.
The next 2 lines define the state space using the SPACE command. For this system two
attributes suffice to define the state of the system:
NW = the number of working processors in the configuration
NF = the number of faulty processors in the configuration
The SPACE statement declares that the state space is 2-dimensional, that the first dimension
is named NW and has domain 0 to NP and that the second dimension is NF and has domain
0 to NP. The START statement declares that the construction of the model will begin with
the state (NP,0). The next two TI_NT0 statements define the rules for building the model.
Informally these rules are:
1. Every working processor in the current configuration fails at rate LAMBDA.
2. The system removes faulty processors at rate DELTA.
The informal rule is easily converted into an ASSIST statement. The phrase "Every working
processor in the current configuration" becomes:
IF NW > 0
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Note that if NW is greater than zero there is a working processor, so a transition should be
created. The phrase "fails" is captured by
TRANTO NW = NW + I
This says that the destination state is obtained from the current state by incrementing the
NW component by 1. The phrase "at rate LAMBDA" is captured by
BY NW*LAMBDA
This declares that the rate of the generated transition is NW*LAMBDA. The identifier
LAMBDA which represents tile failure rate is muliplied by NW because any of the working
processors can fail. Each processor fails at rate LAMBDA. Therefore the rate that "any"
processor fails is NW*LAMBDA.
The second rule is translated into ASSIST syntax in a similar manner. A faulty processor
(i.e. NF > 0) is removed (i.e. NF = NF - 1) at rate DELTA (i.e. total rate is NF*DELTA):
IF NF > 0 TKANTO (NW, NF-1) BY FAST NF*DELTA;. (* system recovery *)
The keyword FAST alert, s the SURE program that this transition is a fast recovery and not
a failure. The SURE program assumes that the transition is exponentially distributed with
rate DELTA and automatically calculates the mean and standard deviation. Alternatively,
the user could specify this TRANT0 rule as follows:
IF NF > 0 TRANTO (NW, NF-I) BY <MU,SIG>; (* system recovery *)
The advantage of this form is that the corectness of the solution does not depend upon an
assumption that the recovery distribution is exponential.
The DEATHIF statement defines the system failure states. Informally, if the number of
faulty processors is greater than or equal to the number of working processors, the system
fails. This is translated into
DEATHIF NF >= NW
9 Reconfigurable Triad Systems
In this section systems which use both sp_ring and degradation to accomplish reconfiguration
will be explored. Even in the first example, a triad with cold spares, the reconfiguration
process changes when the supply of spares is exhausted. The later examples add more detail
to more closely capture the behavior of the spares. The models in this section demonstrate
the flexibility of the semi-Markov modeling approach.
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9.1 Triad with Cold Spares
A system consisting of a triad with a set of cold spares (i.e. they do not fail while inactive)
will be explored. The number of initial spares is defined using a constant, NSI. This is done
so that the initial number of spares can be changed by altering only one hne of the ASSIST
input. (Although the change involves a change of only one line in the input file, the size of
the model generated varies significantly as a function of this parameter). For simplicity, it
is assumed in this section that spares do not fail until they are made active. The system
replaces failed processors with spares until they are a_ depleted. Then the system degrades
to a simplex.
NSI = 3;
LAMBDA = IE-4;
MU = 7.9E-5;
SIGMA = 2.56E-5;
(* Number of spares initially *)
(* Failure ra_e of active processors *)
(* Mean time to replace with spare *)
(* S_an. dev. of time to replace with spare *)
MU_DEG = fi.3E-5;
SIGMA_DEG = 1.74E-5;
(* Mean time to degrade to simplex *)
(* S_an. dev. of time to degrade to simplex *)
SPACE = (NW: 0..3,
NF: 0..3,
NS: O..NSI);
(* Number of working processors *)
(* Number of failed active processors *)
(* Number of spares *)
START = (3,0,NSI);
IF NW > 0 (* Processor failure *)
TRANT0 (NW-I,NF+I,NS) BY NW*LAMBDA;
IF (NF > O) AND (NS > O) (* Non-failed spare becomes active *)
TRANTO (NW+I,NF-1,NS-I) BY <MU,SIGMA>;
IF (NF > O) AND (NS = O) (* No more spares, degrade to simplex *)
TRANTO (1,0,0) BY <MU_DEG,SIGMA_DEG>;
DEATHIF NF >= NW;
The first statement defines a constant NSI which represents the number of initial spares. The
value of this constant can be changed to generate models for systems with various numbers of
initial spares. The next 5 lines define con%ants which are not used directly by ASSIST, but are
passed along verbatim to SURE for computation purposes. The SPACE statement defines the
domain of the state space. For this model a 3-dimensional space is needed. The components
of the space are NW: number of working processors in the active configuration, NF: number
of failed processors in the active configuration, and NS: the number of spares available. The
initial configuration is defined with the START statement, i.e. (3,0,NSI) which indicates that
NW=3, NF=0 and NS=NSI initially. The next three statements define the rules which are
used to build the model. The first of these statements defines processor failure. As long
as there are working processors (i.e. NW > 0), the rule adds a transition. The destination
state is derived from the source state according to the formula (NW-1, NF+I, NS). This
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is short-hand notation for NW = NW-1, NF = NF+I, NS = NS. The rate of the resulting
transition is NW*LAMBDA. For example, if the current state were (2,1,3) this rule would
generate a transition to (1.2,3) with rate 2*LAMBDA. The next rule only applies to states
where (NF > 0) AND (NS > 0), i.e. states with a failed processor and with available
spares. The destination state is derived from the current state by the formula (NW+I, NF-
1, NS-1), i.e. the number working NW is increased by 1, the number faulty is decremented
and the number of spares is decremented. This of course corresponds to the replacement of
a faulty processor with a spare. The last TRANT0 rule describes how the system degrades to
a simplex. This occurs when no spares are available and a processor has failed, i.e. (NF >
0) AND (NS = 0). The transition is to the state (1,0,0). The transition occurs according
to a distribution with mean MU_DEG and standard deviation SIGMA./)EG. This is given
in SURE notation: <MU_DEG, SIGMA_DEG>. Finally, the conditions defining the death states
are given. The formula NF >= NW defines the states which are death states, i.e. whenever
the number of faulty processors are greater than or equal to the number of good processors.
The following session was performed on this model stored in file TPNFS.AST:
$ ASSIST TPNFS
ASSIST VERSION 6.0
The Front End Routine FER SURE
PROCESSING TIME = 0.52
NUMBER OF STATES IN MODEL = 10
NUMBER OF TRANSITIONS IN MODEL = 13
5 DEATH STATES AGGREGATED INTO STATES I - 1
Thank you for using ASSIST, FER SURE
$ SURE
SURE V7.1 NASA Langley Research Center
i? READ TPNFS
2: NSI = 3;
3: LAMBDA = IE-4;
4: MU = 7.9E-5;
5: SIGMA = 2.56E-5;
6: MU_DEG = 6.3E-5;
7: SIGMA_DE = 1.74E-5;
8:
9:
10:
11: 2(* 3,0,3 *)
12: 3(* 2,1,3 *)
13: 3(* 2,1,3 *)
14: 4(* 3,0,2 *)
15: 5(* 2,1,2 *)
16: 5(* 2,1,2 *)
17: 6(* 3,0,1 *)
18: 7(* 2,1,1 *)
19: 7(* 2,1,1 *)
3(* 2,1,3 *) = 3*LAMBDA;
1(* 1,2,3 *) = 2*LAMBDA;
4(* 3,0,2 *) = <MU,SIGMA>;
S(* 2,1,2 *) : 3*LAMBDA;
I(* 1,2,2 *) : 2*LAMBDA;
6(* 3,0,1 *) = <MU,SIGMA>;
7(* 2,1,1 *) = 3*LAMBDA;
1(* 1,2,1 *) = 2*LAMBDA;
8(* 3,0,0 *) = <MU,SIGMA>;
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Number of Spares Number of States Number of Transitions
0
1
2
3
lO
I00
12
15
36
306
4
7
10
13
34
304
Table 1: Model Sizes for Triad of Processors with Spares
20:
21:
22:
23:
24 :
25:
28 :
27:
8(* 3,0,0 *),
9(* 2,1,0 *),
9(* 2,1,0 *),
10(* 1,0,0 *),
9(* 2,1,0 *) = 3*LAMBDA;
1(* 1,2,0 *) = 2*LAMBDA;
i0(* 1,0,0 *) = <MU_DEG,SIGMA_DEG>;
1(* 0,1,0 *) = I*LAMBDA;
(* NUMBER OF STATES IN MODEL = I0 *)
(* NUMBER OF TRANSITIONS IN MODEL = 13 *)
(* 5 DEATH STATES AGGREGATED STATES 1 - 1 *)
0.83 SECS. TO READ MODEL FILE
287 RUN
MODEL FILE = TPNFS.MOD SURE V7.1 7-JUN-1989 13:39:09
LOWERBOUND UPPERBOUND
.................................
4.71208E-II 4.74718E-11
5 PATH(S) PROCESSED
0.060 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
29? EXIT
COMMENTS RUN #1
The value of NSI can be changed to model systems with different numbers of spare
processors initially. As shown in table 9.1, changing this single value can have a significant
effect on the size of the model generated.
9.2 Triad with Instantaneous Detection of Warm Spare Failure
This section builds on the previous model by allowing the spare to fail. However, the model
is still simplistic in that it assumes that the system always detects a failed spare. Thus, a
failed spare is never brought into the active configuration:
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NSI = 3;
LAMBDA = IE-4;
GAMMA = IE-6;
MU = 7.9E-5;
SIGMA = 2.56E-5;
MU_DEG = 6.3E-5;
SIGMA_DEG = 1.74E-5;
(* nwnber of spares initially *)
(* failure rate of active processors *)
(* failure ra_e of spares *)
(* mean _ime to replace with spare _)
(* start, dev. of _ime to replace with spare *)
(* mean time to degrade to simplex *)
(* stan. dev. of time to degrade to simplex *)
SPACE = (NW: 0..3,
NF: 0..3,
NS: O..NSI);
(* number of working processors *)
(* number of failed active procssors *)
(* number of spares *)
START = (3,0,NSI);
IF NW > 0 (* a processor can fail *)
TRANTO (NW-I,NF+I,NS) BY NW*LAMBDA;
IF (NF > O) AND (NS > O) (* a spare becomes active *)
TRANTO (NW+I,NF-I,NS-I) BY <MU,SIGMA>;
IF (NF > O) AND (NS = O) (* no more spares, degrade to simplex *)
TRANTO (I,0,0) BY <MU_DEG,SIGMA_DEG>;
IF NS > 0 (* a spare fails and is detected *)
TRANTO (NW,NF,NS-I) BY NS*GAMMA;
DEATHIF NF >= NW;
Since failed spares can never be brought into the active configuration, there is no reason
to keep track of these spares once they fail. Thus, no state space variable was defined to
keep track of the number of failed spares, and the transition depicting a spare failing simply
decrements the number of spare processors by one.
9.3 Degradable Triad with Non-Detectable Spare Failure
In the previous models we assumed that the spare does not fail while inactive or that its
failure was immediately detected. These are clearly non-conservative assumptions. In this
example we will investigate _he other extreme--not only can the spares fail (i.e. warm) but
the spare's fault remains undetectable until brought into the active configuration. The model
in this example utilizes a different failure rate for the spares than for the active processors.
This failure rate is varied over a range (up to the active processor rate) to see the advantage
of cold spares. This comparison would be n_re reahstic if the increase in recovery time due
to having to initialize the warm spare had been modeled.
NSI = 3;
LAMBDA = 1E-4;
GAMMA = 1E-6;
MU = 7.9E-5;
SIGMA = 2.56E-5;
(* number of spares ini_ially *)
(* failure ra_e of active processors *)
(* failure rate of spares *)
(* mean time to replace with spare *)
(* start, dev. of time to replace wi_h spare *)
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MU_DEG = 6.3E-5;
SIGMA_DEG = 1.74E-5;
SPACE = (NW: 0..3,
NF: 0..3,
NWS: O..NSI,
NFS: O..NSI);
(* mean $ime $o degrade _o simplex *)
(* s%an. dev. of %ime _o degrade %0 simplex *)
(* number of working processors *)
(* number of failed active processors *)
(* number of working spares *)
(* number of failed spares *)
START = (3,0,NSI,O);
PRG = NWS/(NWS+NFS); (* probabili%y of switching in a good spare *)
(* processor failure *)
IF NW > 0 TRANTO (NW-I,NF+I,NWS,NFS) BY NW*LAMBDA;
IF (NF > O) AND (NWS+NFS > O) THEN (* reconfigure using a spare *)
(* a good spare becomes active *)
IF NWS > 0 TRANTD (NW+I,NF-I,NWS-1,NFS) BY <MU,SIGMA,PRG>;
(* a failed spare becomes ac%ive *)
IF NFS > 0 TRANT0 (NW,NF,NWS,NFS-I) BY <MUoSIGMA,I-PRG>;
ENDIF;
IF (NF > O) AND (NWS+NFS = O) (* no more spares, degrade %o simplex *)
TRANTO (I,0,0,0 BY <MU_DEG,SIGMA_DEG>;
IF NWS > 0 (* a spare fails *)
TKANTO (NW,NF,NWS-I,NFS+I) BY NS*GAMMA;
DEATHIF NF >= NW;
When reconfiguration occurs, the probability of switching in a good spare (_ersus a failed
spare is equal to the current proportion of good spares to failed spares in the system. The
variable PRG is used to calculate this probability. When all of the spares are good, the
probability of switching in a good spare is one, and the probability of switching in a bad
spare is zero. Conversely, when all of the spares have failed, the probability of switching in
a good spare is zero, and the probability of switching in a bad spare is one. The tests NWS
> 0 and NFS > 0 check for these two cases and prevent the generation of a transition when
it is inappropriate.
9.4 Degradable Triad with Partial Detection of Spare Failure
If the system is designed with off-line diagnostics for the spares, this must be included in the
model. Two aspects of an off-line diagnostic must be considered: (1) a diagnostic usually
cannot detect all possible faults and (2) a diagnostic requires time to execute. The first
aspect is sometimes referred to as the "coverage" of the diagnostic. We will avoid the term
"coverage" since it is used in so many different ways by different people and is thus confusing.
Instead, we will just call it the "fraction of detectable faults" and assign it an identifer, K. It
is necessary to expand the state space to keep track of whether a fault in a spare is detectable
or undetectable:
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SPACE = (NW: 0,.3,
NF: 0..3,
NWS: O..NSI,
NDFS: O..NSI,
NUFS: O..NSI);
(* ntunber of working processors *)
(* number of failed active procssors *)
(* number of working spares *)
(* number of detectable failed spares *)
(* number of undeteczable failed spares *)
The second aspect requires thal.-a rule be added to generate transitions which decrement
the NDFS state-space variable according to some fast. general recovery distribution:
IF NDFS > 0 (* "detectable" spare-failure is detected *)
TRANTO (NW,NF,NWS,NDFS-1,NUFS) BY <MU_SPD,SIGMA_SPD>;
No such transition is generated for "NUFS" faults.
The active processor failure TRANTO rule is the same as in the previous example, except
that the state space is larger. The spare failure TRANT0 rule must be altered to include
whether the failure is detectable or not:
IF NWS > 0 THEN (* a spare fails *)
TRANTO (NW,NF,NWS-I,NDFS+I,NUFS) BY K*NS*GAMMA; (* detectable fault *)
TRANTO (NW,NF,NWS-I,NDFS,NUFS+$) BY (I-K)*NS*GAMMA; (* undetectable faul% *)
ENDIF;
Note that the rates are multipled by K and (l-K).
The reconfiguration rule is now more complicated than in the previous example. Three
possibilities exist: (1) the faulty active processor is replaced with a working spare, (2) the
faulty processor is replaced with a spare containing a detectable fault and (3) the faulty
processor is replaced with a spare containing an undetectable fault. The probability of each
of these cases are PRW, PRD, and PRU, respectively, defined as follows:
PRW = NWS/(NWS+NDFS+NUFS);
PRD = NDFS/(NWS+NDFS+NUFS);
PRU = NUFS/(NWS+NDFS+NUFS);
(* prob. working spare is used *)
(* prob. spare w/ detectable fault is used *)
(* prob. spare w/ undezeczable fault is used *)
The reconfiguration rule is:
IF (NF > O) AND (NWS+NDFS+NUF5 > O) THEN (* a spare becomes active *)
IF NWS > 0 TRANTO (NW+I,NF-I,NWS-I,NDFS,NUF5) BY <MU,SIGMA,PRW>;
IF NDFS > 0 TR4NTO (NW,NF,NWS,NDFS-I,NUFS) BY <MU,SIGMA,PRD>;
IF NUFS > 0 TRANTO (NW,NF,NWS,NDFS,NUFS-I) BY <MU,SIGMA,PRU>;
ENDIF;
The complete model is:
NSI = 3;
LAMBDA = IE-4;
GAMMA = 1E-6;
MU = 7.9E-5;
SIGMA = 2.56E-5;
(* number of spares ini%ially *)
(* failure raze of active processors *)
(* failure rate of spares *)
(* mean _ime to replace with spare *)
(* start, dev. of time %o replace wizh spare *)
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MU_DEG = 6.3E-5;
SIGMA_DEG = 1.74E-5;
(* mean time ¢o degrade ¢o simplex *)
(* start, dev. of time to degrade ¢o simplex *)
K = 0.9;
MU_SPD = 2.6E-3;
SIGMA_SPD = 1.2E-3;
(* fraction of faults that the
spare off-line diagnostic can detec¢ *)
(* mean time %o diagnose a failed spare *)
(* s¢andard deviation of time _o diagnose *)
SPACE = (NW: 0..3,
NF: 0..3,
NWS: O..NSI,
NDFS: O..NSI,
NUFS: O..NSI);
(* number of working processors *)
(* number of failed active procssors *)
(* number of working spares .)
(* number of de$ec_able failed spares *)
(* number of undeeectable failed spares *)
START = (3,0,NSI,O,O);
IF NW > 0 (* a processor can fail *)
TRANTO (NW-1,NF+I_NWS,NDFS,NUI_S) BY NW*LAMBDA;
IF NWS > 0 THEN (* a spare fails *)
TRANT0 (NW,NF,NWS-1,NDFS+I,NUFS) BY K*NS*GAMMA; (* detectable fault *)
TRANTO (NW,NF,NWS-1,NDFS,NU?S+I) BY (1-K)*NS*GAMMA; (* unde%ec_able fault *)
ENDIF;
PRW = NWS/(NWS+NDFS+NUFS); (* prob. a working spare is reconfiguzed *)
PRD= NDFS/(NWS+NDFS+NUFS); (* prob. a spare w/ de%. f. is reconfigured *)
PRU = NUFS/(NWS+NDFS+NUFS); (* prob. a spare w/ unde¢ f. is reconfigured *)
IF (NF > O) AND (NWS+NDFS+NUFS > O) THEN (* a spare becomes active *)
IF NWS > 0 TRANTO (N_+I,NF-I,NWS-I,NDFS,NUFS) BY <MU,SIGMA,PRW>;
IF NDFS > 0 TRANTO (NW,NF,NWS,NDFS-I,NUFS) BY <MU,SIGMA,PRD>;
IF NUFS > 0 TRANT8 (NW,NF,NWS,NDFS,NUFS-I) BY <MU,SIGMA,PRU>;
ENDIF;
IF (NF > O) AND (NWS+NDFS+NUFS = O) (* no more spares, degrade to simplex *)
TRANTD (1,0,0,0,0) BY <MU_DEG,SIGMA_DEG>;
IF NDFS > 0 (* "de%ec%able" spare-failure is de%ected *)
TRANTO (NW,NF,NWS,NDFS-I,NUFS) BY <MU_SPD,SIGMA_SPD>;
DEATHIF NF >= NW;
In this section, systems consisting of a single reconfigurable triad were modeled. In
the following section, systems consisting of multiple sets of these reconfigurable triads are
discussed.
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10 Multiple Triads
This section starts with a simple model of two triads sharing a pool of cold spares. In later
models, various reconfiguration concepts are introduced and spare failures are included.
These models are then generalized to model more than two triads. Finally, the section
concludes with a general discussion of how to model multiple competing recoveries.
10.1 Two Triads with Pooled Cold Spares
In this section we will model a system which consists of two triads which operate inde-
pendently but replace faulty processors from a common pool of spares. When the pool of
spares runs out, the triads continuing operating with faulty processors and do not degrade
to simplex. The system fails when either triad has two faulty processors. This can happen
because a second fault occurs in a triad before the first faulty processor can be replaced by
an available spare or because the supply of spares to replace the faulty processors has been
exhausted. For this model, it is assumed that the spares do not fail while they are inactive.
To facilitate performing trade-off studies, we will use the ASSIST INPUT statement to
define a constant to represent the initial number of spares in the system. The ASSIST
program will query the user interactively for the value of this constant before generating the
model.
Since the triads do not degrade to a simplex configuration, there is no need to keep
track of the current number of processors in a triad. Thus, the state of each triad can be
represented by a single variable---NW, number working. Similarly, the spares do not fail
while they are inactive, so their state can be represented by a single variable--NS, number
of spares available. Thus, the state space is:
SPACE = (NWi, NW2, N_SPARES);
The full model description is:
(* TWO TRIADS WITH POOL OF SPARES *)
INPUT N_SPARES;
LAMBDA_P = IE-4;
DELTAI = 3.6E3;
DELTA2 = 6.3E3;
(* Number of spaces *)
(* Failure ra_e of ac$ive processors *)
(* Reconfigura_ion ra_e of triad I *)
(* Reconfigura$ion ra_e of _riad 2 *)
SPACE = (NWI,
NW2,
NS);
(* Number of ::orking processors in _riad I *)
(* Number of working processors in _riad 2 *)
(* Number of spare processors *)
START = (3, 3, N_SPARES);
(* Active processor failure *)
IF NWl > 0 TRANTO NWI = NWI-I BY NWI*LAMBDA_P;
IF NW2 > 0 TRANTO NW2 = NW2-1 BY NW2*LAMBDA_P;
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(* Replace failed processor wi_h workinE spare *)
IF (NWI < 3) AND (NS > O) TRANTO NWI = NWI+I, NS = NS-I BY FAST DELTA1;
IF (NW2 < 3) AND (N$ > O) TRANTO NW2 = NW2÷I, NS = N$-I BY FAST DELTA2;
DEATHIF NW1 < 2;
DEATHIF NW2 < 2;
(* Two faults in triad I is sys%em failure *)
(* Two faul%s in triad 2 is system failure *)
The start state is (3, 3, N.SPARES) which indicates that both triads have a full complement
of working processors and the number of initial spares is N_SPARES. The first two TRAICr0
rules define the fault arrival process in each triad. This is accomplished by decrementing
either NW1 or NW2 depending upon which triad experiences the failure. The next two
TI_NTO rules define recovery by replacing the faulty processor with a spare. Note that this
is conditioned upon NS > 0--if there are no spares recovery cannot take place. The result
of reconfiguration is replacement of the faulty processor with a working processor (i.e. NWx
= NWx ÷ 1 for triad x) and depletion of 1 spare from the pool (i.e. NS = NS - 1). The
system fails whenever either triad experiences two or more coincident faults (i.e. (NWl <
2) or (NW2 < 2)).
This system has two different recovery processes--recovery in triad 1 and recovery in triad
2--that can potentially occur at the same time. Since this model was developed assuming
that the completion times for both recovery processes are exponentially distributed, the
SURE keyword FAST was used, and the SURE program will automatically calculate the
conditionaJ recovery rates wherever these two recovery processes compete. This feature was
described in section 5.2.7. Modeling of multiple competing recovery processes that are not
exponentially distributed is discussed in section 10.8. How to model systems in which the
competing recoveries are not independent are also discussed in that section.
10.2 Two Triads with Pooled Cold Spares Reducable to One
Triad
The model given above can be modified easily to describe a system that can survive with
only 1 triad. This strategy was used in the FTMP system [16]. If spares are available, the
system reconfigures by replacing a faulty processor with a spare. If no spares are available,
the faulty triad is removed and its good processors are added to the spares pool. There is
one exception, however. When there is only one triad left, the system maintains the faulty
triad until it can no longer out-vote the faulty processor, i.e. until the second fault arrival.
As before, this model assumes that the spares are cold--they do not fail while inactive.
The state space must be modified to indude the notion of whether a triad is active or not.
This is accomplished by setting NWx = 0 when triad x is inactive. The number of triads is
maintained in a state space variable NT. Although this is redundant--the number of active
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triads can be determined by looking at NW1 and NW2--the inclusion of this extra state
space variable greatly simplifies the ASSIST input description. Thus, the state space is:
SPACE = (NW1,
NW2,
NT,
NS);
(* Number of working processors in triad I *)
(* Number of working processors in triad 2 *)
(* Number of active triads *)
(* Number of spare processors *)
The initial state is (3, 3, 2, N.SPARES). The DEATtIIF statement becomes:
DEATHIF (NWI = I) OR (NW2 = I);
Note that the statement DEATHIF (NW1 < 2) OR (NW2 < 2) ; would be wrong. This would
conflict with the strategy of setting NWx equal to 0 when triad x becomes inactive. Note
also that the condition (NW1 = 0) AND (NW2 = 0) is also not included. This clause could
be added but it would not change the model. This follows because the last triad is never
collapsed into spares. Thus, this condition can never be satisfied.
Next, we define two new constants OMEGA1 and OMEGA2 which define the rate at
which triads are collapsed when no spares are available:
OMEGAI = 5.6E3;
OMEGA2 = 8.3E3;
(* Collapsing ra_e of _riad I *)
(* Collapsin E rate of triad 2 *)
The fault arrival rules are the same as in the previous model. However, the reconfiguration
specification must be altered. The rules for each triad x are
IF (NWx = 2) AND (NS > O) TKANTO NWx = NWx+I, NS = NS-1
BY FAST DELTAx;
IF (NWx = 2) AND (NS = O) AND (NT > I) TRANTO NWx = O, NS = NS+2, NT = NT-I
BY FAST OMEGAx;
The first rule above defines reconfiguration by replacement with a spare. Thus, this rule is
conditioned by (NS > 0). The second rule defines the collapsing of a triad when no spares
are available, i.e. when NS = 0. Note that the condition (NT > 1) prevents the collapse of
the last triad. The complete model is:
(* TWO TRIADS WITH POOL OF SPARES --> I TRIAD *)
INPUT N_SPARES;
LAMBDAI = IE-4;
LAMBDA2 = 1E-4;
DELTA1 = 3.6E3;
DELTA2 = 6.3E3;
OMEGA1 = 5.6E3;
OMEGA2 = 8.3E3;
SPACE = (NWI,
NW2,
NT,
(* Number of spares *)
(* Failure rate of active processors *)
(* Failure ra_e of active processors *)
(* Reconfiguration rate of triad I *)
(* Reconfigura_ion rate of triad 2 *)
(* Collapsing rate of triad i *)
(* Collapsing rate of _riad 2 *)
(* Number of working processors in triad I *)
(* Number of working processors in triad 2 *)
(* Number of active triads *)
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NS); (* Number of spare processors *)
START = (3, 3, 2, N_SPARES);
(* Active processor failure *)
IF (NW1 > O) TRANTO NW1 = NWI-1 BY NWI*LAMBDAI;
IF (NW2 > O) TKANTO NW2 = NW2-1 BY NW2*LAMBDA2;
(* Replace failed processor wi_h working spare *)
IF (NW1 = 2) AND (NS > O) TRANTO NW1 = NWI+I, NS = NS-1 BY FAST DELTA1;
IF (NW2 = 2) AND (NS > O) TRANTO NW2 = NW2÷I, NS = NS-1 BY FAST DELTA2;
IF (NW1 = 2) AND (NS = O) AND (NT > 1) TRANTO NW1 = O, NS = NS+2, NT = NT-1
BY FAST OMEGA1; (* Degrade _o one _riad only -- triad 2 *)
IF (NW2 = 2) AND (NS = O) AND (NT > 1) TRANTO NW2 = O, NS = NS+2, NT = NT-1
BY FAST OMEGA2; (* Degrade _o one _riad only -- triad I*)
DEATHIF (NWl = I) OR (NW2 = 1);
10.3 Two Degradable Triads with Pooled Cold Spares
The system modeled in this section consists of two triads which can degrade to a simplex.
However, unlike the previous example, this system requires the throughput of two processors.
Therefore, the system does not degrade to one triad. Instead, when no more spares are
available, the system degrades the faulty triad into a simplex. The extra non-faulty processor
is added to the spares pool.
In this system each of the two triads can be degraded into a simplex. Therefore, it is
necessary to add state space variables that indicate whether the active configuration is a
triad or simplex. Otherwise it is impossible to determine whether each state which satisfies
the condition NWx = 1 for triad x is a failed state (i.e. 1 good out of three) or an operational
state (i.e. 1 good out of 1). Thus, two state space variables, NC1 and NC2, are added to the
model to indicate the total number of processors in the current configuration of each triad.
If triad x still has three active processors, then NCx = 3; if triad x has already degraded to
a simplex, then NCx = 1. The complete state space is:
SPACE = (NCl, (* Number of active processors in _riad I *)
NWI, (* Number of working processors in _riad 1 *)
NC2, (* Number of active processors in _riad 2 *)
NW2, (* Number of working processors in _riad 2 *)
NS); (* Number of spare processors *)
The initial state is (3, 3, 3, 3, N_SPARES) where N_SPARES represents the number of
processors in the spares pool initially. The processor failure rules are the same as in previous
models. As expected, the reconfiguration rules must be altered. These rules for each triad
are
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IF (NWx < 3) AND (NCx = 3) AND (NS > O) TRANTO NWx = NWx+I, NS = NS-I
BY FAST DELTAx; (* Replace failed processor wi_h working spare *)
IF (NWx < 3) AND <NS = O) AND (NCx=3) TRANTO NCx = i, NWx = I, NS = NS+I
BY FAST OMEGAx; (* Degrade to simplex *)
where x represents triad 1 or triad 2. The first rule describes the replacement of a faulty
processor in a triad with a spare. Note that the condition (NCx = 3) has been added. Oth-
erwise states with NWx = 1 and NCx = 1 (i.e. a good simplex processor) would erroneously
have a recovery transition leaving them. The second rule describes the process of degrading
a triad to a simplex. Note that this is only done when no spares are available, i.e. NS = 0.
Also, the extra non-faulty processor is returned to the spares_pool, i.e. NS = NS + 1. The
DEATHIF conditions are:
DEATHIF 2*NWx <= NCx;
for each triad x. This restricts the operational states to only those where a majority of the
processors are working. The complete specification is:
(* TWO DEGRADABLE TRIADS WITH A POOL OF SPARES *)
INPUT N_SPARES;
LAMBDA1 = IE-4;
LAMBDA2 = 1E-4;
DELTA1 = 3.6E3;
DELTA2 = 6.3E3;
OMEGA1 = 5.6E3;
OMEGA2 = 8.3E3;
SPACE = (NCl,
NWI,
NC2,
NW2,
NS);
(* Number of spares *)
(* Failure ra_e of active processors *)
(* Failure rate of active processors *)
(* Reco_figuraZion ra_e of _riad I *)
(* Reconfiguration rate of triad 2 *)
(* Reconfigura_ion rate of _riad I *)
(* Reconfiguration rate of _riad 2 *)
(* Number of active processors in triad I *)
(* Number of working processors in triad I *)
(* Number of active processors in zriad 2 *)
(* Number of working processors in triad 2 *)
(* Number of spare processors *)
START = (3, 3, 3, 3, N_SPARES);
(* AcZive processor failure *)
IF NWI > 0 TRANTO NW1 = NWI-I BY NWI*LAMBDAI;
IF NW2 > 0 TRANTO NW2 = NW2-1 BY NW2*LAMBDA2;
(* Replace failed processor wizh working spare *)
IF (NWI < 3) AND (NCl = 3) AND (NS > O) TRANTO NWI = NWI+I, NS = NS-I
BY FAST DELTAI;
IF (NW2 < 3) AND (NC2 = 3) AND (NS > O) TRANTO NW2 = NW2+I, NS = NS-I
BY FAST DELTA2;
(* Degrade to simplex *)
IF (NWI < 3) AND (NS = O) AND (NCI=3) TRANTO NC1 = I, NWI = i, NS = NS+I
BY FAST OMEGA1;
IF (NW2 < 3) AND (NS = O) AND (NC2=3) TRANTO NC2 = I, NW2 = i, NS = NS+I
BY FAST OMEGA2;
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DEATHIF 2*NWl <= NCI;
DEAITIF 2*NW2 <= NC2;
All of the previous models have used the simplifying assumption that spare processors
cannot fail until they are brought into the active configuration. While this assumption
significantly simphfies the modehng, it is too optimistic an assumption for many systems,
especially those with long mission times.
10.4 Two Degradable Triads with Pooled Warm Spares
The models presented above can be generahzed by allowing the spares to fail while inactive.
This is easily done if we make a simplifying assumption that the system can instantly detect
the failure of a warm spare. This can be accomphshed by adding the following statements
to the model descriptions:
LAMBDA_S = 1E-5; (* Failure raze of inactive warm spare *)
IF NS > 0 TRANTO NS = NS - I BY NS*LAMBDA_S;
If the failure of a warm spare is not detectable while it is inactive, the state space must
be enlarged by adding a new variable NFS to count the number of failed warm spares. The
above rules are modified to be:
LAMBDA_S = 1E-5; (* Failure rate of inactive warm spare *)
IF NS > NFS TRANTO NS = NS - 1 BY (NS-NFS)*LAMBDA;
Also the reconfiguration process must be generalized to include two distinct results: (1) a
faulty warm spare is broughi into the active configuration, and (2) a working warm spare is
brought into the active configuration.
Thus, the model presented in section 10.3 can be modified to describe a system of two
degradable triads with a pool of warm spares:
(* TWO DEGRADABLE TRIADS WITH A POOL OF WARM SPARES *)
INPUT N_SPARES;
LAMBDAI = IE-4;
LAMBDA2 = IE-4;
LAMBDA_S = IE-5;
DELTA1 = 3.6E3;
DELTA2 = 6.3E3;
OMEGA1 = 5.6E3;
OMEGA2 = 8.3E3;
SPACE = (NCl,
(* Number of spares *)
(* Failure rate of active processors *)
(* Failure rate of active processors *)
(* Failure rate of active processors *)
(* ReconfiEuration rate of triad I *)
(* Reconfiguration rate of triad 2 *)
(* Reconfigura_ion ra_e of _riad I *)
(* ReconfiEuration ra_e of triad 2 *)
(* Number of active processors in triad 1 *)
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NWI,
NC2,
NW2,
NS,
NWS);
(* Number of working processors in triad I *)
(* Number of active processors in triad 2 *)
(* Number of working processors in triad 2 *)
(* Total number of warm spares *)
(* Number of working warm spares*)
START = (3, 3, 3, 3, N_SPARES, N_SPARES);
IF NWI > 0 TRANTO NWI = NWI-I BY NWI*LAMBDA1;
IF NW2 > 0 TRANTO NW2 = NW2-1 BY NW2*LAMBDA2;
IF NWS > 0 TRANTO NWS = NWS-I BY NWS*LAMBDA_S;
(* Active processor failure *)
(* Active processor failure *)
(* Warm spare failure *)
IF (NS > O) AND (NWS > O) THEN
IF (NWl < 3) AND (NCl = 3)
TRANTO NW1 = NWI+I, NS = NS-I, NWS = NWS -
BY FAST (NWS/NS)*DELTAI;
IF (NW2 < 3) AND (NC2 = 3) AND (NS > O)
TRANTO NW2 = NW2+I, NS = NS-1, NWS = NWS -
BY FAST (NWS/NS)*DELTA2;
ENDIF;
(, Replace with working spare *)
i
IF (NS > O) AND (NS > NWS) THEN (* Replace with failed spare *)
IF (NWI < 3) AND (NCI = 3)
TRANTO NS = NS-I BY FAST [(NS-NWS)/NSJ*DELTAI;
IF (NW2 < 3) AND (NC2 = 3)
TRANTO NS = NS-I BY FAST [(NS-NWS)/NS]*DELTA2;
ENDIF;
IF (NWI < 3) AND (NS = O) AND (NC1=3) (* Degrade so simplex *)
TRANTO NCl = 1, NWI = 1, NS = NS+I BY FAST 8MEGAI;
IF (NW2 < 3) AND (NS = O) AND (NC2=S) (* Degrade So simplex *)
TRANTO NC2 = I, NW2 = 1, NS = NS+I BY FAST OMEGA2;
DEATHIF 2*NW1 <= NC1;
DEATHIF 2*NW2 <= NC2;
10.5 Multiple Non-degradable Triads with Pooled Cold Spares
This section demonstrates development of a generalized description that can be used to model
an arbitrary number of triads. This will be accomplished by creating a general specification
that will work for any number of initial triads and having the ASSIST program prompt for
a specific value in order to generate a specific model.
For simplicity, we will first investigate a system which is incapable of collapsing a triad
into either a simplex or into spares. Thus, this system fails when any triad fails. We will
also simplify this first model by assuming we have cold spares that cannot fail until they are
brought into the active configuration. The complete generalized specification is:
(* MULTIPLE TRIADS WITH POOL OF COLD SPARES *)
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INPUT N_TRIADS;
INPUT N_SPARES;
LAMBDA = IE-4;
(* Number of _riads ini_ially *)
(* Number of spares *)
(* Failure ra_e of active processors *)
SPACE = (NW: ARRAY[I..N_TRIADS] OF 0..3, (* Number working procs per %riad *)
NS); (* Number of spare processors *)
STAKT = (N_TRIADS OF 3, N_SPARES);
FOR J = 1, N_TRIADS;
(* Active processor failure *)
IF NW[J] > 0 TRANTO NW[J] = NW[J]-I BY NW[J]*LAMBDA;
(* Replace failed processor wi_h workinK spare *)
IF (NW[J] < 3) AND (NS > O) TRANTO NW[J] =-NW[J]+I, NS = NS-1
BY FAST DELTA'J;
DEATHIF NWEJ] < 2; (* Two faul_s in a _riad is system failure *)
ENDFOR;
The array state space variable NW contains a value for each triad representing a count of
the number of working processors in that triad. Similarly, the FOR loop (which terminates at
the ENDFOR statement) defines for each triad (t) the active processor failures in that triad_
(2) the replacement of failed processors in that triad with spares from the pool, and (3) the
conditions for that triad that result in system failure.
To accommodate systems with differing reconfiguration rates for different triads, the con-
catenation feature was used in the rate expression of the reconfiguration TRAFr0 statement.
The expression BY FAST DELTA_J within the FOR loop results in a reconfiguration rate of
"FAST DELTAI," for triad 1, "FAST DELTA2," for triad 2, etc. Unfortunately, since the
number of triads is unknown until run time (i.e. H_TRIADS is specified using the INPUT
statement), there is no way to assign values to these identifiers. This must be done by editing
the output file or entering them at SURE run time. For simplicity, the rest of the models in
this section will assume that all triads have the same reconfiguration rates.
10.6 Multiple Degradable Triads with Pooled Cold Spares
In this section, the simple model given above will be modified to allow degradation of triads.
When no more spares are available, each faulty triad is broken up and the non-faulty proces-
sors are added to the spares pool. It is assumed that the system can operate with degraded
performance with the throughpu! of only one processor. In other words, although the initial
configuration consists of mutiple triads, the system can still maintain its vital functions with
only 1 triad remaining.
Since we are going to be breaking up triads, we need a way of deciding if a triad is active.
This will be done by adding an array state-space variable NP to keep track of the number of
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actzve processors in a triad. This will have the value of three for each triad initially and will
be set to zero for each triad when it is broken up. The array state space variable NFP keeps a
count of the number of failed processors active in each triad. The state space variable NT is
used to keep track of how many triads are still in operation. This variable will always equal
the number of nonzero entries in array NP. Thus, it is in some sense redundant. However,
the specification of the TKANTO is simplified by including it in the SPACE statement.
The specification is:
(* MULTIPLE TRIADS WITH POOL OF WARM SPARES *)
INPUT N_TRIADS;
INPUT N_SPARES;
LAMBDA = IE-4;
DELTA1 = 3.6E3;
DELTA2 = 5.1E3;
(* Number of %riads iniZially *)
(* Number of spares *)
(* Failure ra%e of ac%ive processors *)
(* Reconfiguration ra%e to switch in spare *)
(* Reconfiguration ra%e %o break up a %riad *)
SPACE = (NP: ARRAY[I..N_TRIADS]
NFP : ARRAY [I..N_TRIADS]
NS, (*
NT: O..N_TRIADS) ; (*
0F 0..3, (* Number of processors per %riad *)
Of 0..3, (* Num. failed active procs/%riad *)
Number of spare processors *)
Number of non-failed %riads *)
START = (N_TRIADS OF 3, N_TRIADS OF O, N_SPARES, N_TRIADS);
FOR J = I, N_TRIADS;
IF NP[J] > NFP[J] TRANT0 NFP[J] = NFP[J]+I
BY (NP[J]-NFP[J])*LAMBDA; (* Ac%ive processor failure *)
IF NFP[J] > 0 THEN
IF NS > 0 THEN TRANTO NFP[J] = NFP[J]-I, NS = NS-I
BY FAST NFP[J]*DELTAI;
(* Replace failed processor wi%h working spare *)
ELSE
IF NT > I TRANTO NP[J]=O, NFP[J]=O, NS = NS + (NP[J]-NFP[J]), NT = NT-I
BY FAST DELTA2;
(* Break up a failed triad when no spares available *)
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
DEATHIF 2 * NFP[3] >= NP[J] AND NP[J] > O;
(* Two faul%s in a_n ac%ive _riad is sys%em failure *)
ENDFOR;
As before, all of the TRANT0 and DEATHIF statements are set inside of a FOR loop so that
they are repeated for each triad. The first TKANT0 statement defines failure of an active
processor. When there is an active failed processor in a triad, the second TKANT0 statement
replaces that failed processor with one from the pool of spares. If there are no spares available,
then the faulty triad is broken up and its working processors are put into the spares pool.
fi5
(This assumesthat the systemcan determinewhich processorhas failed with 100lasttriad
in the system(i.e., NT <= 1) then the triad is not broken up. The last triad is allowedto
continueoperation with one faulty processoruntil another of its processorsfa_ls_defeating
the voter. The singleDEATHIFstatementcapturesthe occurrenceof the secondfault in the
last triad aswell asnear-coincidentfaults in the other triads.
The following sequenceof statesrepresentsa typic_ path through the model:
(3,3,3,0,0,0,1,3) -> (3,3,3,0,0,1,1,3) ->
(3,3,3,1,0,0,0,3) -> (0,3,3,0,0,0,2,2) ->
(0,3,3,0,0,0,1,2) -> (0,3,3,1,0,0,1,2) ->
(0,3,3,0,1,0,0,2) -> (0,0,3,0,0,0,2,2) ->
(3,3,3,0,0,0,0,3) ->
(0,3,3,0,1,0,2,2) ->
(0,3,3,0,0,0,0,2) ->
10.7' Multiple Degradable Triads with Pooled Warm Spares
The model given above can be easily modified to include spare failures:
(* MULTIPLE TRIADS WITH POOL OF WARM SPARES *)
INPUT N_TRIADS;
INPUT N_SPARES;
LAMBDA_P = IE-4;
LAMBDA_S = 1E-5;
DELTA1 = 3.6E3;
DELTA2 = 5.1E3;
(* Number of triads ini%ially *)
(* Number of spares *)
(* Failure rate of active processors *)
(* Failure ra%e of warm spare processors *)
(* Reconfiguration ra_e to swi%ch in spare *)
(* Reconfigura%ion ra%e %0 break up a %riad *)
SPACE = (NP: AKRAY[I..N_TRIADS] OF 0..3, (* Number of processors per %riad *)
NFP: ARRAY[1..N_TRIADSJ Of 0..3, (* Num. failed active procs/triad *)
NS, (* Number of spare processors *)
NFS, (* Number of failed spare processors *)
NT: O..N_TRIADS); (* Number of non-failed _riads *)
START = (N_TRIADS OF 3, N_TRIADS OF O, N_SPARES, O, N_TRIADS);
IF NS > NFS TRANTO NFS = NFS+I BY (NS-NFS)*LAMBDA_S; (* Spare failure *)
FOR J = I, N_TRIADS;
IF NP[J] > NFP[J] TRANTO NFP[J] = NFP[J]+I
BY (NP[JJ-NFP[J])*LAMBDA_P; (* At%ire processor failure *)
IF NFP[J] > 0 THEN
IF NS > 0 THEN
IF NS > NFS TRANTO NFP[J] = NFP[JJ-I, NS = NS-I
BY FAST (I- (NFS/NS)),NFF [J] *DELTA1 ;
(* Replace failed processor wi_h working spare *)
IF NFS > 0 TRANTO NS = NS-I, NFS = NFS-I
BY FAST (NFS/NS)*NFP[J]*DELTAI;
(* Replace failed processor wi_h failed spare *)
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ELSE
IF NT > I TRANTO NP[J]=O, NFP[J]=O, NS = NP[J]-NFP[J], NT = NT-I
BY FAST DELTA2;
(* Break up a failed triad when no spares available *)
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
DEATHIF 2 * NFP[J] >= NP[J] AND NP[J] > O;
(* Two faults in an active triad is system failure *)
ENDFOR;
The additional state space variable, NFS, is needed to keep track of how many failed spares
are in the spares pool. The failure of spares is defined by the first TRANT0 statement. Note
the placement of this statement outside of the FOR loop--if this statement were incorrectly
placed inside of the F0R loop, it would be equivalent to having the spare failure rate multi-
plied by N_TRIADS. This model includes two TRANT0 statements to define replacement of
a failed processor with a spare. The first defines replacement of the failed processor with a
working spare, and it is conditioned on the existence of non-failed spares. The second defines
replacement of a failed processor with a failed spare, conditioned on the existence of failed
spares.
10.8 Multiple Competing Recoveries
In the preceding examples (i.e. multiple triads with pooled spares), we encountered the first
example of a model containing states with multiple recovery processes leaving a single state.
This occurs when multiple faults accumulate in different parts of the system which together
do not cause system failure. The diagram in figure 25 illustrates this concept: Here we have
two triads which are accumulating faults--the first at rate _1 and the second at rate A2. In
state (2,2,7) they both have a faulty processor active at the same time. This is not system
failure since the two failures are in separately voted triads. There are two possible recoveries
from this state--triad 1 recovers first then triad 2, or vice versa. Which case occurs depends
on how long each recovery takes.
In some systems, the recovery process may take longer when there is another recovery
also ongoing in the system. But even when the two recovery processes have no effect on
each other in the system, the presence of competing recoveries still impacts the transition
specification, since the SURE program requiies conditional means and conditional standard
deviations for the competing recovery processes. Consider the simple case where the two
recovery distributions are identical. On average, half of the time triad 1 will recover first, and
half of the time triad 2 will recover first. The conditional mean recovery time is the mean
of the minimum of the two competing recoveries times. The SURE program also requires
the specification of a third parameter--the transition probability. This is the probability
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Figure 25: Model With Multiple Competing Recoveries
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Figure 26: Triad 1 is Always Repaired First
that this transition will be traversed rather than one of the other fast transitions leaving this
state. The sum of the transition probabilities given for all of the fast transitions leaving a
state must equal one.
In the examples above, the recovery processes were assumed to be exponentially dis-
tributed, and the SURE FAST keyword was used to specify these transitions. As discussed
in section 5.2.7, for this special case the SURE program will automatically calculate the
conditional rates from the unconditional fast exponential rates given.
For systems with nonexponential recovery times or in which recovery times are affected by
the presence of other competing recoveries, the problem of competing recoveries can be dif-
ficult to model accurately. How the system actually behaves in state (2,2,7) of the two-triad
example depends upon the design of the redundancy management system. Many possibilities
exist.. To illustrate, three possible systems are discussed: (1) the system always repairs triad
1 first, (2) the system repairs both triads at the same time, and (3) two independent repair
processes take place.
The model for case (1), triad 1 alway_ repaired first, is shown in figure 26. Although
the two recovery transitions no longer occur simultaneously, the recovery transition rates,
R1..FIRST and R2_SECOND, may or may not have the same distribution as the noncom-
peting rates, R1 and R2. This depends on the system, and may be determined by analysis
or experimentation.
The case (2) mode] of both triads being repaired at the same time is shown in figure 27.
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Figure 27: Both Triads are Repaired at the Same Time
The mean and standard deviation of the multiple recovery transition must be determined ex-
perimentally. This can be accomplished by injecting two simultaneous faults and measuring
the time to recovery completion.
The third case, two independent repair processes, is shown in figure 28. Even if the two
recoveries are truly independent and not competing for resources, the transition rates will
still be different from the noncompeting rates because they are conditioned on "winning" the
competition. There is no way to analytically determine the conditional means and standard
deviations from the unconditional recovery distributions in general; therefore, these four
distributions must be measured experimentally.
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Figure 28: Two Independent, Repair Processes
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11 Transient and Intermittent Faults
Computer systems are susceptable to transient and intermittent faults as well as solid perma-
nent faults. Transient faults are faults which cause erroneous behavior for a short period of
time and then disappear. Intermittent faults are permanent faults which periodically exhibit
erroneous behavior then correct behavior. The problem with transient faults is that they
can confuse a reconfigurable system--if the system improperly diagnoses a transient fault as
a permanent fault, then a good processor is unnecessarily eliminated from the active config-
uration. Since they tend to occur more frequently than permanent faults, this can have a
significant impact on the probability of system failure. The problem with intermittent faults
is that they can deceive the operating system into diagnosing that the fault is transient
rather than permanent. Therefore, a processor experiencing an intermittent fault may be
left in operation much longer than a solid permanent fault or may be repeatedly removed,
restarted, and returned to operation. This makes the system vulnerable to near-coincident
faults for a much longer time than would a solid permanent fault, and also may increasing
the fault management overhead enough to degrade performance. Clearly a properly designed
system must deal effectively with these types of faults. Furthermore, the assessment of such
systems depends upon careful modeling of these faults.
11.1 Transient Fault Behavior
A transient fault may or may not generate errors which are detectable by the operating
system's voters. The following two timing graphs illustrate the two possible effects of a
transient fault:
Case 1: Reconfiguration does not occur
I I I I I I I I
s el e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 ... en
t< Z ..... >1
--> t
Case 2: Reconfiguration occurs
I I I I I I I I I
--> t
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where
s = time of fault arrival
ei = time of detection of the i th error (1 < i < n)
r = time operating system reconfigures
Z _ c n - 8
R -_- T-.s
These two cases represent the outcome of two competing processes--the disappearance of the
transient fault, and the reconfiguration process of the 5perating systein. In-the first, cffSe, Z is ................
a random variable which represents the duration of transient errors given that reconfiguration
does not occur, and R is a random variable which represents the reconfiguration time given
that. reconfiguration does occur. Let FR(r) represent the distribution of the reconfiguration
time (given that the system reconfigures).
FR(,') = ProblR < 7"] (1)
Let Fz(z) represent the distribution of the time for the disappearance of the transient fault
given that reconfiguration does not occur.
Fz(z) = Prob[Z < z] (2)
The first distribution FR can be directly observed. The second distribution Fz is more
troublesome to determine. The problem is that a fault produces errors which may persist long
after the fault has actually disappeared. Sometimes the errors disappear quickly, sometimes
they don't. The problem is that the exact time when the last error has disappeared is not
directly observable. However, determination of a worst-case result is often possible. This
maximum time of disappearance can sometimes be derived from the operating system code.
This follows from the fact that the operating system is responsible for the recovery from the
transient fault. If the operating system does not perform some type of "state-restoration"
process periodically, a transient fault is as damaging as a permanent fault. For example,
an alpha particle may flip a bit in memory. If this memory is not re-written, the error
will persist indefinitely. Therefore it is essential that the fault-tolerant operating system
periodically rewrite volatile memory with "voted" versions of the state.
11.2 Modeling Transient Faults
In this section we will investigate the problem of modeling a triplex system that is subject
to transient faults. First, a failure rate 7 must be determined for the transient class of
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Figure 29: Degradable Triad Subject to Transient Faults
faults (i.e. the rate of transient fault arrivals) . Often the transient fault rate 7 is assumed
to be 10 times [1] the permanent fault rate )_. We will assume that this system has been
designed such that it can recover from transient faults. (Otherwise, transient faults are as
deadly as permanent faults and should be modeled as such.) This recovery is accomplished
by periodically voting all of the volatile internal state of the processor. Each (non-faulty)
processor rewrites each data value of its internal state with a voted value. Let ISVP = the
period with which the operating system replaces the entire volatile state with voted values.
We also will assume that the active duration of a transient fault is small in comparison
to ISVP. Assuming that the time from the fault arrival to the operating system update is
uniformally distributed, the mean is ISVP/2 and the standard deviation is ISVP/2x/_. Of
course, the actual mean and standard deviation should be experimentally measured. The
values of these parameters would depend strongly upon the strategy of transient recovery
used by the operating system.
During the period of time from the arrival of a transient fault until the system can recover,
the system is vulnerable to near-coincident failures. If a second processor experiences a
transient or permanent fault while transient errors are present, then the 3-way voter can no
longer mask the faults. Such a state is a system failure state. In figure 29, a model of a
degradable triad system subject to only transient faults is given. The corresponding SURE
model is:
GAMMA = 1E-4;
MU1 = 2.7E-4;
SIGMA1 = 1.3E-4;
ISVP = IE-3;
PROB_RECONF = .1;
(* Arrival ra_e for _ransien_ faul_s *)
(* Mean reconfigura_ion time *)
(* $_andard deviation of reconfigura_ion _ime *)
(* Mean In_ernal Sta_e Vo_ing Period *)
(* Probability of reconfiguring ou_ _ransien_ faul_ *)
1,2 = 3*GAMMA;
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Figure 30: Failure Probability as a Function of IVSP
2,3 = 2*GAMMA;
2,4 = <MUI,SIGMAI,PKOB_KECONF>;
2,1 = <ISVP/2,ISVP/(2*SQRT(3)),I-PKOB_RECONF>;
4,5 = GAMMA;
In this model there are two recovery transitions from state 2. Therefore, it is necessary
that SURE's three-parameter form of recovery be used. The first two parameters are the
conditional mean and standard deviation. The third parameter is the probability that the
recovery transition succeeds over all of the other competing recovery transitions. An exper-
imental procedure for measuring these parameters is decribed in [17]. The probability of
failure of the system as a function of the voting period, ,_[VSP, is shown in figure 30
11.3 Model of Quad Subjefft to Transient and Permanent Faults
Since transient faults tend to occur at a faster rate than permanent faults, many systems
are designed to tolerate transients that disappear after a short amount of time. Because
fewer processors are needlessly reconfigured out, this can significantly reduce the number
of spare components needed. However, the operating system must be able to distinguish
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between transient faults and permanent faults. Typically, a simple algorithm is used by the
operating system to distinguish the two types of faults. Since this algorithm is not fool-
proof, it is necessary to include a transition in the model representing the operating system
incorrectly reconfiguring in the presence of a transient fault.
In the SIFT system significant consideration was given to this problem. The operating
system is faced with conflicting goals. If the fault is permanent, the system needs to recon-
figure as quickly as possible. If the fault is transient, then the system should not reconfigure.
Typically, the operating system delays the reconfiguration process temporarily to see if the
fault will disappear. Clearly, the amount of time the operating system delays has a sig-
nificant impact on system reliability because of the susceptibility to near-coincident faults.
Only a minimal amount of information resides in the dynamic (volatile) portions of system
memory. The schedule table in SIFT is static, so it could be stored in non-volatile read-only
memory (ROM). This is also lrue of the program code.
The ASSIST input file for a SIFT-like system starting with four processors is:
NP = 4;
LAMBDA = IE-4;
GAMMA = IO*LAMBDA;
MU = IE-4;
STD = 2E-4;
MU_REC = 7.4E-5;
STD_REC = 8.5E-5;
P_REC = .I0;
"ISVP = IE-2;"
(* Number of processors *)
(* Permanent fault arrival ra_e *)
(* Transien% faul_ arrival ra_e *)
(* Mean permanen% fault reconfigura_ion time *)
(* S%andard dev. of permanenz fault reconfig. *)
(* Cond. mean reconfiguration %ime for zransien_ faul% *)
(* Cond. s%andard devia%ion of %ransient reconfigura_ion *)
(* Probabili%y sys%em reconfigures out a transien% *)
(* Period of sys%em rewri%e of internal sta%e *)
"MU_DISAPPEAR = ISVP/2;" (* Cond. mean _ime %o %ransien_ disappearance *)
"STD_DISAPPEAR = ISVP/(2*SQRT(3));" (* Cond. s_an. dev. of disappearance %ime *)
SPACE = (NW: O..NP,
NFP: O..NP,
NFT: O..NP);
START = (NP, O, 0);
(* Number of working processors *)
(* Ac%ive procs, wi%h permanent faul%s *)
(* Ac%ive procs, wi%h %ransient faul_s *)
DEATHIF NFP+NFT >= NW; (* Majori%y of active processors failed *)
IF NW>O THEN
TRANTO (NW-I, NFP+I, NFT) BY NW*LAMBDA;
TRANTO (NW-1, NFP, NFT+I) BY NW*GAMMA;
ENDIF;
(* Permanen% faul% arrival *)
(* Transien% fault arrival *)
IF NFT > 0 THEN
TRANTO (NW+I, NFP, NFT-I) BY <MU_DISAPPEAR,STD_DISAPPEAR,I-P_REC>
(* Transien_ faul_ disappearance *)
TKANTO NFT = NFT-1 BY <MU_REC, STD_REC,P_REC>;
(* Transien% fault reconfigura%ion *)
ENDIF;
IF NFP > 0 TRANTO NFP = NFP-I BY <MU,STD>;
(* Permanen% fault reconfigura%ion *)
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11.4 Degradable NMR with Transients
In this section, some problems associated with modelling degradable NMR systems subject
to permanent and transient faults is explored. The major problem is that many different
situations arise where there are competing recoveries. Each of these situations involves
different, parameters which must be experimentally measured. To illustrate the problem, we
will first consider a degradable 6-plex. If we modify the model of the previous section by
changing the first, line to:
NP = 6;
the SURE program will object with the following message:
*** ERROR: SUM OF EXITING PROBABILITIES IS NOT I AT 12
When we examine the generated model, we find that at state 12, we have five transitions:
48: 12(* 3,1,1 *),
49: 12(* 3,1,1 *),
50: 12(* 3,1,1 *),
51: 12(* 3,1,1 *),
52: 12(* 3,1,1 *),
1(* 2,2,1 *) = 3*LAMBDA;
1(* 2,1,2 *) = 3*GAMMA;
9(* 4,1,0 *) = <WO_DISAPPEAR,STD_DISAPPEAR,I-P_REC>;
1S(* 3,1,0 *) = <MU_REC,STD_REC,P_REC>;
16(* 3,0,1 *) = <HU,STD>;
Three of the five transitions are competing recoveries. The reason for this is that there
are two active faults at state 12--one transient and one permanent. The three possible
outcomes are (1) the permanent fault, is reconfigured, (2) the transient fault is reconfigured
and (3) the transient fault disappears. The ASSIST model was originally constructed for
a quad system where any state with two active faults would be a death state. However,
with higher levels of redundancy comes more complexity. There are several ways around this
problem. Unfortunately, the more satisfactory models are more complex. We will begin will
the simplest.
The easiest way around the problem, is to make all such states death states. This is the
approach used by programs based on the "critical-pair" approach such as CARE and HARP
[9, 10]. This can be done with ASSIST by changing the DEATHIF statement to
DEATHIF NFT + NFP >= 2;
Although this results in a conservative answer, it is not a satisfactory solution since the
model simply ignores all of the additional redundancy. Overly conservative results can be
obtained using this technique.
A second way around the problem is to model all of the recovery transitions with expo-
nential distributions. The SURE program automatically determines all of the conditional
parameters when this is done. The model would be:
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NP = 6;
LAMBDA = IE-4;
GAMMA = IO*LAMBDA;
W = .5;
DELTA = 3.6E3;
SPACE = (NW: O..NP,
NFP: O..NP,
NFT: O..NP);
START = (NP, O, 0);
DEATHIF NFP+NFT >= NW;
IF NW>0 THEN
TRANT0 (NW-I,
TRANT0 (NW-I,
ENDIF;
(* Number of processors *)
(* Pez_nanent fault arrival rate *)
(* Transien$ faul_ arrival rate *)
(* Transient fault disappearance rate *)
(* Reconfiguration rate *)
(* Number of working processors *)
(* Active procs, with permanent faults *)
(* Active procs, wi_h transient faults *)
(* Majority of active processors failed *)
NFP÷I, NFT) BY NW*LAMBDA; (* Permanen$ fault arrival *)
NFP, NFT+I) BY NW*GAMMA; (* Transient fault arrival *)
IF NFT > 0 THEN
TKANTO (NW+I, NFP, NFT-I) BY FAST W;
TRANTO NFT = NFT-I BY FAST DELTA;
ENDIF;
(* Transient fault disappearance *)
(* Transient fault reconfiguration *)
IF NFP > 0 TRANTO NFP = NFP-I BY FAST DELTA; (* Permanent f. reconfiguration *)
This model will work for arbitrary values of "NP". Unfortunately, this model makes the
assumption that all of the recovery distributions are exponentially distributed.
The most accurate way to model such systems is to use general recovery distributions.
This necessitates analysis of each of the situations where multiple competing recoveries occur.
For a 5-plex or a 6-plex, there are operational states with two active faults. The following
cases exist: (1) two permanents, (2) two transients and (3) a transient and a permanent.
The conditional moments for each of these cases musi be measured experimentally. These
parameters are:
Case 1: two permanents
• .Y[U2 = conditional mean recovery time of the first of two competing recoveries
• STD_2 = conditional standard deviation of the recovery time of the first of two competing
recoveries
Case 2: two transients
• MU_DISAPPEAR_2 = conditional meaa_ time of disappearance of one of the two transients
• STD_DISAPPEAR_2 = conditional standard deviation of the time of disappearance of one
of the two transients
• P_DISAPPEAR_2 = probability one of the transients disappears before the system recomfig-
ures one of the transients.
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• MU..REC-2 = conditional mean time to reconfigure one of the transients before either dis-
appears
• STD_REC_2 = conditional standard deviation of time to reconfigure one of the transients
before either disappears.
Case 3: a transient and a permanent
P_DIS-BEF2 = probability the transient disappears before the system reconYigures either
fault.
• P_REC_TRAN = probability the system reconfigures the transient before it disappears or
the permanent is reconfigured.
• P_REC_PERM = probability the system reconfigures the permanent before the transient
disappears or is reconfigured.
• MU_DIS_3 = conditional mean time of disappearance of the transient given that it wins the
3-way race.
• STD-DIS-3 = conditional standard deviation of the time of disappearance of the transient
given that it wins the 3-way race.
• MU..REC_3 = conditional mean time to reconfigure the transient given that it wins the 3-way
race.
• STD-REC_3 = conditional standard deviation of time to reconfigure the transient given that
it wins the 3-way race.
• MU_3 = conditional mean time to reconfigure the permanent given that it wins the 3-way
race.
• STD_ = conditional standard deviation of time to reconfigure the permanent given that it
wins the 3-way race.
The complete model is:
NP = 6;
LAMBDA = IE-4;
GAMMA = IO*LAMBDA;
(, ............ Cons'cants
MU = 1E-4;
STD = 2E-4;
(, ............ Constants
MU_REC = 7.4E-5;
STD_REC = 8.5E-5;
(* Number of processors *)
(* Permanent fault arrival rate *)
(* Transient fault arrival rate *)
associated w_h one permanent ........... *)
(* Mean permanent fault recovery time *)
(* S_andard deviation permanent fault *)
associated wi_h one transien_ ........... *)
(* Mean reconfiguration time from transient *)
(* S_andard deviation of _ransien_ reconfiguration *)
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P_REC = .10; (* Probability system reconfigures transient *)
"ISVP = 1E-2;" (* Period of system rewrite of internal state *)
"MU_DISAPPEAH = ISVP/2;" (_ Mean time to transient disappearance *)
"STD.DISAPPEAK = ISVP/(2*SQRT(3));" (* S_an. dew. of disappearance time _)
(* ............ Constants associated with two transients ........... *)
MU_REC_2 = 7.4E-5; (* Mean reconfiguration time from _ransient *)
STD_REC_2 = 8.5E-5; (* S_andard deviation of transient reconfi_ration *)
P_DISAPPEAH_2 = .92; (* Probability system reconfigures transien_ *)
"MU_DISAPPEAH_2 = 5E-3;" (* Mean time to transient disappearance *)
"STD_DISAPPEAR_2 = 3E-3;" (* Stan. dew. of disappearance time *)
(* ............ Cons%ants associated wi%h two permanents ........... *)
MU_2 = 1E-4;
STD_2 = 2E-4;
(, Mean permanent fault recovery time *)
(* S_andard deviation permanent fault *)
(* --- constants associated with states with a permanent and a transient --- *)
"P_DIS_BEF2 = .3;" (* Probability the transient disappears ,)
"P_REC_TKAN = .3;" (* Probability the _ransient is reconfigured *)
"P_REC_PEB/_ I-(P_DIS_BEF2+P_KEC__AN): °' (* Prob. permanent is reconfigured *)
"MU_DIS_3 = IE-4;" (* Conditional mean time of disappearance of
transient given that it wins the 3-way race. *)
"STD_DIS_3 = IE-4;" (* Conditional szandard time of disappearance of
the _ransient given that it wins _he 3-way race. *)
"MU_EEC_3 = IE-4;" (* Conditional mean time _o reconfig_Lre the
transient given that it wins the 3-way race. *)
"STD_REC_3 = IE-4;" (* Conditional s_andard deviation of time to
reconfigure the transient given that it wins *)
"MU_3 = IE-4;"
"STD_3 = 1E-4;"
(* Conditional mean time to reconfigure _he
permanent given that i_ wins. *)
(* Conditional standard deviation of time
to reconfigure the permanent given that it wins *)
SPACE = (NW: O..NP,
NFP: O..NP,
NFT: O..NP);
START = (NP, O, 0);
(* Number of working processors *)
(* Active procs, with permanent faults *)
(* Active procs, with transienz faults *)
DEATHIF NFP+NFT >= NW; (* Majority of active processors failed *)
IF NW>O THEN
THANTO (NW-I, NFP+I, NFT) BY NW*LAMBDA; (* Permanent faul_ arrival *)
TKANTO (NW-I, NFP, NFT+I) BY NW*GAMMA; (* Transient fault arrival *)
ENDIF;
IF NFT * NFP = I THEN (* i active faul_ *)
IF NFT > 0 THEN
TKANTO (NW+I, NFP, NFT-1) BY <MU_DISAPPEAK,STD_DISAPPEAR,I-P_KEC> ;
(* Transient fault disappearance *)
TRANTD NFT = NFT-1 BY <MU_REC, STD_REC,P_REC>;
(* Transient fault reconfiguration *)
ENDIF;
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IF NFP > 0 TRANTO NFP = NFP-1 BY <MU,STD>; (* Perm. f. reconfigura_ion *)
ENDIF;
IF NFP = 2 (* Case 1: Two permanents *)
TRANTO NFP = NFP-1 BY <MU_2,STD_2>; (* Perm__nen_ faul_ reconfigura_ion *)
IF NET = 2 THEN (* Case 2: Two _ransients *)
TRANTO (NW+I, NFP, NFT-I)
BY <MU_DISAPPEAR_2,STD_DISAPPEAR_2,P_DISAPPEAR_2> ;
(* Transien$ faul_ disappearance *)
TRANTO NFT = NFT-I BY <MU_REC_2, STD_REC.2,I-P_DISAPPEAR_2>;
(* Transient faulZ reconfigura_ion *)
ENDIF;
IF (NFT = 1) AND (NFP = I) THEN (* I transien_ and I permanen_ *)
TRANTO (NW+I, NFP, NFT-I) (* Transien% faulZ disappearance *)
BY <MU_DIS_3,STD_DIS_3,P_DIS_BEF2> ;
TRANTO NFT = NFT-I (* Transien% faul% reconfigura_ion *)
BY <MU_REC_3, STD_REC_3,P_REC_TRAN>;
TRANTO NFP = NFP-I (* Permanen% faul% reconfigura%ion *)
BY <MU_3,STD_3,P_REC_PERM>;
ENDIF;
Obviously one would want to perform a rough sensitivity analysis to determine how sen-
sitive a system is to transient faults before developing such a complex model and measuring
so many parameters.
11.5 FTP
The strategy used in the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory's Fault-Tolerant Processor (FTP)
for dealing with transient faults is different than that used in earlier fault-tolerant systems
such as SIFT [19]. In the earlier systems, reconfiguration was deferred until the system was
reasonably certain that the fault was permanent. Once a processor was removed, it was never
reinstated. In FTP a different strategy is used. Upon the first detection of an error, the
faulty processor is removed. The system then executes a self-test on the removed processor.
If the processor passes the test, the system diagnoses the problem as a transient fault and
reinstates the processor. If the processor fails the self-test program, the fault is diagnosed
as permanent and the processor is permanently removed. Thus, a transient fault that does
not disappear in time will be diagnosed as permanent.
A partial model for the FTP is shown in figure 31. In this model each state is described
by a triple:
(NW,NFA,NFT)
where
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Figure 31: Partial Model of FTP
NW
NFA
NFT
= number of working processors
= number of faulty processors (both transient and permanent)
= number of processors undergoing self test
The transition from (4,0,0) to (3,1,0) represents the failure of any processor in the con-
figuration. The transition from (3,1,0) to (3,0,1) represents the detection of a fault, the
temporary removal of the processor from the active configuration, and the initiation of the
self-test program. If the processor passes the self-test, the processor is returned to the active
configuration, as represented by the transition from (3,0,1) back to (4,0,0). If the processor
fails the self-test, the processor is permanently removed from the configuration. This occurs
in the model in the transition (3,0,1) to (3,0,0). Note that while the self-test program is in
progress (i.e. in state (3,0,1)), that a second failure does no_ lead to system failure. This is
true because the outputs from the removed processor are not considered in the voting, thus
the majority of the outputs being voted _re nonfaulty. Thus, state (3,1,1) is not a death
state. The complete SURE model is:
F_P = IE-6 TO* 1 BY I0;
F_T = I.O-F_P;
LAMBDA = 1E-4;
DET = IE-7;
SIGDET = IO*DET;
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TESTTIME = IE-3;
SIGTEST = 2*TESTTIME;
2(* 4 0 0 *)
3(* 3 1 0 *)
3(* 3 1 0 *)
4(* 3 0 1 *)
4(* 3 0 1 *)
4(* 3 0 1 *)
5(* 2 1 1 *),
5(* 2 I I *),
S(* 2 1 i *),
6(* 3 0 0 *),
7(* 2 i 0 *),
7(* 2 1 0 *),
8(* 2 0 1 *),
8(* 2,0 I *),
8(* 2,0 1 *),
9(* 2,0 0 *),
3(* 3,1,0 *) = 4*LAMBDA;
i(* 2,2,0 *) = 3*LAMBDA;
4(* 3,0,1 *) = <DET,SIGDET>;
5(* 2,1,1 *) = 3*LAMBDA;
2(* 4,0,0 *) = <TESTTIME,SIGTEST,F_T>;
6(* 3,0,0 *) = <TESTTIME,SIGTEST,1-F_T>;
1(* 1,2,1 *) = 2*LAMBDA;
3(* 3,1,0 *) = <TESTTIME,SIGTEST,F_T>;
7(* 2,1,0 *) = <TESTTIME,SIGTEST,I-F_T>;
7(* 2,1,0 *) = 3*LAMBDA;
i(* 1,2,0 *) = 2*LAMBDA;
8(* 2,0,1 *) = <DET,SIGDET>;
I(* i,I,I *) = 2*LAMBDA;
6(* 3,0,0 *) = <TESTTIME,SIGTEST,F_T>;
9(* 2,0,0 *) = <TESTTIME,SIGTEST,1-F_T>;
I(* i,i,0 *) = 2*LAMBDA;
This model was generated with the ASSIST input given below:
SPACE = (NW: 0..4,
NFA: 0..4,
NFT: 0..4);
(* number of working processors *)
(* number of faulty active processors *)
(* number of processors undergoing self tes_ *)
START = (4,0,0);
LAMBDA = IE-4; (* Arrival rate of failures -- perm. or transient *)
DET = 1E-7; (* Mean time ro detect and remove proc. with fault *)
SIGDET = IO*DET; (* S_an. dev. _ime _o de_ec_ and remove processor *)
TESt"rIME = 1E-3; (* Mean time _o execute self _est *)
SIGTEST = 2*TESTTIME; (* S_an. dev. of rime to execute self test *)
"F_P = IE-6 TO* I BY i0;" (* Probability failure was pezlnanen_ *)
"F_T = I.O-F_P;" (* Probability failure was transient *)
(* Faul_ arrival *)
IF NW > 0 TRANTO NW=NW-I, NFA = NFA + 1 BY NW*LAMBDA;
(* Detection of fault and removal of processor for self test *)
IF (NFA > O) AND (NFT = O) TRANTO NFT=NFT+I, NFA = NFA - I BY <DET,SIGDET>;
IF NFT > 0 THEN
(* Reinsta_emen_ of processor after transient fault *)
TRANT0 NFT=NFT-1, NW = NW+I BY <TESTTIME,SIGTEST,F_T>;
(* Pex_nanent removal of processor with pex_naunent fault *)
TRANTO NFT=NFT-1 BY <TESTTIME,SIGTE2T,I-F_T>;
ENDIF;
(* System failure occurs if majority of outputs sent to voter are faul_y *)
DEATHIF NFA >= NW;
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Figure 32: Detailed Intermittent Fault Submodel
In this model it is assumed that the FTP does not allow a second processor to undergo self
test, while another processor is undergoing self-test. Note that the "IF-expression" which
governs the generation of transitions which remove a processor from the active configuration
for self-test, is IF (NFA > 0) AND (NFT = 0). The second term prevents the generation of
a "self-test" transition, when a processor is already under self-test.
Most models containing transient faults, require the estimation of the disappearance rates
for transient faults. There is virtually no data available on what are reasonable values for
this parameter because this data cannot be measured on operational equipment or through
fault injection experiments.
This parameter was not used explicitly in the above model of the FTP system. The
disappearance rate of short transients does not matter because the FTP operating system
masks all outputs after the first erroneous output until the self test is complete. However,
if a transient persists long enough for a processor to fail the self test, then the fault is
assumed to be permanent and the processor is permanently removed. Thus, the true transient
disappearance rate affects what the ratio of transient to permanent faults will be. And that
ratio, which is unknown, can play an important part in assessing whether the FTP strategy
of reinstating processors is a good strategy.
11.6 Modeling Intermittent Faults
A remnant of the multi-step fault error-handling model methodology (see section 4.5) is the
notion that separate states must be used to represent the active and inactive states of an
intermittent fault. Models are constructed that resemble the partial model in figure 32.
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In this partial modelof a triplex-simplex systemsubject to intermittent faults, the states
are described with a triple:
(NW,NFA,NFB)
where
NW = number of working processors
NFA = number of processors with active faults
NFB = number of processors with benign faults
When a processor fails, the fault is initially benign. At some rate a the fault becomes active.
At some rate b the active intermittent fault, returns to the benign state. While the fault
is benign, no errors are produced which would enable the system to detect the fault. The
question that the modeler must address, is whether "benign" faults cause near-coincident
failure. One conservative approach is to assume that they do. In this case, intermittent
faults behave identically to permanent faults except that they are reconfigured at a different
rate than permanents. If faults in the benign state are assumed to not cause near-coincident
failure, then there are many "additional" states in the model which contain benign faults.
For example, states (1,0,2), (1,0,3), (2,0,2) contain more faulty benign processors than good
processors, yet these states are operational. The following ASSIST input could be used to
generate the complete model for a triplex system:
SPACE = (NW: 0..3, (* Number of working processors *)
NFA: 0..3, (* Number of processors with active inS. faults *)
NFB: 0..3); (* Number of processors with benign in%. faults *)
START = (3,0,0);
L = 1E-4;
REC = 1E4;
A = 1E2;
B = IE2;
(* Rate of arrival of inteI_nittent faults *)
(* Mean rate of reconfiguration *)
(* Rate benign intez_nittent fault goes active *)
(* Rate active interTnittent fault goes benign *)
(* Arrival of interraiZ_ent fault -- assumed to start out benign *)
IF NW > 0 TRANTO NW = NW-I, NFB = NFB + 1 BY NW*L;
(* Benign intermittent fault becomes active *)
IF NFB > 0 TRANTO NFB = NFB - 1, NFA = NFA + 1 BY FAST A;
IF NFA > 0 THEN
(* Active intermittent fault becomes benign *)
TRANTO NFB = NFB + 1, NFA = NFA - 1 BY FAST B;
(* Processor wi_h active intezlni_tent fault reconfigured -- 2 cases: *)
(* Reconfigttre to simplex working processor *)
IF NW > 0 TRANTO (1,0,0) BY FAST [NW/(NW+NFB)]*REC;
(* Reconfigure to simplex with benign intermittent fault *)
IF NFB > 0 TBANTO (0,0,1) BY FAST [NFB/(NW+NFB)]*REC;
ENDIF;
(* System failure occurs when majority of processors have active fault *)
DEATHIF NFA >= (NW+NFB);
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Figure 33: Model of Triplex to Simplex System Subject to Intermittent
The recovery rule generates two competing recoveries. This is necessary because the
operating system makes an arbitrary choice among the processors which do not contain
active faults when it degrades to a simplex. The probability that a processor with a benign
fault becomes the remaining simplex processor is: NFB/(NW+NFB).
The problem with this model is that the on-off cycles of the intermittent must be modeled
and the associated parameters must be measured. Realistic intermittent faults are difficult
to create in the laboratory, and the rates at which they become active and benign are difficult
to measure. Even if we could accurately measure these parameters, a semi-Markov model
may not have enough generality to accurately represent the behavior of the active-benign
oscillations. We believe it is preferable to inject intermittent faults and observe the impact
on the system. The system recovery time will probably be longer for intermittents than for
transients. The resulting model is shown in figure 33. Even though this model is considerably
simpler, it can be much more accurate than the detailed model given above in some cases
because it relies only on directly observable parameters. Note that this method uses the
conservative approach of assuming that benign faults can cause near-coincident failure.
The SURE program has difficulty solving models with "fast loops", i.e, loops containing
no slow transitions. The SURE program can solve the model generated by the ASSIST input
above. The output is
air51_ sure
SURE V7.4 NASA Langley Research CenCer
17 readO inCm
0.20 SECS. TO READ MODEL FILE
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35? run
MDDEL FILE = in%m.mod SURE V7.4 24 Jan 90 14:17:49
LOWERBOUND UPPERBOUND COMMENTS RUN #1
..................................................................
1.38175e-06 1.50309e-06 <prune 8.9e-13>
64 PATH(S) TO DEATH STATES 54 PATH(S) PRUNED
HIGHEST PRUNE LEVEL = 6.18304e-13
1.650 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
36? exi_
However, for some parameter regions the program may require large amounts of CPU time.
For example, if the value of B is changed to 1ES, the SURE program will require 3458 secs.
to solve the model. In fact as B --_ oo, the execution time --* o¢_ If the SURE program is
unable to solve the model in a reasonable amount of time, the PAWS or STEM programs
may be used to solve the model. However, these programs assume that all recoveries are
exponentially distributed.
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Figure 34: System with 5 Subsystems
12 Modeling Control System Architectures
All of the models in the previous sections contained only processors in various configurations.
In this section we will discuss how to include the fault behavior of all of the components in
a typical flight control system architecture in the reliability model. Although some of the
previous models were somewhat complex, they typically dealt with only a few components.
As more components are added to the models, the possible combinations and sequences
of component failures, and thus the size of the reliability model, increases exponentially.
Therefore, model pruning techniques needed to reduce the size of these models are introduced
in this section.
The system shown in figure 34 consists of five subsystems: (1) the triplicated sensors, (2)
the triplicated sensor-to-processor bus SP_BUS, (3) the degradable quad of processors, (4)
the triplicated processor-to-actuator bus PA_BUB, and (5) the forced-sum voting actuator.
As long as there are no failure dependencies, the separate subsystems can be represented
by separate reliability models. Each of "these are solved in isolation. Finally, the results
are added together probabilistically, i.e. the probability of the union. The SURE command
ORPROB performs the probabilistic add automatically. The SURE input file is:
LAMBDA_SENSORS = 3.8E-6;
1,2 = 3*LAMBDA_SENSOR$;
2,3 = 2*LAMBDA_SENSORS;
RUN;
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LAMBDA_SP_BUS = 3.8E-6;
1,2 = 3,LAMBDA_SP_BUS;
2.3 = 2,LAMBDA_SP_BUS;
RUN;
LAMBDA_PA_BUS = 3.8E-6;
1.2 = 3,LAMBDA_PA_BUS;
2,3 = 2,LAMBDA_PA_BUS;
RUN;
LAMBDA_ACT = 1E-8;
1,2 = LAMBDA_ACT;
RUN;
LAMBDA = IE-4;
MEANREC = 1E-5;
STDKEC = 1E-5;
(, Failure rate of processor *)
(* Mean reconfigura_ion _ime *)
(* S_andard deviation of .... *)
1,2 = 4*LAMBDA;
2,3 = 3*LAMBDA;
2,4 = <MEANREC,STDREC>;
4,5 = 3*LAMBDA;
5,6 = 2*LAMBDA;
5,7 = <MEANREC,STDREC>;
7,8 = LAMBDA;
RUN;
ORPROB;
The interactive session follows:
$ sure
SURE V7.4 NASA Langley Research Center
17 read sa
2: LAMBDA_SENSORS = 3.8E-6;
3:1,2 = 3,LAMBDA_SENSORS;
4:2,3 = 2,LAMBDA_SENSORS;
5: RUN;
MODEL FILE = sa.mod SURE V7.4 24 Jan 90 10:28:46
LOWERBOUND
4.33173e-09
UPPERBOUND
4.33200e-09
I PATH(S) TO DEATH STATES
0.034 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
6:
7: LAMBDA_SP_BUS = 3.8E-6;
8:1,2 = 3*LAMBDA_SP_BUS;
9:2,3 = 2*LAMBDA_SP_BUS;
COMMENTS RUN #1
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10: RUN;
MODEL FILE = sa.mod SURE V7.4 24 Jan 90 10:28:46
LOWEHBOUND
4.33173e-09
UPPEKBOUND
4.33200e-09
I PATH(S) TO DEATH STATES
0.034 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
11:
12: LAMBDA_PA_BUS = 3.8E-6;
13:1,2 = 3*LAMBDA_PA_BUS;
14:2,3 = 2*LAMBDA_PA_BUS;
15: RUN;
MODEL FILE = sa.mod
COMMENTS RUN #2
.................................
SURE V7.4 24 Jan 90 i0:28:47
LOWERBOUND
4.33173e-09
UPPERBOUND
4.33200e-09
I PATH(S) TO DEATH STATES
0.050 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
16:
17: LAMBDA_ACT = 1E-8;
18:1,2 = LAMBDA_ACT;
19: RUN;
MODEL FILE = sa.mod
COMMENTS RUN #3
--_. ..............................
SURE V7.4 24 Jan 90 10:28:47
LOWERBOUND
l.O0000e-07
UPPERBOUND
1.00000e-07
I PATH(S) TO DEATH STATES
0.050 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
20:
21: LAMBDA = IE-4;
22: MEANREC = 1E-5;
23: STDREC = 1E-5;
24:
25:1,2 = 4*LAMBDA;
26:2,3 = 3.LAMBDA;
27:2,4 = <MEANKEC,STDREC>;
28:4,5 = 3*LAMBDA;
29:5,6 = 2*LAMBDA;
30:5,7 = <MEANREC,STDREC>;
31:7,8 = LAMBDA;
32: RUN;
COMMENTS RUN #4
(* Failure rate of processor *)
(, Mean reconfigura_ion Zime *)
(* S_andard deviazion of .... *)
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MODEL FILE = sa.mod SURE V7.4 24 Jan 90 10:28:47
LDWERBOUND
2.00574e-09
3 PATH(S) TO DEATH STATES
0.134 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
33:
34: ORPROB;
MODEL FILE = sa.mod
UPPERBOUND
2.01201e-09
RUN # LOWERBOUND UPPERBOUND
................................
1 4.33173e-09 4.33200e-09
2 4.33173e-09 4.33200e-09
3 4.33173e-09 4.33200e-09
4 1.00000e-07 1.00000e-07
5 2.00574e-09 2.01201e-09
.....................
OR PROB = 1.15001e-07 1.15008e-07
COMMENTS RUN #S
SURE V7.4 24 Jan 90 10:28:48
0.70 SECS. TO READ MODEL FILE
357 exit
The sensor subsystem for this example was very simple to model. The following section
shows a more complex sensor subsystem.
12.1 Monitored Sensors
In this example, a set of monitored sensors is modeled. Initially, the system consists of five
sensors, and each sensor has a monitor to detect failure of that sensor. Sensors fail at rate
As, and monitors fail at rate AM. If a sensor fails and the monitor is working, the monitor
will detect with 90% probability that the sensor failed and will remove that sensor from the
active configuration. If the monitor has failed or does not detect that the sensor has failed,
then the faulty sensor remains in the active configuration, contributing its faulty answers to
the voting. There is no other means of reconfiguration.
Since values from all of the sensors in the active configuration are voted, system failure
occurs when one-half or more of the active sensors are faulty.
The ASSIST input file to describe this system is as follows:
LAMBDA_S = 1E-4;
LAMBDA_M = 1E-5;
COV = .90;
(* Failure rate of sensor *)
(* Failure rate of monitor *)
(* Detection coverage of monitor *)
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SPACE = (NW: 0..5,
NW_MDN: 0..5,
NF: O..5) ;
(* Number of working sensors *)
(* Number of working sensors wi_h monitors *)
(* Number of failed active sensors *)
START = (5,5,0); (* S_ar_ wi_h 5 working sensors with monitors *)
(* Failure of monitored sensor *)
IF (NW_MON > O) THEN
TRANTO NW=NW-I,NW_MON=NW_MON-I BY COV*LAMBDA_S;
TRANTO NW=NW-I,NW_MON=NW_MON-I,NF=NF*I BY (I-COV)*LAMBDA_S;
ENDIF;
(* Failure of unmonitored sensor *)
IF (NW > NW_MON) TRANTO NW = NW-I, NF=NF+I BY (NW-NW_MON)*LAMBDA_S;
(* Failure of monitor *)
IF NW_MON > 0 TRANTO NW_MON = NW_MON-I BY LAMBDA_M;
DEATHIF 2*NF >= NW;
The state space consists of three variables: NW, NW_MON, and NF. The state space
variable NW represents the number of working sensors in the active configuration and is
decremented whenever a monitor detects that its sensor has failed. The variable NW_MON
represents how many of the NW sensors have functioning monitors. This is decremented
whenever a monitor fails or a monitored sensor fails. The variable NF represents the number
of failed sensors in the active configuration and is incremented ,_henever a sensor fails and
its monitor is either faulty or fails to detect that the sensor has failed.
In the above examples, subsystems could be modeled separately because the functioning
and failures in each subsystem were not dependent on the current state of the other subsys-
tems. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case. In the following sections, modehng of systems
with various failure dependencies between subsystems will be discussed.
12.2 Failure Dependency
The following architecture description for the ARCS flight control system was taken from [18].
The system consists of 3 sensors (sl, s2, s3), 3 hydraulics units (hl, h2, h3), 3 computers (el,
c2, c3) and 3 servos (vl, v2, v3). The system is assumed to have perfect failure detection.
Therefore, as long as there is one computer working, the system still has computational
capability. Also, the reconfigdration is assumed to be instantlaneous, which means that
the probability of system failure due to near-coincident failures is zero. This assumption
eliminates the need for recovery transitions. The three sensors are redundant, but are linked
to specific computers (e.g., sl to el), and thus there is failure dependency between them. If
sl, s2 and c3 all fail, system failure occurs. However, if sl, s2 and cl fail, the system is still
operational. The sensor/computer combinations producing system failure are:
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Figure 35: Fault. Tree of Failure Modes
AND(0R(sl,cl), 0R(s2,c2), 0R(s3,c3) )
Similarly, the servos are linked with the computers. System failure occurs for the following
combinations of servo/computer failures:
AND(0R(vl,cl), 0R(v2,c2), 0R(v3,c3) )
System failure also occurs when no hydraulic units are working:
AND( hl, h2, h3 )
The fault-tree of figure 35 defines all of these failure modes together.
Since certain failure combinations of specific processors and specific sensors cause system
failure, it is not possible to classify the states simply by a count of the number of working
processors. It is necessary to keep track of each component separately. Thus, the state space
is:
SPACE = (WS : ARRAY[I .3] OF 0..1,
WC : ARRAY[I..3] OF 0..I,
NV : ARRAY[I..3] OF 0..1,
NH : 0..3;
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Each of the ARRAY constructs defines three boolean variables, thus, the state space consists
of 9 boolean variables (i.e {0,1} domain) and one integer variable. The complete ASSIST
model description is:
SPACE = (WS : ARRAY [I ..3] OF 0..I,
WC : ARRAY [I ..3] OF 0..I,
WV : ARRAY [I ..3] OF 0..I,
NH : 0..3);
(* Status of the 3 sensors *)
(* Status of %he 3 computers *)
(* S_a_us of the 3 serves *)
(* Number of working hydraulics units *)
START = (3 OF i, 3 OF i, 3 OF 1, 3); (* All components working *)
LS = 7.62E-4;
LC = 3.50E-4;
LV = 3.90E-4;
LH = 6.00E-5;
(* Failure rate of sensor *)
(* Failure rate of computer *)
(* Failure rate of serve *)
(* Failure rate of hydraulics *)
FOR I = 1,3
IF WSCI] > 0 TRANTO WSCI]
IF WC[I] > 0 TRANTO WC[I]
IF WV[I] > 0 TRANTO WV[I]
ENDFOR;
IF NH > 0 TRANTO NH = NH - I
DEATHIF (WS[I]=O OR WC[I]=O)
(WS [2]=0 OR WC [2]=0)
(WS[3]=0 OR WC[3]=0)
= WS [I]
= WC[I] -
= WV[I] -
BY NH*LH;
AND
AND
I BY LS;
I BY LC;
I BY LV;
(* Sensor failure *)
(* Computer failure *)
(* Serve failure *)
(* Hydraulics unit failure *)
(* Enumeration of sensor/computer *)
(* combinations leading %o failure *)
DEATHIF NH = O;
DEATHIF (WV[1]=O OR WC[1]=O) AND
(WV[2]=O OR WC[2]=O) AND
(wv [3]=0 oR wc [3]=0) ;
(* Loss of all hydraulics units *)
(* Enumeration of serve/computer *)
(* combinations leading _o failure *)
The F0R loop effectively creates 9 TBtNT0 rules. These create failure transitions corresponding
to failures of the 9 individual components. Since there are no dependencies between the
hydraulics and the other parts of the system, the individual units do not have to be separately
accounted for. Thus, the last TI_NT0 rule merely decrements the count of working hydraulic
units. The DEATHIF statements define all of the failure combinations. The ASSIST output
is:
ASSIST VERSION 6.0
The Front End Routine FER SURE
PROCESSING TIME = 145.62
NUMBER OF STATES IN MODEL = 618
NUMBER OF TRANSITIONS IN MODEL = 4116
1672 DEATH STATES AGGREGATED INTO STATES 1 - 3
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This model is large enough to require significant time 1o generate and to solve. The
reason the model is so large is because there are many combinations of components in the
system that can fail before system failure occurs. In fact, there are many combinations of
up to 5 or 6 component failures consisting of one or two failures of each type of component
before a condition of system failure is reached. Because the occurrence of so many failures is
unlikely during a short mission, these long paths typically contribute insignificant amounts to
the probability of system failure. The dominant failure modes of the system are typically the
short paths to system failure consisting of failures of only 3 or 4 components. Although the
long paths contribute insignificantly to the probability of system failure, the majority of the
execution time needed to generate and solve this model is spent handling those long paths.
Fortunately, model pruning can be used to eliminate the long paths to system failure by
conservatively assuming that system failure occurs earlier on those paths. Both the ASSIST
and SURE programs provide the capability to prune paths in the model automatically.
With the SURE program, the user specifies a probability level for model pruning, for
example 10 -as, and each time the probability of encountering a state in the model falls
below the specified value that path is pruned. The program sums the probabilities of all of
the pruned paths and reports that value to the user as the estimated error due to pruning.
Pruning in SURE is very effective in reducing the execution time required to solve most large
models. However, this does nothing to reduce the execution time required to generate the
large model or the amount of memory required to store a large model.
Pruning in the ASSIST program can reduce the model generation time and memory
requirements as well as the solution time. However, since pruning in ASSIST must be based
on state space variable values rather than probability calculations, it must be done more
crudely. The ASSIST user typically specifies pruning at a certain level of component failures
in the system. For example, if the user knows or suspects that the dominant failures occur
after only 3 or 4 component failures, then he can command ASSIST to prune the model at
the 4th component failure. Two ways to specify this are shown below. The easiest method
is to write a PRUNEIF statement that calculates the component failure level directly from the
state space variables:
PRUNEIF (9 - WS[I]+WS[2]+WS[3]+WC[I]+WC[2]+WC[3]+WV[I]+WV[2]+WV[3]) + 3-NIl >= 4;
This command is added to the ASSIST input file. However, this type of PRUNEIF state-
ment can be quite complicated, and calculation of component failure level directly from the
other state space variable values is not possible for some models. The second method is
to introduce a new state space variable, say "NF", specifically for the purpose of keeping a
count of the number of component failures in the system. This state space variable must
be incremented in every TRANT0 statement that defines a component failure. The complete
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ASSIST input file for the ARCS architecture with pruning at the fourth component failure
level is thus:
LS = 7.62E-4;
LV = 3.90E-4;
LC = 3.50E-4;
LH = 6E-5;
(* Failure rate of sensors *)
(* Failure rate of servos *)
(* Failure rate of computers *)
(* Failure rate of hydraulics units *)
SPACE = (WS : ARRAY[I..3J OF 0..I,
WC : ARRAY [I..3] DF 0..I,
WV : ARRAY [1..3] OF 0..I,
NH : 0..3,
NF: 0..12);
(* Status of the 3 sensors *)
(* Status of the 3 computers *)
(* Status of the 3 servos *)
(* Number of working hydraulics units *)
(* Number of component failures *)
START = (3 OF 1, 3 OF i, 3 OF I, 3, 0); (* All components working *)
FOR I = 1,3
IF NS[I] > 0 TRANTO WS[I] = WS[I] - I, NF = NF + I BY LS; (* Sensor fails *)
IF we[I] > 0 TRANTO WC[I] = WC[I] - i, NF = NF + 1 BY LC; (* Compu. fails *)
IF WV[I] > 0 TRANTO WV[IJ = WV[I] - I, NF = NF + I BY LV; (* Servo fails *)
ENDFOR;
IF NH > 0 TRANTO NH = NH - I, NF = NF + I BY NH*LH; (* Hydraulics unit fails *)
DEATHIF (WS[I]=O 0R WC[I]=O) AND
(WS[2]=O OR WC[2]=O) AND
(WS [3]=0 OR WC [3]=0) ;
(* Enumeration of sensor/computer *)
(* combinations leading ¢o failure *)
DEATHIF NH = O; (* Loss of all hydraulics uniCs *)
DEATHIF (WV[I]=O OR WC[I]=O) AND
(WV[2]=O OR WC[2]=O) AND
(WV[3]=O OR WC[3]=O);
(* Enumeration of servo/compu_er *)
(* combinations leading ¢o failure *)
PRUNEIF NF >= 4; (* Pruning at fourth component failure level *)
The ASSIST program reports the number of states at which the model was pruned:
$ assist arcs
ASSIST VERSION 6.0
The Front End Routine FER SURE
PROCESSING TIME = 15.60
NUMBER OF STATES IN MODEL = 175
NUMBER OF TRANSITIONS IN MODEL = 1332
262 DEATH STATES AGGREGATED INTO STATFS I - 3
636 PRUNED STATES AGGREGATED INTO STATES 4 - 4
THANK YOU FOR USING ASSIST, FER SURE
Thus, pruning at the fourth component level reduced the model from 618 states and
4116 transitions to only 175 states and 1332 transitions. All of the pruned states are lumped
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together into one state. If there had been more than one PRUNEIF statement; the pruned
states would have been lumped according to which PRUNEIF statement they satisfied. In this
example, aH of the paths pruned by the ASSIST program end in state number four.
Whenever the ASSIST input file includes one or more PRUNEIF statements, the pro-
gram automatically includes a statement in the SURE input file indicating which states are
pruned states generated by ASSIST. For example, if an ASSIST input file contained two
PRUNEIF statements and the model generated has states four and five as prune states, then
the statement
PRUNESTATES = (4,5);
would be included in the ASSIST output file, i.e., the ".mod" file.
The output from the SURE run is:
$ sure
SURE V7.4 NASA Langley Research Cen_er
i? readO arcs
11.10 SECS. TO READ MODEL FILE
40107 iis%=2
40117 run
MODEL FILE = arcs.mod SUB_ V7.4 24 Jan 90 12:12:20
DEATHSTATE LOWERBOUND UPPERBOUND
.....................
1 1.35113e-06 1.39351e-06
2 2.15552e-10 2.23300e-10
3 3.57167e-07 3.69102e-07
......................
SUBTOTAL 1.70852e-06 1.76283e-06
PRUNESTATE LOWERBOUND UPPERBOUND
................................
prune 4 5.07787e-08 5.24308e-08
......................
SUBTOTAL 5.07787e-08 5.24308e-08
COMMENTS RUN #1
.................................
TOTAL 1.70852e-06 1.81526e-06
4960 PATH(S) TO DEATH STATES
51.467 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
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40127 exit
The ASSIST prune states are reported separately from the death states as follows. When
reporting the total bounds on probability of system failure (in the line labeled "TOTAL"),
the upper bound includes the contribution of the prune states whereas the lower bound does
not. Thus, the TOTAL line reports valid bounds on the system failure probability. If the
PRUNESTATE upper bound is significant with respect to the TOTAL upper bound, then
the user has probably pruned his model too severely in ASSIST. The upper and lower bounds
can be made significantly closer by relaxing the amount of pruning.
For this example, the upper bound on the error due to the pruning done in ASSIST is
5.24308 x 10 -s.
Next, we will consider the effect of imperfect coverage of single-point failures. This will
be done by using "coverage parameters". The system is known to fail a certain fraction of
the time in the presence of a single fault. In the ARCS architecture this is assumed to only
occur after one of the units in a triad has failed and been removed. In other words, there
is perfect coverage when the triad is working. Once it has degraded to a duplex, then it is
subject to single point failures. The probability that a single fault causes system failure (in
duplex mode) are COV..S, COV_V, COV_C, and COV._H for sensors, servos, computers and
hydraulics, respectively. To simplify the DEATHIF statements, a new variable SPF is added
to the state space. The SPF variable is originally set to 0. If a single fault leads to failure
then SPF is set to 1.
LS = 7.62E-4;
LV = 3.90E-4;
LC = 3.50E-4;
LH = 6E-5;
(* Failure ra_e of sensors *)
(* Failure rate of servos *)
(* Failure rate of computers *)
(* Failure rate of hydraulics u_nits *)
COV_S = .7231;
COV_V = .95;
COV_C = .95;
COV_H = .95;
(* Sensor single-point failure coverage *)
(* Servo single-point failure coverage *)
(* Computer single-point failure coverage *)
(* Hydraulics single-point failure coverage *)
SPACE = (WS : ARRAY[I..3] OF 0..I,
WC : ARRAY[I..3] OF 0..I,
WV : AHRAY[I..3] OF 0..I,
WH : 0..3,
SPF: 0..I,
NF : 0..12);
(* S¢atus of the 3 sensors *)
(* StaCus of the 3 compuCers *)
(* StaCus of the 3 servos *)
(* Number of working hydraulics tmiCs *)
(* Single-poin¢ failure flag *)
(* Number of componen¢ failures *)
START = (3 OF 1, 3 OF 1, 3 OF 1, 3, O, 0);
(* Sensor failures *)
IF WS[I] + WS[2] + WS[3] = 3 THEN (* Triplex *)
TRANTO WS[I] = O, NF = NF + 1 BY LS;
TRANTO WS[2] = O, NF = NF + 1 BY iS;
TRANTO WS[3] = O, NF = NF + 1 BY LS;
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ELSE (* Vulnerable to SPF *)
THANTO WS[I] = O, NF = NF + I BY COV_S*LS;
TRANTO WS[2] = O, NF = NF + 1 BY COV_S*LS;
TRANTO WS[3] = O, NF = NF + 1 BY COV_S_LS;
TRANTO SPF = 1, NF = NF + 1 BY (I-COV_S)*(WS[I] + WS[2] + WS[3])*LS;
ENDIF ;
(_ Computer failures *)
IF WC[1] + WC[2] + WC[3] = 3 THEN (* Triplex *)
TRANTO WC[I] = O, NF = NF + 1 BY LC;
TRANTO WC[2] = O, NF = NF + I BY LC;
TRANTO WC[3] = O, NF = NF + I BY LC;
ELSE (* Vulnerable to SPF *)
TRANTO WC[I] = O, NF = NF + 1 BY COV_C*LC;
TRANTD WC[2] = O, NF = NF + 1 BY COV_C*LC;
TRANTO WC[3] = O, NF = NF + 1 BY COV_C*LC;
TRANTO SPF = 1, NF = NF + 1 BY (I-COV_C)*(WC[I] + WC[2] + WC[3])*LC;
ENDIF ;
(* Servo failures _)
IF WV[1] + WV[2] + WV[3] = 3 THEN (* Triplex *)
TKANTO WV[1] = O, NF = NF + 1 BY LV;
TRANTO WV[2] = O, NF = NF + 1 BY LV;
TRANTO WV[3] = O, NF = NF + 1 BY LV;
ELSE (* Vulnerable to SPF *)
TRANTO WV[1] = O, NF = NF + 1 BY COV_V_LV;
TRANTD WV[2] = O, NF = NF + 1 BY COV_V_LV;
TKANTO WV[3] = O, NF = NF + I BY COV_V.LV;
TKANTO SPF = I BY (I-COV_V)*(WV[I] + WV[2] ÷ WV[3])*LV;
END IF ;
(* Hydraulics failures *)
IF WH = 3 THEN (* Triplex _)
TRANTO WH = WE - 1, NF = NF + 1 BY WE*LE;
ELSE (* Vulnerable to SPF z)
TKANTO WE = WE - i, NF = NF + i BY COV_H.WH*LH;
THANTO SPF = 1 BY (1-COV_H)_WH_LH;
ENDIF;
DEATHIF SPF = I;
DEATHIF (WS[I]=O OK WC[I]=O) AND
(WS [2]=0 OR WC [2]=0) AND
(WS [3]=0 OR WC [3]=0) ;
(* Single-point failure *)
(* Enmneration of sensor/computer .)
(* combinations leading to failure .)
DEATHIF WH = O;
DEATHIF (WV[1]=O OR WC[I]=O) AND
(WV[2]=O OR WC[2]=O) AND
(WV [3]=0 OR WC [3]=0) ;
(* Loss of all hydraulics units _)
(* En%uneration of servo/compu_er _)
(* <ombinations leadi_ _o fail%Lre _)
PRUNEIF (NF >= 4); (* Pru_ning at fourth component failure level *)
COMMENT=O;
LIST=2;
(_ Tells ASSIST not _o print the state space variable .)
(_ values for each state in co_unents, to decrease _)
(* the memory needed to hold the .MOD file _)
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This input file generates a model with 239 states and 2813 transitions:
$ assist arcs2
ASSIST VERSION 6.0
The Front End Routine FER SURE
PROCESSING TIME = 26.50
NUMBER OF STATES IN MODEL = 239
NUMBER OF TRANSITIONS IN MODEL = 2813
780 DEATH STATES AGGREGATED INTO STATES 1 - 4
1419 PRUNED STATES AGGREGATED INTO STATES 5 - 5
THANK YOU FOR USING ASSIST, FER SURE
The output from the SURE program for this model is:
$sure
SURE V7.4 NASA Langley Research Center
I? readO arcs2
19.30 SECS. TO READ MODEL FILE
28337 list=2
2834? run
MODEL FILE = arcs2.mod SURE V7.4 24 Jan 90 12:41:21
DEATHSTATE LOWERBOUND UPPERBOUND
................................
1 5.18371e-05 5.34787e-05
2 9.59118e-07 9.93014e-07
3 1.94166e-I0 2.01157e-10
4 3.38427e-07 3.48844e-07
sure prune O.O0000e+O0 2.80604e-09
SUBTOTAL 5.31328e-05 5.48186e-05
PRUNESTATE LOWERBOUND UPPERBOUND
.........................
prune 5 1.03318e-07 1.07218e-07
......................
SUBTOTAL 1.03318e-07 1.07218e-07
COMMENTS RUN #I
.................................
TOTAL 5.31328e-05 5.49284e-05
11430 PATH(S) TO DEATH STATES, 1 PATH(S) PRUNED
HIGHEST PRUNE LEVEL = 3.99918e-09
100
116.700 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
2835? exi_
The SURE program pruned one additional path. The SURE program automatically sets
a pruning level based on the value of the first death state encountered in the model. The
SURE program reports a bound on the error due to SURE-level pruning in a separate row:
sure prune O.O0000e+O0 2.60604e-09
The SURE-level pruning can be disabled by issuing the AUTOPFtUNE command
AUTOPRUNE = 0 ;
in the SURE input file. BY default AUTOPRUNE = 1. Once the model has been solved,
subsequent runs can be accelerated by specifying a manual PRUNE level, e.g.
PRUNE = 5E-9;
The result is:
$ sure
SURE V7.4 NASA Langley Research Cen_er
1? readO arcs2
19.20 SECS. TO READ MODEL FILE
2833? prume=Se-9
2834? run
MODEL FILE = arcs2.mod SURE V7.4 24 Jan 90 13:07:15
DEATHSTATE LOWERBOUND UPPEB3OUND
................................
1 5.18370e-05 5.34766e-05
2 9.58952e-07 9.92843e-07
3 1.88177e-i0 1.94940e-10
4 3.35984e-07 3.48183e-07
sure prune O.OO000e+O0 4.78666e-07
......................
SUBTOTAL 5.31321e-05 5.48178e-05
PRUNESTATE LOWERBOUND UPPERBOUND
................................
prune 5 9.87666e-08 1.02492e-07
......................
SUBTOTAL 9.87666e-08 1.02492e-07
COMMENTS RUN #1
.................................
TOTAL 5.31321e-05 5.53990e-05
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9768 PATH(S) TO DEATH STATES,
99.416 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
2835? exit
135 PATH(S) PRUNED AT LEVEL 5.00000e-09
Finally, we will remove the assumption of instantaneous reconfiguration. We have four
types of components--sensors, servos, computers, and hydraulics--that all have recovery
processes associated with them. Since all of these components can fail while others are
recovering, this system could potentially experience up to four simultaneous competing re-
coveries. Rather than try to model all of these competing recoveries, we will use a bounding
technique similar to one developed by Dr. Allan White and Daniel Palumbo [20], and con-
servatively assume that any second component failure during a recovery leads to system
failure. This is accomplished by generating a transition to a death state from each state in
which the system is experiencing a recovery. This transition to death will have a rate that
is the sum of the failure rates for all other components in the system. We can conveniently
reuse the SPF state space variable to flag that this is a death state, and we will distinguish
the near-coincident failure deaths from the single-point failure deaths by checking for the
presence of an active component failure:
DEATHIF (SPF = i) AND (SA+VA+HA÷CA > 0); (* Near-coinciden% failures *)
DEATHIF SPF = I; (* Single-point failures *)
Note that since the death states are lumped according to the first DEATHIF statement they
satisfy, the more specific DEATHIF statement that uses the SPF flag to signal near-coincident
failures as death states must precede the DEATHIF statement that defines true single-point
failures as death states. If these two statements were reversed, all of these failures would be
lumped as single-point failures.
The bounding near-coincident failure transitions must be defined for each component
type--sensors, servos, computers, and hydraulics. For example, the transitions from each
state with an active sensor failure are:
TRANTO SA = 0 BY FAST REC_S;
TRANTO SPF = I BY 2*LS + 3*LV + 3*LC + 3*LH;
(* Recovery *)
(* Conserva%ive bound on *)
(* near-coincident failures *)
The complete ASSIST description of the model is:
LS = 7.62E-4;
LV = 3.90E-4;
LC = 3.50E-4;
LH = 6E-5;
(* Failure rate of sensors *)
(* Failure rate of servos *)
(* Failure ra_e of computers *)
(* Failure ra%e of hydraulics units *)
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COV_S = .7231;
COV_V = .95;
COV_C = .95;
COV_H = .95;
(. Sensor sinEle-poin% failure coverage *)
(* Servo single-point failure coverage *)
(* Computer single-point failure coverage *)
(* Hydraulics single-point failure coverage *)
REC_$ = IE4;
REC_V = 1E4;
KEC_C = 1E4;
REC_H = 1E4;
(* Exponential time to recovery from sensor failure *)
(* Exponential time %o recovery from servo failure =)
(* Exponential time %o recovery from computer failure *)
(* Exponential _ime to recovery from hydraulics failure *)
SPACE = (WS : ARRAY [I ..3] OF 0..1,
WC : ARRAY [I ..3] OF 0..I,
WV : ARRAY [1..3] OF 0..i,
WH : 0 .3,
CA: 0. 1,
VA: O. I,
SA: O. i,
HA: O. 1,
SPF: 0 .I,
NF : 0 12);
(* Status of the 3 sensors *)
(* Status of the 3 computers *)
(* Status of the 3 servos *)
(* Number of working hydraulics units *)
(* Fault in active computer *)
(* Fault in active servo *)
(* Fault in active sensor *)
(* Fault in active hydxaulics %tni% *)
(* Single-point failure flag *)
(* Number of component failures *)
START = (3 0F 1, 3 0F 1, 3 0F 1, 3, 4 0F 0, 0, 0);
(* Sensors *)
IF SA = 1 THEN (* Active sensor failure *)
TKANTO SA = 0 BY FAST P_EC_S; (* Recovery *)
TRANTO SPF = I BY 2*LS + 3*LV + 3*LC + 3*LH; (* Conservative bound on *)
(* near-coincident failures *)
ELSE (* No active sensor failures *)
IF WS[I] + WS[2] + WS[3] = 3 THEN (= Triplex *)
TKANTO WS[1] = O, NF = NF + I, SA = 1 BY LS;
TRANTO WS[2] = O, NF = NF + 1, SA = I BY LS;
TRANTO W513] = O, NF = NF + 1, SA = 1 BY LS;
ELSE (. Vulnerable _o SPF *)
TRANTD WS[I] = O, NF = NF + I, SA = I BY COV_S*LS;
TRANTO WS[2] = O, NF = NF + 1, SA = I BY COV_S*LS;
TRANTO WS[3] = O, NF = NF + 1, SA = I BY COV_S*LS;
TRANTO SPF = 1, NF = NF + i BY (1-COV_S)*LS;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* Computers *)
IF CA = 1 THEN (* Active computer failure *)
TRANTO CA = 0 BY FAST REC_C; (* Recovery *)
TRANTO SPF = I BY 3*LS + 3*LV + 2*LC + 3*LH; (* Conservative bound on *)
(* near-coincident failures *)
ELSE (* No active computer failures *)
IF WC[1] * WC[2] ÷ WC[3] = 3 THEN (* Triplex *)
TRANTO WC[I] = O, NF = NF + 1, CA = 1 BY LC;
TRANTO WC[2] = O, NF = NF + 1, CA = 1 BY LC;
TRANTO WC[3] = O, NF = NF + 1, CA = 1 BY LC;
ELSE (= Vulnerable to SPF *)
TRANTO WC[I] = O, NF = NF + 1, CA = 1 BY COV_C*LC;
TRANTD WC[2] = O, NF = NF + 1, CA = 1 BY COV_C*LC;
TRANTO WC[3] = O, NF = NF + 1, CA = I BY COV_C*LC;
TRANTQ SPF = I0 NF = NF ÷ 1, CA = 1 BY (1-COV_C)*LC;
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ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* Serves *)
IF VA = I THEN (* Active serve failure *)
TRANTO VA = 0 BY FAST REC_V; (* Recovery *)
TRANTO SPF = I BY 3*LS + 2*LV + 3*LC + 3*LH; (* Conservative bound on *)
(* near-coincidenz failures *)
ELSE (* No active serve failures *)
IF WV[1] + WV[2] + WV[3] = 3 THEN (* Triplex *)
TRANTO WV[1] = 0, NF = NF + i, VA = 1 BY LV;
TRANTO WV[2] = O, NF = NF + I, VA = 1 BY LV;
TRANTO WV[3] = 0, NF = NF + 1, VA = 1 BY LV;
ELSE (* Vulnerable to SPF *)
TRANTO WV[1] = 0, NF = NF + 1, VA = 1 BY COV_V*LV;
TRANTO WV[2] = 0, NF = NF + I, VA = 1 BY COV_V*LV;
TRANTO WV[3] = 0, NF = NF + I, VA = 1 BY COV_V*LV;
TRANTO SPF = 1 BY (1-COV_V)*LV;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* Hydraulics *)
IF HA = i THEN (* Active hydraulics failure *)
TRANTO HA = 0 BY FAST REC_H;
TRANTO SPF = I BY 3*LS + 3*LV + 3*LC + 2*LH;
ELSE (* No active hydraulics failure *)
IF WH = 3 THEN (* Triplex *)
TRANTD WH = WH - 1, HA = I BY WH*LH;
ELSE (* Vulnerable to SPF *)
TKANTO WH = WH - 1, HA = 1 BY COV_H*WH*LH;
TRANTO SPF = 1 BY (I-COV_H)*WH*LH;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* Recovery *)
(* Conservative bound on *)
(* near-coincident failures *)
DEATHIF (SPF = 1) AND (SA+VA+HA+CA > 0); (* Near-coincident failures *)
DEATHIF SPF = i; (* Single-point failures *)
DEATHIF (WS[I]=O OR WC[I]=O) AND
(WS[2]=O OR WC[2]=O) AND
(WS [3]=0 OR WC [3]--0);
(* All combinations of sensor/computer *)
(* failures that lead to system failure *)
DEATHIF WH = O;
DEATHIF (WV[I]=O OR WC[1]=O) AND
(WV[2]=O OR WC[2]=O) AND
(WV [3]:0 oR wc [3]=o) ;
(* Loss of all hydraulics *)
(* All combinations of serve/computer *)
(* failures that lead to system failure *)
PRUNEIF (NF = 3); (* Pruning at 3rd component failure level *)
The ASSIST output is:
$ assist arcs3
ASSIST VERSION 6.0
The Fron_ End Routine FER SURE
104
PROCESSING TIME = 181.97
NUMBER OF STATES IN MODEL = 821
NUMBER OF TRANSITIONS IN MODEL = 8802
2570 DEATH STATES AGGREGATED INTO STATES 1 - 5
4185 PRUNED STATES AGGREGATED INTO STATES 6 - 6
The SURE output using the AUTOPRUNE _ature is:
$ sure
SURE V7.4 NASA Lan81ey Research Center
17 readO arcs3
119.17 SECS. TO READ MODEL FILE
26429? run
MODEL FILE = arcs3.mod SURE V7.4 24 Jan 90 13:24:06
DEATHSTATE LOWERBOUND UPPERBOUND
................................
1 9.32078e-07 9.63921e-07
2 2.50414e-05 2.58639e-05
3 9.40684e-07 9.78264e-07
4 1.93553e-10 2.01578e-10
5 3.28266e-07 3.41884e-07
sure prume O.O0000e+O0 9.42664e-09
......................
SUBTOTAL 2.72427e-05 2.81482e-05
PRUNESTATE LOWERBOUND UPPERBOUND
................................
prune 6 1.07040e-05 1.11349e-05
......................
SUBTOTAL 1.07040e-05 1.11349e-05
COMMENTS RUN #I
......................... --._.--------
TOTAL 2.72427e-05 3.92925e-05
12018 PATH(S) TO DEATH STATES, 1673 PATH(S) PRUNED
HIGHEST PRUNE LEVEL = 1.54070e-10
133.817 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
26430? exi_
The five death states correspond to the five DEATHIF statements in the ASSIST input file.
The dominant death state is the second death state, which represents the probability of
system failure due to single-point failures. The second largest failure mode is death state
three, combinations of sensor/computer failures that lead to system failure. The conservative
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approximation of the probability of failure due to near-coincident failures, which is death
state two, is almost two orders of magnitude smaller than the dominant failure mode.
The ASSIST pruning on this model, at the third component failure level, is very severe,
and the calculated error due to pruning is of the same order of magnitude as the dominant
failure mode probability. However, the size of the model will become quite large if the AS-
SIST pruning is moved back to the fourth component failure level. We can use a technique
similar to the bounding technique used on the near-coincident failures to reduce the conser-
vativeness of the calculation of error due to pruning. The state into which all of the pruned
paths terminate, state six, is actually an operational state of the system, not a death state.
Therefore, some other component in the system would have to fail before system failure is
reached. This can be represented by adding an additional transition to the model from state
six to some new death state not already defined in the model, say state 0. The rate for
this new transition can be conservatively set as the sum of the failure rates of all of the
components in the system:
6,0 = 3*LS + 3*LV + 3*LC + 3*LH;
This rate is conservative because some of three of these components will already have failed
at this point. In fact, the three lowest component failure rates can even be deleted from
this calculation and the rate will still be conservative. (Note. One does not have to delete
the statement, PRb_ESTATES=(6) from the generated model file. Since an operational state
cannot be a prune state, SURE will ignore this statement.) The SURE output below shows
that this modification, while still conservative, significantly reduced the calculated error due
to ASSIST pruning:
$ sure
SURE V7.4 NASA Langley Research Cen_er
I? readO arcs3
119.53 SEC$. TO READ MODEL FILE
26432? 6,0 = 3*LS + 3*LV + 3*LC + 3*LH;
26433? run
MODEL FILE = arcs3.mod
DEATHSTATE LOWERBOUND UPPERBOUND
0 1.24779e-07 1.30345e-07
1 9.32079e-07 9.63921e-07
2 2.50414e-05 2.58639e-05
3 9.40697e-07 9.78278e-07
4 1.93553e-10 2.01578e-10
SURE V7.4 24 Jan 90 13:37:00
COMMENTS RUN #1
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5 3.28268e-07 3.41886e-07
sure prune 0.00000e+00 7.68769e-09
TOTAL 2.73675e-05 2.82862e-05
6464 PATH(S) TO DEATH STATES, 8760 PATH(S) PRUNED
HIGHEST PRUNE LEVEL = 4.60607e-ll
87.917 SEES. CPU TIME UTILIZED
26433? exit
12.3 Two Triads with Three Power Supplies
This example consists of two triads of computers with one triad of power supplies connected
such that one computer in each triad is connected to each power supply. Thus, if a power
supply fMls, then one computer in each triad fails. Because of the complex failure dependen-
cies, this is not an easy system to model. The usual method of using state space variables
to represent the number of failed computers in each triad is insufficient because which com-
puters have failed is Mso important state information. One way to model this system is
to use the state space variables as flags to indicate the failure of each computer and power
supply in the system. This uses a large number of state space variables, but the system can
be described using only a few simple TRANT0 statements. The large number of state space
variables, however, leads to an unnecessarily complex semi-Marker model. The ASSIST
input file is as follows:
LAM_PS = IE-6;
LAM_C = IE-5;
(* Failure rate of power supplies *)
(* Failure rate of compu%ers *)
SPACE = (CAF: ARRAY[1..3] OF 0..I,
CBF: ARKAY[I..3] OF 0..I,
PSF: ARKAY[I..3] OF 0..I);
START = (9 OF 0);
(* Failed computers in Triad A *)
(* Failed computers in Triad B *)
(* Failed power supplies *)
DEATHIF CAF[I] + CAF[2] + CAF[3] > I;
DEATHIF CBF[I] + CBF[2] + CBF[3] > I;
(* 2/3 computers in Triad i failed *)
(* 2/3 computers in Triad B failed *)
FOR I = 1,3
IF CAF[I]=O TRANTO CAF[I] = I BY LAM_C;
(* Failure of computer in Triad A *)
IF CBF[I]=O TRANT0 CBF[I] = 1 BY LAM_C;
(* Failure of computer in Triad B *)
IF PSF[I]=O TKANTO CAF[I] = I, CBF[I] = i, PSF[I]
(* Power supply failure *)
ENDFOR;
= I BY LAM_PS;
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This rather brute-force method of modeling the system leads to a semi-Markov model with
70 states and 138 transitions to model this relatively simple system.
Using state space variables to represent the number of failed computers in each triad
and adding a flag to signal the dependencies between failed computers, the system may be
modeled with a much smaller state space. Combining the resulting complex transition rules
by logical reasoning, the system described above can be modeled by the following input file:
LAM_PS = 1E-6;
LAM_C = 1E-5;
SPACE = (NFP: ARRAY[I..2] OF 0..3,
(* Failure rate of power supplies *)
(* Failure raze of computers *)
NFS: 0..3,
SAME: 0..1);
START = (0, O, O, 1);
(* Number of failed *)
(* computers in each triad *)
(* Number of failed power supplies *)
(* Set to 0 if 2 failed computers are on *)
(* different power supplies, I otherwise *)
DEATHIF NFP[1]>I OR NFP[2]>I;
(* The system fails if 2/3 computers in either _riad fail *)
FOR I=1,2
IF NFP[I]<3 THEN
IF NFP[3-I]=I THEM (. Other _riad has a failed computer *)
TRANT0 NFP[I] = NFP[I]+I BY LAM_C;
(* Failure of computer on same power supply as other failed one *)
TRANT0 NFP[I] = NFP[I]+I, SAME = 0 BY (2-NFP[I])*LAM_C;
(* Failure of computer on different *)
(* power supply than o_her failed one *)
ELSE
TRANT0 NFP[I] = NFP[I]+I BY (3-NFP[I])*LAM_C;
(* Failure of computer when other triad has no failures yet *)
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ENDFOR;
IF (NFP[I]=O AND NFP[2]=O) THEN
TRANTO (NFP[1]+I, NFP[2]+I, NFS+I, I) BY 3*LAM_PS;
(* Power supply failures when no previous *)
(* computer failures have occurred. *)
ELSE
TRANTO (2, 2, 2, O) BY (3-SAME)*LAM_PS;
(* Failure of a power supply not connected to another
(* previously failed computer. NOTE: State (2,2,2,1)
(* is an aggregation of several death states.
IF SAME = 1TRANTO (i0 1, 1, i) BY *LAM_PS;
(* Failed power supply connected to *)
(* a previously failed computsr. *)
ENDIF;
,)
,)
,)
This second ASSIST input file leads to a semi-Markov model with only 17 states and 30
transitions to model the same system that using the first strategy required 70 states and 138
transitions. However, this input file is much more difficult to understand and verify. It is
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not unusual to encounter a trade-off between the size of the model and the simplicity of the
rules for generating the model.
12.4 Byzantine Faults
In this section we will introduce the concept of "Byzantine" faults and "Byzantine-resilient"
algorithms. Byzantine faults arise from the need to distribute single-source data such as
sensor-data to the replicated computational sites. Data values from sensors are unreplicated.
Although there may be redundant sensors, these do not produce exactly the same result.
Thus, if each processor were connected to one of the redundant sensors, they would get
different results. This is unacceptable in a system which uses exact-match voting algorithms
for fault-detection. For example, if the system uses voting for fault-detection as well as
fault-masking, Byzantine faults can cause the system to reconfigure the wrong processor.
Furthermore, the problem is not solved by having each of the processors read all of the
redundant sensors. Since the redundant processors run off of different clocks, they would
access the sensors at slightly different times and receive different results. Consequently, a
signal-processing algorithm is run on each of the processors to derive a trustworthy value
from the set of redundant sensors. This necessitates that each sensor be distributed to all of
the redundant processing sites in a consistent manner. Suppose the sensor value is read and
stored. If there is a failure in the transmission medium between this value and the redundant
sites, different values may be received by the good processors.
In order for each processing site to be guaranteed to receive the same set of "raw" values,
special "Byzantine-resilient" algorithms must be used to distribute the single-source value.
The algorithm depends fundamentally upon the availability of 4 separate fault-isolation
regions. If processors are used for the rebroadcasting, then there must be a minimum of four
processors. Consequently a simplex triplex system cannot be Byzantine resilient without
the addition of special additional hardware. The model in figure 36 models the effect of a
Byzantine fault on a triplex system with one spare that does not contain any extra hardware.
This model is the same as the traditional triplex model except that it contains two extra
transitions--from (2) to (5) and from (5) to (8). These transitions represent the situations
where a Byzantine fault has confused the operating system into reconfiguring the wrong
processor. In the first case, a good processor has been replaced by the spare and not the
faulty one. In the second case, the system incorrectly diagnoses the faulty processor and
degrades to a faulty simplex. The competing transitions at state (2) would be:
2,3 = 2*L;
2,4 = <MU_F,STD_F,I-P_W>;
2,5 = <MU_W,STD_W,P_W>;
The competing transitions at state (5) would be:
5,6 = 2*L;
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Figure 36: Simple Triplex System with One Spare Subject to Byzantine Faults
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Figure 37: Failure Prob. As a Function of Pw
5,7 -- <MU_F,STD_F,I-P_W>;
5,8 = <MU_W,STD_W,P_W>;
The parameter P_W is the most critical parameter in this model. This can be seen in figure
37 which shows a plot of the results of executing SURE on the full model:
LAMBDA = IE-4;
MU_F = 1E-4; STD_F = 1E-4;
MU_W = IE-4; STD_W -- IE-4;
P_W = 0 TO 1 BY 0.i;
1,2 = 3*LAMBDA;
2,3 = 2.LAMBDA;
2,4 = <MU_F,STD_F,I-P_W>;
2,5 = <MU_W,STD_W,P_W>;
4,5 = 3*LAMBDA;
5,6 = 2*LAMBDA;
5,7 = <MU_F,STD_F,I-P_W>;
5,8 = <MU_W,STD_W,P_W>;
7,8 = LAMBDA;
TIME = I0;
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Unfortunately, there is very little experimental data or methods available to aid in the
estimation of Pw. For this reason, conservative fault-tolerant system designers have elected
to add the additional hardware to make the architecture Byzantine-resilient. This eliminates
this failure mode from the system. However, the failure of any additional hardware must be
modelled.
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13 Time and Sequence Dependencies
Many systems experience failure or recovery rates that are dependent on the current state
or the failure history of the system. Several example systems exhibiting these types of
dependencies are given in this section.
13.1 Failure Rate Dependencies
Consider a triad of processors in which the processors are protected from voltage surges by
voltage regulators. The processors fail at rate Ap. The system initially contains two voltage
regulators. These voltage regulators fail at rate SR. Once both of the voltage regulators fail,
the processors are also subject to failure due to voltage surges, which arrive at an exponential
rate Av.
(* FAILURE RATE DEPENDENCIES *)
LAMBDA_P = 1E-5;
LAMBDA_V = 1E-2;
LAMBDA_R = IE-3;
SPACE = (NP: 0..3,
NFP: 0..3,
NR: 0..2);
START = (3,0,2);
DEATHIF 2 * NFP >= NP;
(* Permanen_ failure rate of processors *)
(* Arrival rate of damaging voltage surges *)
(* Failure ra_e of vol_age regulators *)
(* Number of active processors *)
(* Number of failed active processors *)
(* Number of working voltage regulators *)
(* Star_ wi_h 3 working processors, 2 regs. *)
(* Vo_er defeated *)
(* Processor failures *)
IF NP > NFP TRANTO NFP = NFP+I BY (NP-NFP)*LAMBDA_P;
(* Failure of processor due to voltage surge *)
IF (NR = O) AND (NP > NFP) TRANTO NFP _ NFP+i BY (NP-NFP)*LAMBDA_V;
(* Voltage regulator failures *)
IF NR > 0 TRANTO NR = NR-I BY NR*LAMBDA_R;
(* Reconfiguration *)
IF NFP > 0 TRANTO (NP-I,NFP-I,NR) BY <8.0E-S,3.0E-5>;
Since this model contains only one DEATHIF statement, all of the system failure proba-
bilities will be lumped together. The addition of another DEATHIF statement placed in front
of the one above could capture the probability of having both voltage regulators fail before
the system failure condition is reached:
DEATHIF (NR=O) AND (2 * NFP >= NP);
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13.2 Recovery Rate Dependencies
In this system, the speed of the recovery process is significantly affected by the number of
active components. This is accomplished by making the recovery rate a function of the state
space variable NP, the number of active processors.
(* RECOVERY BATE DEPENDENCIES *)
N_PROCS = 10; (* Initial number of processors *)
LAMBDA_P = 8E-3; (* Permanen_ failure rate of processors *)
SPACE = (NP: O..N_PROCS, (* Number of active processors ,)
NFP: 0..N_PR0CS); (* Number of failed active processors *)
START = (N_PROCS,0);
DEATHIF 2 * NFP >= NP; (* Vo_er defeated *)
(* Processor failures ")
IF NP > NFP TRANTO NFP = NFP+I BY (NP-NFP)*LAMBDA_P;
(* Reconfiguration where rate is a function of NP *)
IF NFP > 0 TRANTO (NP-1,NFP-I) BY <NP*I.OE-5 ÷ 3.0E-5,NP*2.0E-6 ÷ 1.0E-5>;
14 Sequences of Reliability Models
The SURE program provides the user with the capability to calculate and store the prob-
ability of terminating in each of the operational states of the model as well as the death
state probabilities. The program also allows the user to initialize a model using these same
operational state probabilities. These features support the use of sequences of rehability
models to model systems with phased missions or non-constant failure rates.
14.1 Phased Missions
Many systems exhibit different failure behaviors or operational characteristics during dif-
ferent phases of a mission. For example, a spacecraft may experience considerably higher
component failure rates during liftoff than in the weightless, benign environment of space.
Also, the failure of a particular component may be catastrophic only during a specific phase,
such as the three-minute landing phase of an aircraft.
In a phased-mission solution, a model is solved for the first phase of the mission. The
final probabilities of the operational states are used to calculate the initial state probabilities
for a second model. (The second model usually differs from the first model in some manner.)
This process is repeated for as many phases as there are in the mission.
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The SURE program reports upper and lower bounds on the operational states just as
for the death states. These bounds are not as tight as the death state probabilities_ but
are usually acceptable. The upper and lower bounds on recovery states (i.e. states with
fast transitions leaving them) are usually not very close together. Fortunately, these states
usually have operational probabilities which are several orders of magnitude lower than the
other states in the model because systems typically spend a very small percentage of their
operational time performing recoveries. Thus, in subsequent phases the crudeness of the
bounds for the recovery states in previous phases do not lead to an excessive separation of the
final death state bounds. In other words, the crude operational recovery state probabilities
will usually result in only a small separation of the final bounds obtained in phased mission
calculations. Although the bounds may sometimes be unacceptably far apart, they will
always be mathematically correct.
Suppose we have a system which operates in two basic phases--(1) cruise and (2) landing.
The system is implemented using a triad of processors and two warm spares. For simplicity,
we will assume perfect detection of spare failure. During the cruise phase which lasts for
2 hours, the system reconfigures by sparing and degradation. After the cruise phase, the
system goes into a landing phase which lasts 3 minutes. During this phase, the workload
on the machines is so high that the additional processing that would be needed to perform
reconfiguration cannot be tolerated. Therefore, the system is designed to "turn off" the
reconfiguration processes during this phase.
In order to model this two-phased mission, two different models must be created--one
for each phase. The following ASSIST input describes a model for the cruise phase:
NSI = 2;
LAMBDA = IE-4;
GAMMA = IE-6;
TIME = 2.0;
MU = 7.9E-5;
SIGMA = 2.56E-5;
MU_DEG = 6.3E-5;
SIGMA_DEG = 1.74E-5;
SPACE = (NW: 0..3,
NF: 0..3,
NS: O..NSI);
START = (3,0,NSI);
LIST=3;
(* Number of spares initially *)
(* Failure rate of active processors *)
(* Failure rate of spares *)
(* Mission time *)
(* Mean time to replace with spare *)
(* Start. dev. of time to replace with spare *)
(* Mean time to degrade so simplex *)
(* S%an. dev. of time to degrade to simplex *)
(* Number of working processors *)
(* Number of failed active procssors *)
(* Number of spares *)
IF NW > 0
TRANTO (NW-I,NF+I,NS) BY NW*LAMBDA;
(* A processor can fail *)
IF (NF > O) AND (NS > O) (* A spare becomes active *)
TBANTO (NW+I,NF-I,NS-I) BY <MU,SIGMA>;
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IF (NF > O) AND (NS = O)
TRANT0 (I,0,0) BY <MU_DEG,SIGMA_DEG>;
IF NS > 0
TRANTO (NW,NF,NS-1) BY NS*GAMMA;
DEAI'HIF NF >= NW;
(* No more spares, degrade _o simplex *)
(* A spare fails and is deSecSed *)
The ASSIST program generates the following SURE model.
NSI = 2;
LAMBDA = 1E-4;
GAMMA = 1E-6;
TIME = 2.0;
MU = 7.9E-5;
SIGMA = 2.56E-5;
MU_DEG = 6.3E-5;
SIGMA_DE = 1.74E-5;
LIST = 3;
2(* 3,0,2 *),
2(* 3,0,2 *)
3(* 2,1,2 *)
3(* 2,1,2 *)
3(* 2,1,2 *)
4(* 3,0,1 *)
4(* 3,0,1 *)
5(* 2,1,1 *),
S(* 2,1,1 *)
5(* 2,1,1 *)
6(* 3,0,0 *)
7(* 2,1,0 *)
7(* 2,1,0 *)
8(* 1,0,0 *)
3(* 2,1,2 *) = 3*LAMBDA;
4(* 3,0,1 *) = 2*GAMMA;
1(* 1,2,2 *) = 2*LAMBDA;
4(* 3,0,1 *) = <MU,SIGMA>;
5(* 2,1,1 *) = 2*GAMMA;
5(* 2,1,1 *) = 3*LAMBDA;
6(* 3,0,0 *) = 1*GAMMA;
1(* 1,2,1 *) = 2*LAMBDA;
6(* 3,0,0 *) = <MU,SIGMA>;
7(* 2,1,0 *) = 1*GAMMA;
7(* 2,1,0 *) = 3*LAMBDA;
1(* 1,2,0 *) = 2*LAMBDA;
8(* 1,0,0 *) = <MU_DEG,SIGMA_DEG>;
1(* 0,1,0 *) = I*LAMBDA;
(* NUMBER OF STATES IN MODEL = 8 *)
(* NUMBER OF TRANSITIONS IN MODEL = 14 *)
(* 4 DEATH STATES AGGREGATED STATES 1 - 1 *)
The model for the second phase (call it "phaz2.mod") is easily created with an editor by
deleting the reconfiguration transitions and changing the mission time to 0.05 hours. The
resulting file is:
NSI = 2;
LAMBDA = 1E-4;
GAMMA = 1E-6;
TIME = 0.05;
LIST = 3;
2(* 3,0,2 *), 3(* 2,1,2 *) = 3*LAMBDA;
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2(* 3,0,2 *), 4(* 3,0,1 *) = 2*GAMMA;
3(* 2,1,2 *), 1(* 1,2,2 *) = 2*LAMBDA;
3(* 2,1,2 *), 5(* 2,1,1 *) = 2*GAMMA;
4(* 3,0,1 *), 5(* 2,1,1 *) = 3*LAMBDA;
4(* 3,0,1 *), 6(* 3,0,0 *) = 1*GAMMA;
5(* 2,1,1 *), 1(* 1,2,1 *) = 2*LAMBDA;
5(* 2,1,1 *), 7(* 2,1,0 *) = 1*GAMMA;
6(* 3,0,0 *), 7(* 2,1,0 *) = 3*LAMBDA;
7(* 2,1,0 *), 1(* 1,2,0 *) = 2*LAMBDA;
8(* 1,0,0 *), 1(* 0,1,0 *) = I*LAMBDA;
The SURE program is then executed on the first model (stored in file "phaz.mod"), using
the LIST = 3 option. This causes the SURE program to output all of the operational state
probabities as well as the death state probabilities. This is illustrated below:
SURE V7.2 NASA Langley Research Center
1? readO phaz
317 run
MODEL FILE = phaz.mod SURE V7.2 11 Jan 90 13:56:49
DEATHSTATE LOWERBOUND UPPERBOUND
................................
1 9.35692e-12 9.48468e-12
TOTAL 9.35692e-12 9.48468e-12
COMMENTS RUN #1
.................................
OPER-STATE
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
LOWERBOUND
9.99396e-01
0 O0000e+O0
6 02277e-04
0 O0000e+O0
i 80332e-07
0 O0000e+O0
3 57995e-ll
UPPERBOUND
9.99396e-01
1.53952e-06
6.03819e-04
1.43291e-09
1.81768e-07
5.59545e-13
3.63591e-ll
20 PATH(S) PROCESSED
0.617 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
32? exit
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The SURE program also creates a file containing these probabilities in a format that
can be used to initialize the states for the next phase. The SURE program names the file
"phaz.ini", i.e. adds ".ini" to the file name. The contents of this file generated by the run
above is:
S:
6:
7:
8:
);
INITIAL_PROBS(
1: ( 9.35692e-12, 9.48468e-12)
2: ( 9.99396e-01, 9.99396e-01)
3: ( O.O0000e+O0, 1.53952e-06)
4: ( 6.02277e-04, 6.03819e-04)
( O.O0000e+O0, 1.43291e-09)
( 1.80332e-07, 1.81768e-07)
( O.O0000e+O0, 5.59545e-13)
( 3.57995e-11, 3.63591e-11)
Next, the SURE program is executed on the second model. The state probabilities are
initialized using the SURE INITIAL_PROB$ command. The second model must number its
states in an equivalent manner to the first model. Note that ".ini" file output is in the correct
format for the SURE program:
sure
SURE V7.2 NASA Langley Research Cen_er
17 readO phaz2
317 read phaz.ini
32: INITIAL_PROBS(
33: 1: ( 9.35692e-12, 9.48468e-12),
34: 2: ( 9.99396e-01, 9.99396e-01),
35: 3: ( O.O0000e+O0, 1.53982e-06),
36: 4: ( 6.02277e-04, 6.03819e-04),
37: 5: ( O.O0000e+O0, 1.43291e-09),
38: 6: ( 1.80332e-07, 1.81768e-07),
39: 7: ( O.O0000e+O0, 5.59545e-13),
40: 8: ( 3.57995e-11, 3.63591e-11)
41: );
42? run
MODEL FILE = phaz.ini SURE V7.2 11JaJ_ 90 13:58:i2
DEATHSTATE LOWERBOUND UPPERBOUND
1 8.43564e-11 9. 98944e-II
TOTAL 8. 43564e- 11 9. 98944e- 11
COMMENTS RUN #1
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OPER-STATE LOWERBOUND
2 9.99381e-01
3 1.49908e-05
4 6.02368e-04
5 9.03554e-09
6 1.80359e-07
7 2.70540e-12
8 3.57993e-ll
UPPER3OUND
9 99381e-01
I 65304e-05
6 03910e-04
I 04918e-08
I 81795e-07
3 28658e-12
3 63589e-ll
9 PATH(S) PRUNED AT LEVEL 1.49540e-16
SUM OF PRUNED STATES PROBABILITY < 5.04017e-18
9 PATH(S) PROCESSED
0.417 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
43?
14.2 Non-Constant Failure Rates
In the previous section, a two-phased system was analyzed which required different models
for each of the phases. A related situation occurs when the structure of the model remains
the same, but some parameters, such as the failure rates, change from one phase to another.
Consider a triad with warm spares that experiences different failure rates for each of the
phases:
, phasel(fimin): _=2 x 10 -4 , "r= 10 -4
• phase 2 (2 hours): A=10 -4 , "_=10 -s
• phase3 (3rain): A=10 -3 , "_=10 -4
The same SURE model can be used for all of the phases, and the user can be prompted
for the parameter values using the SURE INPUT command:
INPUT LAMBDA, GAMMA, TIME;
The full SURE model, stored in file "phase.mod,"is:
INPUT LAMBDA, GAMMA, TIME;
NSI = 2;
MU = 7.9E-5;
SIGMA = 2.56E-5;
MU_DEG = 6.3E-5;
SIGMA_DE = 1.74E-5;
LIST = 3;
QTCALC = 1;
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2(* 3,0,2 *),
2(* 3,0,2 *),
3(* 2,1,2 *),
3(* 2,1,2 *),
3(* 2,1,2 *),
4(* 3,0,1 *),
4(* 3,0,1 *),
5(* 2,1,1 *),
5(* 2,1,1 *),
S(* 2,1,1 *),
6(* 3,0,0 *),
7(* 2,1,0 *),
7(* 2,1,0 *),
8(* 1,0,0 *),
3(* 2,1,2 *) = 3*LAMBDA;
4(* 3,0,1 *) = 2*GIMMA;
1(* 1,2,2 *) = 2*LAMBDA;
4(* 3,0,1 *) = <NU,SIGMA>;
S(* 2,1,1 *) = 2*GAMMA;
5(* 2,1,1 *) = 3*LAMBDA;
6(* 3,0,0 *) = I*GJLMMA;
1(* 1,2,1 *) = 2*LAMBDA;
6(* 3,0,0 *) = <MU,SIGMA>;
7(* 2,1,0 *) = 1*GAMMA;
7(* 2,1,0 *) = 3*LAMBDA;
1(* 1,2,0 *) = 2*LAMBDA;
8(* 1,0,0 *) = <MU_DEG,SIGMA_DEG>;
1(* 0,1,0 *) = I*LAMBDA;
The 0TCALC = 1 command causes the SURE program to use more accurate (but slower)
numerical routines. This increased accuracy is often necessary when analyzing phased mis-
sions. The interactive session follows:
SURE V7.2 NASA Langley Research Cen_er
1? readO phase
LAMBDA? 2e-4
GAMMA? le-4
TIME? .1
30? run
MODEL FILE = phase.mod SURE V7.2 12 Jan 90 09:38:50
TIME = 1.000o-01, GAMMA = 1.000o-04, LAMBDA = 2.000e-04,
DEATHSTATE LOWERBOUND UPPERBOb_D COMMENTS
................................
1 1.78562e-12 1.89600e-12 <ExpMat>
TOTAL 1.78562e-12 1.89600o-12 <ExpMa¢ - 14,14>
RUN #1
OPER-STATE LONERBOUND UPPER3Ob_D
.....................
2 9.99920e-01 9.99920e-01 <ExpMat>
3 O.O0000e+O0 9.98043e-07 <ExpMa¢>
4 7.89960e-05 7.99941e-05 <ExpMa¢>
5 O.O0000e+O0 1.14966o-10 <ExpMa¢>
6 2.67751e-09 2.80076e-09 <ExpMa_>
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7 O.O0000e+O0 5.17358e-15 <ExpMa_>
8 5.08706e-14 5.60442e-14 <ExpMat>
10 PATH(S) PRUNED AT LEVEL 4.75740e-20
SUM OF PRUNED STATES PROBABILITY < 6.11113e-20
Q(T) ACCURACY >= 14 DIGITS
10 PATH(S) PROCESSED
2.867 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
31? readO phase
LAMBDA? le-4
GAMMA? Ie-5
TIME? 2.0
60? read phase.ini
61: INITIAL_PROBS(
62:
63:
64:
65:
66:
67:
68:
69:
70: );
1: ( 1.78562e-12
2: ( 9.99920e-01
3: ( O.O0000e+O0
4: ( 7.89960e-05
5: ( O.O0000e+O0
6: ( 2.67751e-09
7: ( O.O0000e+O0
8: ( 5.08706e-14
1 89600e-12),
9 99920e-01),
9 98043e-07),
7 99941e-05),
1 14966e-10),
2 80076e-09),
5 17358e-15),
S 60442e-14)
0.07 SECS. TO READ MODEL FILE
71? run
MODEL FILE = phase.ini SURE V7.2 12 Jan 90 09:36:19
TIME = 2.000e+O0, GAMMA = 1.000e-05, LAMBDA = 1.000e-04,
DEATHSTATE LOWERBOUND UPPERBOUND
......................
1 1.11438e-11 1.13950e-li
TOTAL 1.11438e-ll 1.13950e-ll
COMMENTS RUN #2
.........................
<ExpMa_>
<ExpMa_ - 14,14>
0PER-STATE L0WERBOUND UPPERBOUND
................................
2 9.99280e-01 9.99280e-01 <ExpMa_>
3 O.O0000e+O0 2.35621e-06 <ExpMa_>
4 7.17134e-04 7.20490e-04 <ExpMa_>
5 O.O0000e+O0 2.82024e-09 <ExpMa_>
6 2.48355e-07 2.51362e-07 <ExpMa_>
7 O.O0000e+O0 1.19806e-12 " <ExpMat>
8 5.53210e-ll 5.65243e-ll <ExpMa_>
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30 PATH(S) PRUNED AT LEVEL 4.61326e-19
SUM OF PRUNED STATES PROBABILITY < 1.15985e-18
Q(T) ACCURACY >= 14 DIGITS
19 PATH(S) PROCESSED
4.267 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
72? readO phase
LAMBDA? le-3
GAMMA? le-4
TIME? O.OB
I017 read phase.ini
102: INITIAL_PROBS(
103:
104:
105:
106:
107:
108:
109:
110:
III:
1: ( 1.11438e-11, 1.13950e-11),
2: ( 9.99280e-01, 9.99280e-01),
3: ( O.O0000e+O0, 2.3S621e-06),
4: ( 7.17134e-04, 7.20490e-04),
5: ( O.O0000e+O0, 2.82024e-09),
6: ( 2.48355e-07, 2.51362e-07) o
7: ( O.O0000e+O0, 1.19806e-12),
8: ( 5.53210e-11, 5.65243e-11)
);
112? run
MODEL FILE = phase.ini SURE V7.2 12 Jan 90
TIME = 5.000e-02, GAMMA = 1.000e-04, LAMBDA = 1.000e-03,
09:36:57
DEATHSTATE LOWERBOUND UPPER.BOUND COMMENTS
I 3.29083e-II 3.54718e-11 <ExpMa_>
TOTAL 3.29083e-ll 3.54718e-ll <ExpMa_ - 14,14>
RUN #3
OPEK-STATE LOWERBOUND
.....................
2 9.99120e-01
3 O.O0000e+O0
4 8.72933e-04
5 O.O0000e+O0
6 3.68000e-07
7 O.O0000e+O0
8 9.99350e-ll
UPPERBOUND
9 99120e-01
6 30518e-06
8 82595e-04
7 50836e-09
3 78S61e-07
3 72751e-12
I 04866e- 10
<ExpMa_>
<ExpMat>
<ExpMa_>
<ExpMa_>
<ExpMa_>
<ExpMat>
<gxpMat>
33 PATH(S) PRUNED AT LEVEL 8.23385e-18
SUM OF PRUNED STATES PROBABILITY < 3.35190e-17
Q(T) ACCURACY >= 14 DIGITS
122
time(t)
Figure 38: Decreasing Failure Rate Function
13 PATH(S) PROCESSED
3.350 SECS. CPU TIME UTILIZED
I13? exi_
As in the previous section, the results of each previous phase are loaded by reading the
".ini" file created by the previous run. The <ExpMat> output in the COMMENTSfield indicates
that the more accurate QTCALC=I numerical routines were utilized.
14.3 Continuously Varying Failure Rates
Suppose that the failure rates change continuously in time as shown in figure 38. This type
of failure rate is called a "decreasing failure rate". The SURE program cannot handle this
type of failure rate directly since it leads to "non-homogeneous" or "non-stationary" Markov
models. However, good results can be obtained by using the phased-mission approach on a
"linearized" upper bound shown in figure 39.
This problem requires nine steps, but is quite easy with the use of the ".irfi" files. Because
an upper bound is used for the failure rate, the result will be conservative. The problem can
then be solved again using a consistently lower bound for the failure rate function to obtain
a lower bound on the system failure probability.
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time(t)
Figure 39: Upper bound On Failure-Rate Function
15 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have presented a number of techniques for developing reliability models of
fault-tolerant systems. We have tried to present various modeling techniques in a systematic
way, building from simple systems to more complicated ones, and introducing techniques for
modeling specific aspects, such as single-point failures, near-coincident failures, transient-
fault recoveries, cold spares, etc. However, it must be recognized that there is no "right"
way to model a system--there are many valid ways to model a given system, and choosing
which method will result in an efficient, informative model is more of an art than a science.
It is impossible to include every minute detail in a reliability model of a complex system,
because such a model would be exhorbitantly large. It is not even possible to completely
understand and measure the reliability behavior of a system in minute detail. Therefore, the
reliability engineer must make certain assumptions about the behavior of a system. Some of
these assumptions are immediately obvious; while others must be demonstrated or proven
correct. In reality, if two reliability engineers were modelling the same system independently,
they would undoubtedly produce two different models because they would make different
assumptions about the system.
Markov modeling can be a very powerful reliability analysis tool for three reasons. First,
Markov models provide the reliability engineer the flexibility to include whatever assumptions
or behaviors he wishes. Second, the reliability engineer is fully aware of the assumptions he
is making because he must make them explicitly. And third, he can estimate the effects of
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thoseassumptionson the systemfailure probability calculations.
However,reliability analysis requiresa certain level of expertisethat cannot be easily
automated. The useof an automatedtool that makesimplicit assumptionscanbedangerous.
Even if the engineercompletelyunderstandswhat implicit assumptionsa tool can make,he
is likely to forget them if they are not made visible to him. For this reason,the ASSIST
program is designedto generateexactly the model describedin the input languageand to
not makeany implicit assumptions.Thus, ASSISTincludes all of the flexibility of Markov
models. It alsorequiresthe samelevelof modelingexpertise.
Wehopethis papercanserveasatutorial for reliability engineerslearninghow to develop
Markov modelsof fault-tolerant systems.
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